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THE DATA OF ETHICS 



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The Data of Ethics 

BY 

HERBERT SPENCER. 



CHAPTER I. 

CONDUCT IN GENERAL. 

§ 1. The doctrine that correlatives imply 
one another — that a father cannot be thought 
of without thinking of a child, and that there 
can be no onusciousuess of superior without 
a consciousness of inferior — has for one of its 
common examples the necessary connection 
between the conceptions of whole and part. 
Beyond the primary truth that no idea of a 
whole can be framed without a nascent idea 
of parts constituting it, and that no idea of a 
part can be framed without, a nascent idea of 
some whole to which it belongs, there is the 
secondary truth that there can he no correct 
idea of a part without a conect idea of the 
correlative whole. There are several ways 
in which inadequate knowledge cf the one 
involves inadequate knowledge of the other. 

If the part is conceived without any refer- 
ence to the whole, it becomes itself a whole — 
un independent entity ; and its relations to 
existence in general are misapprehended. 
Further, the size of the part as compared 
With the size of the whole must be misap- 
prehended unless the whole is not only recog- 
nized as including it, but is figured in its to- 
tal extent. And again, Ihe position which 
the part occupies in relation to other parts 
cannot be rightly conceived unless there is 



some conception of the whole in its distribu* 
tion as well as in its amount. 

Still more when part and whole, instead of 
being statically related only, are dynamically 
related, must there be a general understand- 
ing of the whole before the part can be un- 
derstood. By a savage who has never seen tv 
vehicle, no idea can be formed of the use and' 
action of a wheel. To the unsymmetrically- 
pierced disk of an eccentric, no place or pur- 
pose can be ascribed by a rustic unac- 
quainted with machinery. Even a mechani- 
cian, if he has never looked into a piano,, 
will, if shown a damper, be unable to con- 
ceive its function or relative value. 

Most of all, however, where the whole is 
organic, does complete comprehension of a 
part imply extensive comprehension of tha 
whole. Suppose a beinc; itrnorant of the hu- 
man body to find a detar hed arm. If not mis- 
conceived by him as a supposed whole.lnstead 
of being conceived as a part, still its relations 
to other parts, and its structure, would bes 
wholly inexplicable. Admitting that the co- 
operation of its bones and muscles might be 
divined, yet no thought could be framed of 
the share taken by the arm in the actions of 
the unknown whole it belonged to ; nor could 
any interpretation be put upon the nerves 
and vessels ramifying through it, which sev- 
eially refer to certain central organs. A thw 



476 



TIIE DATA OF ETHICS. 



ory of the structure of the arm implies a 
theory of the structure of the body at large. 

And this truth holds not of material aggre- 
gates only, but of immaterial aggregates — 
aggregated motions, deeds, thoughts,, words. 
The moon's movements cannot be fully in- 
terpreted without taking into account the 
movements of the So'ar System at large. 
The process of loading a gun is meaningless 
until the subsequent actions performed with 
the gun are known. A fragment of a sen- 
tence, if not unintelligible, is wrongly inter- 
preted in the absence of the remainder. Cut 
•off its beginning and end, and the rest of a 
demonstration proves nothing. Evidence 
given by a plaintiff often misleads until ihe 
•evidence which the defendant produces is 
joined with it. 

§ 2. Conduct is a whole ; and, in a sense, 
it is an organic whole — an aggregate of inter- 
dependent actions performed by an organism. 
That division or aspect of conduct 'with which 
ethics deals is a part of this organic whole 
- — a part having its components inextricably 
bound up with the rest. As currently con- 
ceived, stirring the fire, or reading a news- 
paper, or eating a meal, are acts with which 
morality has no concern. Opening the win- 
dow to air the room, putting on an overcoat 
when the weather is cold, are thought of as 
having no ethical significance. These, how- 
ever, are all portions of conduct. The be- 
havior we call good and the behavior we cull 
bad are included, along with the behavior 
we call indifferent, under the conception of 
behavior at large. The whole of which eth- 
ics forms a part is the whole constituted by 
the. theory of conduct in general ; and this 
whoie must be understood before the part 
-can be understood. Let us consider this prop- 
-osition more closely. 

And first, how shall we define conduct? 
It is not co-extensive with the aggregate of 
actions, though it is nearly so. Such actions 
•as those of an epileptic in a fit are not in- 
cluded in our conception of conduct : the 
conception excludes purposeless actions. 
And in recognizing this exclusion, we simul- 
taneously recognize all that is included. 
Tiie definition of conduct which emerges is 
cither acts adjusted to ends or else the 
adjustment of acts to ends, according as we 
■contemplate the formed body of acts or 
thin'i of Ihe form alone. And conduct in its 
full acceptation must be taken as compre- 
hending all adjustments of acts to ends, 
from the simplest to the most complex, what- 
ever their special natures and whether consid- 
ered separately or in their totality. 

Conduct in general being thus distinguish- 
ed from the somewhat larger whole consti- 
tuted by actions in general, let us next ask 
>vhat distinction is habitually made between 
the conduct on which ethical judgments are 
passed and the remainder of conduct. As 
already said, a large part of ordinary con- 
duct is indifferent. Shall I walk to the 
Waterfall to-day? or shall I ramble along 
ihe seashore? Here the ends are ethi- 
cally indifferent If I go to the water- 



Fall, shall I go over the moor or take 
the path through the wood? Here the 
means are ethically indifferent. And from 
hour to hour most of the things we do are 
not to be judged as eithergood or bad iu tc- 
upect of either ends or means. No less clear 
Is it that the transition from indifferent acta 
to acts which a e good or bad is gradual. If 
a friend who is with me ha» explored the sea- 
shore, but has not seen the waterfall, the 
ehoice of one or other end is no longer ethi- 
cally indifferent. And if, the waterfall being 
fixed on as our goal, the way over the moor 
is too long for his strength, while the shorter 
way through the wood is not, the choice of 
means is no longer ethically indifferent. 
Again, if a probable result of making the one 
excursion rather than the other is that I 
shall not be back in time to keep an appoint- 
ment, or if taking the longer route entails 
this risk while taking the shorter does not, 
the decision in favor of one or other end or 
nieans acquires in another way an ethical 
character ; and if the appointment is one of 
some importance, or one of great importance, 
or one of lifc-aud-death importance, to self 
or others, the ethical character becomes pro- 
nounced. These instances will sufficiently 
suggest the truth that conduct with which 
morality is not concerned passes into con- 
duct which is moral or immoral by small 
degrees and countless Ways. 

But the conduct that has to bo conceived 
scientifically before we can scientifically con- 
ceive those modes of conduct which are the 
objects of ethical judgments, is a conduct 
immensely wider in range than that just indi- 
, cated. Complete comp^ dimension of conduct is 
sot to be obtained by ceralemplating the con- 
duct of human beings only : we have to regard 
this as a part of universal conduct — conduct 
as exhibited by all living creatures. _ For 
evidently this comes within our definition — 
acts adjusted to ends. The conduct of the 
higher animals as compared with that of 
man, and the conduct of the lower animal* 
as compared with that of the higher, mainly 
differ in this, that the adjustments of acts fo 
ends are relatively simple and relatively in- 
complete. And as iu other cases, so in this 
case, we must interpret the more develop**! 
by the less developed. Just as, fully to un- 
derstand the part of conduct which ethics 
deals with, we must study human conduct as 
a whole ; so, fully to understand human con- 
duct as a whole, we must study it as a part 
of that larger whole constituted by the cou- 
duct of animate beings in general. 

Nor is even this whole conceived with the 
needful fulness, so long as we think only of 
the conduct at present displayed around u a . 
We have to include in our conception the 
less-developed conduct out of which this ha* 
arisen in course of time. "We have to regard 
the conduct now shown us by creatures of all 
orders as an outcome of the conduct which 
has brought life of every kind to its present 
height. And this is tantamount to saying 
that our preparatory step must be to study 
the evolutiou of conduct. 



) 



1 1 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



477 



CHAPTER II. 

THE EVOLUTION OF CONDUCT. 

§ 8. We have become quite familiar with 
the ider* of an evolution of structures 
throughout the ascending types of animals. 
To a considerable degree we have become 
familiar with the thought that an evolution 
of functions has gone on pari passu with the 
evolution of structures. Now advancing a 
step, we have to frame a conception of the 
evolution of conduct as correlated with this 
evolution of structures and functions. 

These three subjects are 1o be definitely 
distinguished. Obviously the facts com- 
parative morphology sets forth form a whole 
which, though it cannot be treated in general 
or in detail without taking into account facts 
belonging to comparative physiolog}', in 
essentially independent. No less clear is is 
that we may devote our attention exclu- 
sively to that progressive differentiation of 
functions and combination of functions 
which accompanies the development of struc- 
tures — may say no more about the characters 
"id connections or organs than is implied in 
scribing their separate and joint actions, 
nd the subject of conduct lies outside the 
ibject of fuaclions, if not as far as this lies 
itside the subject of structures, still far 
rough to make it substantially separate. 
•>r those functions which are already vari- 
ously compounded to achieve what we re- 
gard as single bodily acts are endlessly re- 
compounded tc achieve that co-ordination of 
bodily acts which is known as conduct. 

We are concerned with functions in the 
true sense, while we think of them as pro- 
cesses carried on within the body ; and, 
with-it exceeding the limits of physiology, 
we may treat of their adjusted combinations, 
so long as these are regarded as parts of the 
vital consensu*. If we observe how the 
lungs aerate the blood which the heart sends 
to them ; how heart and lungs together 
supply aerated blood to the stomach, and so 
enable it to do its work ; how these co-oper- 
ate with sundry secreting and excreting 
glands to further digestion and to remove 
waste matter; and how all of them join to 
keep the brain in a fit condition for carrying 
on iliose actions which irrd ; rectly conduce to 
maintenance of the life at large, we are deal- 
ing with functions. Even when considering 
how parts that act directly ou the environ- 
ment — legs, arms, wings— perform their 
duties, *.ve are still concerned with functions 
in that aspect of them constituting physiol- 
ogy, go long as we restrict our attention to 
internal processes and to internal combina- 
tions of them. But we enter on the subject 
of conduct when we begin to study such 
combinations among the actions of sensory 
and motor organs as are externally manifest- 
ed. Suppose that instead of observing those 
contractions of muscles by which the optic 
axes are converged and the foci of the eyes ad- 
justed (which is a portion of physiology), 
and that instead of observing the co-opera 
tion of other nerves, muscles, and bones, by 



which a hand is moved to a particular place 
and the ringers closed (which is also a por- 
tion of physiology), we observe a weapon be- 
ing seized by a hand under guidance of the 
eye. We now pass from the thought of 
combined internal functions to the thought 
of combined external motions. Doubtless if 
we could trace the cerebral processes which 
accompany these, we should find an inner 
physiological co-ordination corresponding 
with the outer co-ordination cf actions. Bui 
this admission is consistent with the asser- 
tion, that when we ignore the internal com- 
bination and attend only to the external com- 
bination, we pass from a portion of pbysioj- 
ogy to a portion of conduct. For though it 
may be objected that the external combina- 
tion instanced is too simple to Ire rightly in- 
cluded under the name conduct, yet a mo- 
ment's thought shows that it is joined with 
w-hat we call conduct by insensible grada- 
tions. Suppose the weapon seized is used 
to ward off a blow. Suppose a counter- 
blow is given. Suppose the aggressor runs 
and is chased. Suppose there comes a strug- 
gle and a handing him over to the police. 
Suppose there follow the many and varied 
acts constituting a prosecution. Obviously 
the initial adjustment of an act to an end, in- 
separable from the lest, must be included' 
with them under the same general head ; and 
obviousl}' from this initial timple adjustment, 
having intrinsically no moral character, we 
pass by degrees to the most complex adjust- 
ments and to those on which moral judg- 
ments are passed. 

Hence, excluding all internal co-ordina- 
tions, our subject here is the aggregate of all 
external co-ordinations ; and this aggregate 
includes not only the simple st as well as the 
most complex performed by human beings, 
but also those performed by all inferior 
beings considered as less or more evolved. 

§ 4. Already the question, What consti- 
tutes advance in the evolution of conduct, as 
we trace it up from the lowest types of living 
creatures to the highest ? has been answered 
by implication. A few examples will now 
bring the answer into conspicuous relief. 

We raw that conduct is distinguished frcm 
the totality «f actions by excluding purpose- 
less actions; but during evolution t his distinc- 
tion arises by degrees. In the very lowest 
creatures most of the movements fiommo-: 
me-nt to moment made have not more recog- 
nizable aims than have the struggles of an 
epileptic. An infusorium swims randomly 
about, determined in its course not by a per- • 
ceived object to be pursued or escaped, but 
apparently by varying stimuli in its me- 
dium ; and its acts, unadjusted in any appre 
ciable way to ends, lead it now into contact 
wilh some nutritive substance which it ab- 
soi bs, and now into the neighborhood of 
some creature by which it is swallowed and 
digested. Lacking those developed sentes 
and motor powers which higher animals pos- 
sess, ninety-nine in the hundred of these mi- 
nute animals, severally living for but a few , 
hours, disappear either by innutrition or tar.j 



478 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



destruction. The conduct is constituted of 
actions so little adjusted to ends that life 
continues only as long as the accidents of the 
euvironmeut are favorable. < .But when, 
among aquatic creatures, we observe one 
which, though still low in type, is much 
higher than the infusorium — say a rotifer — 
we see how, along with larger size, more de- 
veloped structures, aud greater power of 
combining functions, there goes an advance 
in conduct. We see how by its whirling 
cilia it sucks in as food these small auirnals 
moving around ; how by its prehensile tail it 
fixes itself to some fit object ; how by with- 
drawing its outer organs and contracting its 
body, it preserves itself from this or that in- 
jury from time to time threatened ; and how 
thus, by better adjusting its own actions, it 
becomes less dependent on the actions going 
on around, and so preserves itself for a long- 
er period. . 

A superior sub kingdom, as the Mollusca, 
still better exemplifies this contrast. When 
we compare alow mollusk, such as a floating 
iseidian, with a high mollusk, such as a ce- 
phalopod, we are again shown that greater or- 
ganic evolution is accompanied by more 
evolved conduct. At the mercy of every 
marine creature large enough to swallow it, 
^nd drifted about by currents which may 
fhance to keep it at sea or may chance to 
leave it fatally stranded, the ascidian dis- 
plays but little adjustment of acts to ends in 
comparison with the cephalopod, which, 
now crawling over the beach, now exploring 
the rocky crevices, now swimming through 
the open water, now darting after a fish, now 
hiding itself from some larger animal in a 
cloud of ink, and using its suckered arms at 
one time for anchoring itself and at another 
for holding fast its prey, selects, and com- 
bines, and proportions its movements from 
minute to minute, so as to evade dangers 
which threaten, while utilizing chances of 
food which offer ; so showing us varied ac- 
tivities which, in achieving special ends, 
achieve Ihe general eud of securing continu 
ance of the activities. 

Among vertebrate animals we similarly 
trace up, along with advance in structures 
and functions, this advance iu conduct. A 
fish roaming about at hazard in search of 
something to eat, able to detect it by smell 
or sight only within short distances, and now 
and again rushing away iu alarm on the ap- 
proach of a bigger fish, makes adjustments 
of acts to ends that are relatively few and 
simple in their kinds, aud shows us, as a 
consequence, how small is the average dura- 
tion of life. So few survive to maturity 
that, to make up for destruction of unhatched 
young aud small fry and half-grown individ- 
uals, a million ova have to be spawned by a 
codfish that two may reach the spawning 
age. Conversely, by a highly evolved mam- 
mal, such as au elephant, those general ac- 
tions performed in common with the fish are 
t&r better adjusted to their ends. By sight 
as well, probably, as by odor, it detects food 
at relatively great distances ; and when, at - 



intervals, there aiises a need for escape, rel- 
atively great speed is attained. But the chief 
difference arises from the addition of new 
sets of adjustments. We have combined 
actions which facilitate nutrition — the bieak- 
iug off of succulent and fruit-bearing 
branches, the selecting of edibla growth: 
throughout a comparatively wide reach ; and 
in case of danger, safely can be achieved 
not by flight only, but if necessary by de- 
fence or attack ; bringing into combined use 
tusks, trunks, and ponderous feet. Further, 
we see various subsidiary acts adjusted tc 
subsidiary ends — now the going into a rivei 
for coolness, and using the trunk as a means 
of projecting water over the body ; now the 
employment of a bough for sweeping away 
flies from the back ; now the making of sig- 
nal sounds to alarm the herd, and adapting 
the actions to such sounds when made by 
others. Evidently the effect of this more 
highly evolved conduct is to secure the bal- 
ance of the organic actions throughout far 
longer periods. 

Aud now, on studying the doings of tho 
highest of mammals, mankind, we not only 
find that the adjustments of acts to ends are 
both more numerous and better than among 
lower mammals, but we find the same thing 
on comparing the doings of higher races of 
men with those of lower races. If we tako 
any one of the major ends achieved, we see 
greater completeness of achievement by civ- 
ilized than by savage ; and we also see an 
achievement of relatively numerous minor 
ends subserving major ends. Is it in nutri- 
tion ? The food is obtained more regularly 
in response to appetite ; it is far higher in 
quality ; it is free from dirt ; it is greater iu 
variety ; it is better prepared. Is it in 
warmth ? The characters of the fabrics and 
forms of the articles used for clothing, and 
the adaptations of them to requirements from 
day to day aud hour to hour, are much supe- 
rior. Is it in dwellings V Between the shel- 
ter of boughs aud grass which the lowest 
savage builds and the mansion of the civil- 
ized man, the contrast in aspect is not more 
extreme than is the contrast in number and 
efficiency of the adjustments of acts to ends 
betrayed iu their respective constructions. 
And when with the ordinary activities of the 
savage we compare the ordinary civilized ac- 
tivities — as Ihe business of the trader, which 
involves multiplied and complex transactions 
extending over long periods, or as profes- 
sional avocations, prepared for by elaborata 
studies and daily carried on in eudlessly va- 
ried forms, or as political discussions and 
agitations, directed now to the carrying of 
this measure and now to the defeating of 
that — we see sets of adjustments of acts to 
ends, not only immensely exceeding those 
seen among lower races of men in variety 
and intricacy, but sets to which lower races 
of men present nothing analogous. And 
along with this greater elaboration of lifo' 
produced by the pursuit of more numerous 
ends, there goes that increased duration ot 
life which constitutes the supreme end. 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



479 



And here is suggested the need for supple- 
menting this conception of evolving conduct. 
For besides being nn improving adjustment 
of ucts to ends, such as furthers prolongation 
of life, it is such as furthers increased amount 
of life. Reconsideration of the examples 
above given will show that length of life is 
not by itself a measure of evolution of con- 
duct, but that quantity of life must be taken 
into account. An oyster, adapted by its struc- 
ture to the diffused food contained in the 
water it draws in, and shielded by its shell 
from nearly all dangers, may live longer than 
a cuttlefish, which has such superior powers 
ef dealing with numerous contingencies ; but 
then the sum of vital activities during any 
given interval is far less in the oyster than in 
the cuttlefish. So a worm, ordinarily shel- 
tered from most enemies by the earth it bur- 
rows through, which also supplies a suffi- 
ciency of its poor food, may have greater 
longevity than many of ils annulose rela- 
tives, the insects ; but one of these, during its 
existence as larva and imago, may experi- 
ence a greater quantity of Ihe changes 
which constitute life. Nor is it otherwise 
when we compare the more evolved with 
their less evolved among mankind. The 
difference between the average lengths of the 
lives of savage and civilized is no true meas- 
ure of the difference between the totalities 
of their two lives, considered as aggregates 
of thought, feeling, and action. Hence, 
estimating life by multiplying ils length into 
jls breadth, we must say that the augmenta- 
tion of it which accompanies evolution of 
conduct results from increase of both fac- 
tors. The more multiplied and varied ad- 
justments of acts to ends, by which the more 
developed creature from hour to hour fulfils 
more numerous requirements, severally add 
to the activities that are Ci.-.ried on abreast, 
and severally help to make greater the period 
through which such simultaneous activities 
endure. Each further evolution of conduct 
widens the aggregate of actions while con- 
ducing to elongation of it. 

§ 5. Turn we now to a further aspect of 
the phenomena separate from, but necessa- 
rily associated with, the last. Thus far we 
have considered only those adjustments of 
acts to ends which have for their final pur- 
pose complete individual life. Now we have 
to consider those adjustments which have fur 
their final purpose the li*c of the species. 

Self-preservation in each generation has all 
aloutr depended on the preservation of off- 
spring by preceding geueratious. And in 
proportion as evolution of the conduct sub- 
serving individual life is high, implying high 
organization, there must previously have been 
a highly evolved conduct subserving nurture 
of the young. Throughout the ascending 
grades of the animal kingdom, this second 
kind of conduct presents stages of advance 
like those which we have observed in the 
first. Low down, where structures and func- 
tions are little developed, and the power of 
adjusting acts to ends but slight, there is no 
tonduct, properly so named, furthering sal- 



vation of the species. Race-maintaining 
conduct, like self-maintaining conduct, arises 
gradually out of that which cannot be called 
conduct : adjusted actions are preceded by 
unadjusted ones. Protozoa spontaneously 
divide and subdivide, in consequence of 
physical changes over which they have no 
control, or, at other times, after a period of 
quiescence, break up into minute portions 
which severally grow in new individuals. In 
neither case can conduct be alleged. Higher 
up, the process is that of ripening, at inter- 
vals, germ-cells and sperm-cells, which, on 
occasion, are sent forth into the surrounding 
water and left to their fate, perhaps one in 
ten thousand surviving to maturity. Here, 
again, we see only development and disper- 
sion going on apart from parental care. 
Types above these, as fish which choose fit 
places in which to deposit their ova, or as the 
higher crustaceans which carry masses of 
ova about until they are hatched, exhibit 
adjustments of acts to ends which we may 
properly call conduct, though it is of the 
simplest kind. Where, as among certain 
fish, the male keeps guard over the eggs, 
driving away intruders, there is/in additional 
adjustment of acts to ends, and the applica- 
bility of the name conduct is more decided. 
Passing at once to creatures far superior, 
such as birds, which, building nests and sit- 
ting on their eggs, feed their broods for con- 
siderable periods, and give them aid after they 
can fly, or such as mammals, which, suck- 
ling their j r oung for a time, continue after- 
ward to bring them food or protect them 
while they feed, until they reach ages at 
which they can proride for themselves, we 
are shown how this conduct which furthers 
race-maintenance evolves hand-iu-hand with 
the conduct which furthers self-maintenance. 
That better organization which makes pos- 
sible the last makes possible the first also. 
Mankind exhibit a great progress of like na- 
ture. Compared with brutes, the savage, 
higher in his self -maintaining conduct, is 
higher too in his race-maintaining conduct. 
A larger number of the wants of offspring are 
provided for ; and parental care, enduring 
longer, extends to Ihe disciplining of off- 
spring in arts and habits which fit them for 
their conditions of existence. Conduct of 
this order, equally with conduct of the first 
order, we see becoming evolved in a still 
greater degree as we ascend from savage to 
civilized. The adjustments of acts to ends 
in the rearing of children become far more 
elaborate, alike in number of ends met, vari- 
ety of means used, and efficiency of their 
adaptations ; and the aid and oversight arc 
continued throughout a much greater part 
of early life. 

In tracing up the evolution of conduct, so 
that we may frame a true conception of con- 
duct in general, we have thus to recognize 
these two kinds as mutually dependent. 
Speaking generally, neither can evolve with- 
out evolution of the other ; and the highest 
evolutions of the two must be reached sirnui 
taneously. 



480 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



§ C. To conclude, however, that on reach- 
ing a perfect adjustment cf acts to ends sub- 
serving individual life and the rearing of off- 
spring, the evolution of conduct becomes 
complete, is to conclude erroneously. Or 
rather, I should say, it is an error to sup- 
pose that either of these kinds of conduct can 
assume its highest form without its highest 
form being assumed by a third kind of .con- 
duct yet to be named. 

The multitudinous creatures of all kinds 
•which fill the earth cannot live wholly apart 
from one another, but are more or less in 
presence of one another — are interfered with 
by one another. In large measure the ad- 
justments of acts to ends which we have been 
considering are components of that " strug- 
gle for existence" carried on both between 
members of the same species and between 
members of different species ; ami, very gen- 
erally, a successful adjustment made by one 
creature involves au unsuccessful adjustment 
made by another creature, either of the same 
kind or of a different kind. That the carni- 
vore may live herbivores must die ; and that 
its young may be reared the young of weaker 
creatures must be orphaned. Maintenance 
rtf the hawk and its brood involves the deaths 
of many small birds ; and that small birds 
may multiply, their progeny must be fed with 
innumerable sacrificed worms and larvae. 
Competition among members cf the same 
species has allied, though less conspicuous, 
results. The stronger often carries off by 
force the prey which the weaker has caught. 
Monopolizing certain hunting grounds, the 
more ferociousdrive others of their kind into 
less favorable places. With plant-eating an- 
imals, too, the like holds : the better food is 
secured by the more vigorous individuals, 
while the less vigorous and worse fed suc- 
cumb either directly from innutrition or in- 
directly from resulting inability to escape en- 
emies. That is to say, among creatines 
whose lives are carried on antagonistically, 
each of the two kinds of conduct delineated 
above must remain imperfectly evolved. 
Even in such few kinds of them as have lit- 
tle to fear from enemies or competitors, as 
lions or tigers, there is still inevitable failure 
in the adjustments of acts to ends toward 
the close of life. Death by starvation from 
inability to catch prey shows a falling short 
of conduct from its ideal. 

This imperfectly evolved conduct intro- 
duces us by antithesis to conduct that is per- 
fectly evolved. Contemplating these adjust- 
ments of acts to ends which miss complete- 
ness because they cannot be made by one 
creature without other creatures being pre- 
vented from making them, raises the thought 
of adjustments such that each creature may 
make them without preventing them frorq 
being made by other creatures. That the 
highest form of conduct must be so distin- 
guished is an inevitable implication ; for 
while the form of conduct is such that ad- 
justments of acts to ends by some necessitate 
trm-adjustments by otheis, there remains 
room for modifications which bring conduct 



into a form avoiding this, and so making the 
totality of life greater. 

Prom the abstract let us pass to the con- 
crete. Recognizing men as the beings whose 
conduct is most evolved, let us ask uuder 
what conditions their conduct, in all three as- 
pects of its evolution, reaches its limit. 
Clearly while the lives led are entirely pred- 
atory, as those of savages, the adjustments of 
acts to ends fall short of this highest form of 
conduct in every way. Individual life, ill 
carried on from hour to hour, is prematurely 
cut short ; the fostering of offspring often 
fails, and is incomplete when it does not fail ; 
and in so far as the ends of self -maintenance 
and race-maintenance are met, they are met 
by destruction of other beings, of different 
kind or of like kind. In social groups form- 
ed by compounding and recom pounding 
primitive hordes, conduct remains imper- 
fectly evolved in proportion as there con- 
tinue antagonisms between the groups and 
antagonisms between members of the same 
group— two traits necessarily associated, 
since the nature which prompts international 
aggression prompts aggression of individuals 
on one another. Hence the limit of evolu- 
tion can be reached by conduct only in per- 
manently peaceful societies. That perfect 
adjustment of acts to ends, in maintaining in- 
dividual life and rearing new individuals, 
which is effected by each without hindering 
others from effecting like perfect adjust- 
ments, is, in its very definition, shown to 
constitute a kind of conduct that can be ap- 
proached only as war decreases and dies out. 

A gap in this outline must now be filled 
Hp. There remains a further advance not yet 
even hinted. For beyond so behaving that 
each achieves his ends witkout preventing 
others from achieving their ends, the mem- 
bers of a society may give mutual help in the 
achievement of ends And if, either indi- 
rectly by industrial co-operation, or directly 
by volunteered aid, fellow-citizens can make 
easier for one another the adjustments of acts 
to ends, then their conduct assumes a still 
higher phase of evolution, since whatever 
facilitates the making of adjustments by 
each increases the totality of the adjust- 
ments made, and serves to render the lives of 
all more complete. 

§ 7. The reader who recalls certain pas- 
sages in First Principles, in the Principles of 
Biology, and in the Principles of Psychology, 
will perceive above a restatement, in an- 
other form, of generalizations set forth in 
those works. Especially will he be remind- 
ed of the proposition that life is " the defi- 
nite combination of heterogeneous changes, 
both simultaneous and successive, in corre- 
spondence with external coexistences and 
sequences ;" and still more of that abridged 
and less specific formula in which life is 
said 1o be "the continuous adjustment of 
internal relations to external relations." 

The presentation of the facts here made 
differs from the presentations before made,, 
mainly by ignoring the inner part of the cor- 
respondence and attending exclusively to: 



THE DATA, OF ETHICS. 



481 



that outer part constituted of visible actions. 
But the two are in harmony ; and the reader 
who wishes further to prepare himself for 
dealing with our present topic from the evo- 
lution point of view, may advantageously 
join to the foregoing more special aspect of 
the phenomena the more general aspects he- 
fore delineated. 

After this passing remark, I recur to the 
main proposition set forth in these two chap- 
leis, which has, I think, been fully justified. 
Guided by the truth that as the conduct with 
which ethics deals is part of conduct at large, 
conduct at largo must be generally under- 
stood before this part can be specially un- 
derstood ; and guided by the further truth 
that to understand conduct at large we must 
undersiaud the evolution of conduct, we 
have been led to see that ethics has for its 
subject-matter that form which universal 
conduct assumes during the last stages of its 
evolution. We have also concluded that 
these last staces in the evolution of conduct 
are those displayed by the highest type of 
being, when he is forced, by increase of num- 
bers, to live rnoie and more in presence of his 
fellows. And there has followed the corollary 
that conduct gains ethical sanction in pro- 
portion as the activities, becoming less and 
less militant and more and more industrial, 
are sttch as do not necessitate mutual injury 
or hiuderance, but consist with, and are fur- 
th'->ed by, co-optfralion and mutual aid. 

These implications of the evolution hy- 
pothesis we shall now. see harmonize with the 
leading moral ideas men have otherwise 
leached. 

CHAPTER III. 

GOOD AKD BAD CONDUCT. 

§ 8. By comparing its meanings in differ- 
ent connections and observing what they 
iiitve in common, we learn the essential mean- 
ing of a word ; and the essential meaning of 
a word that is variously applied may best 
bo learned by comparing with one another 
those applications of it which diverge most 
widely. Let us thus ascertain what good 
and bad mean. 

In which cases do we distinguish as good, 
m knife, a gun, a house? And what trait 
leads us to speak of a bad umbrella or a bad 
pair of boots? The characters here pred- 
icated by the words good and bad are not 
inlrinsic characters, for, apart from human 
wants, such things have neither merits nor 
deme rits. We call these articles good or bad 
according as they are well or ill adapted to 
achieve prescribed ends. The good knife is 
one which will cut ; the good gun is one 
which carries far and tiue ; the good boose 
is one which duly yields the shelter, com- 
fort,, and accommodation sought for. Con- 
versely, the badness alleged of the umbrella 
or the pair of, boots refers to their failures 
in fulfilling the ends of keeping off the rain 
and comfortably protecting the feet, with 
due regard to appearance s. So is it when 
we pass from inauimale objects to inanimate 



actions. We call a day bad in which storms 
prevent U3 from satisfying certain of our 
desires. A good season is the expression 
used when the weather has favored the pro- 
duction of valuable crops. If from lifeless 
things and actions Ave pass to living ones, we 
similarly find that these words in their cur- 
rent applications refer to efficient subser- 
vience. The goodness or badness of a pointer 
or a hunter, of a sheep or an ox, ignoring all 
other attributes of these creatures, lefer in 
the one case to the fitness of their actions for 
effecting the ends men use them for, and in 
the other case to the qualities of their flesh 
as adapting it to suppoit human life. And 
those doings of men which, morally consid- 
ered, are indifferent we class a3 good or 
bad according to their success or failure. A 
good jump is a jump which, remoter ends ig- 
nored, well achieves the immediate purpose 
of a jump ; and a stroke at billiards is called 
good when the movements are skilfully ad- 
justed to the requirements. Oppositely, the 
badness of a walk that is shuffling and an 
utterance that is indistinct is alleged be- 
cause of the relative non-adaptations of the 
acts to the ends. 

Thus recognizing the meanings of good 
and bad as otherwise used, we shall under- 
stand belter their meanings as used in char- 
acterizing conduct under its ethical aspects. 
Here, too, observation shows that we apply 
them according as the adjustments of acts to 
ends are or are not efficient. This truth is 
somewhat disguised. The entanglement of 
social relations is such that men's actions 
often simultaneously affect the welfares of 
self, of offspring, and of fellow-citizens.' 
Hence results confusion in judging of ac j 
tions as good or bad, since actions Well fitted 
to achieve ends of one older may pre- 
vent ends of the other orders from being 
achieved. Nevertheless, when we disentangle 
the three orders of ends, and consider each 
separately, it becomes clear that the conduct 
which achieves each kind of end is regarded 
as relatively good, and is regarded as rela- 
tively bad if it fails to achieve it. 

Take first the primary set of adjustments— ■ 
those subserving individual life. Apart 
from approval or disapproval of his ulterior 
aims, a man who fights is said to make a 
good defence if his defence is well adapted 
for self-preservation ; and, the judgments on 
other aspects of his conduct remaining the 
same, he brings down on himself an unfavor- 
able verdict, in so far as his immediate acts 
are concerned, if these are futile. The good- 
ness ascribed to a man of business, as such, 
is measured by the activity and ability with 
which lie buys and sells to advantage, and 
may coexist with a haul treatment of de- 
pendents "which is reprobated. Though in 
repeatedly lending mcney to a friend who 
sinks one loan nf ler another, a man is doing 
that which considered in itself is held piaise- 
worthy, yet if he does it to the extent of 
bringing on his owniuin he is held blame- 
worthy for a sclf-saciifice cairied too far. 
And thus is it with the opinions we express 



482 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



from hour to hour on those acts of people 
around which hear ou their health and per- 
sonal welfare. " You should not have done 
that" is the reproof given to one who 
crosses the street amid a dangerous rush of 
vehicles. " You ought to have changed 
your clothes" is said to another who has 
taken cold after getting wet. " You were 
right to tukc a receipt," " you were wrong 
to invest without advice," are common crit- 
icisms. All such approving and disapprov- 
ing utterances make the tacit assertion that, 
other things equal, conduct is right or wrong 
according as its special acts, well or ill 
adjusted to special ends, do or do not further 
the general end of self-preservation. 

These ethical judgments we pass on self- 
regarding acts are crdinarily little empha- 
sized ; partly because the promptings of the 
self-regarding desires, generally strong 
enough, do not need moral enforcement, and 
partly because the promptings of the oilier 
regarding desires, less strong and often over- 
ridden, do need moral enfoi cement. Hence 
results a contrast. On turning to that second 
class of adjustments of acts to ends which 
subserve the rearing of offspring, we no long, 
er find any obscurity in the application of 
the words good and bad to them, according 
as they are efficient or inefficient. The ex- 
pressions good nursing and bad uursiug, 
whether the}' refer to the supply of food, the 
quality and amount of clothing, or the due 
ministration to infantine wants from hour to 
hour, tacitly recognize as special ends which 
ought to he fulfilled the furthering of the 
vital functions, with a view to the general 
end of continued life and growth. A moth- 
er is called good who, ministering to all the 
physical needs of her children, also adjusts 
her behavior in ways conducive to their 
mental health ; and a bad father is one who 
either does not provide the necessaries of life 
for his family, or otherwise acts in a manner 
injurious to their bodies or minds. Similar- 
ly of the education given to them or pro- 
vided for them. Goodness or badness is 
affirmed of it (often with little consistency, 
however) according as its methods are so 
adapted to physical and psychical require- 
ments as to further the childien's lives for 
the time being, while preparing them for 
carrying on complete and prolonged adult 
;ifr. 

Most emphatic, however, are the applica- 
tions of the words good and bad to conduct 
throughout that third division of it compris- 
ing the deeds by which men affect one an- 
other. In maintaining their own lives and 
fostering their offspring, men's adjustments 
of acts to ends are so apt to hinder the kin- 
dred adjustments of other men that insistance 
on the needful limitations has to be peipet- 
ual ; and the mischiefs caused by men's in- 
terferences with one another's life-subserv- 
ing actions are so great that the interdicts 
have to be peremptory. Hence the fact that 
the words good and bad have come to be 
specially associated with acts which further 
'he complete living of others and acts which 



obstruct their complete living. Goodness, 
, standing by itself, suggests, above all other 
things, the conduct of one who aids the 
sick in rearquiiing normal vitality, assists 
the^ unfortunate to recover the means of 
maintaining themselves, defends those who 
are thieatened with harm in person, prop- 
erty, or reputation, and aids whatever prom- 
ises to improve the living of all his fel- 
lows. Contrariwise, badness brings to mind, 
as its leading correlative, the conduct of one 
who, in carrying on his own life, damages 
the lives of others by injuring their bodies, 
destroying their possessions, defrauding 
them, calumniating them. 

Always, then, acts are called good or bad 
according as they are well or ill adjusted to 
ends, and whatever inconsistency there is 
in our uses of the words, arises from incon- 
sistency of the ends. Here, however, the 
study of conduct in general, and of the evo- 
lution of conduct, have prepared us to har- 
monize these interpretations. The foregoing 
exposition shows that the conduct to which 
we apply the name good is the relatively 
more ev.,lved couduct, and that bad is the 
name we apply to conduct which is rela- 
tively less evolved. We saw that evolu- 
tion, tending ever toward self-preservation, 
reaches its limit, when individual life is the 
greatest, both.in length and breadth ; and 
dow we see that, leaving other ends aside, 
we regard as good the conduct furthering 
self-preservation, and as bad the conduct 
tending to self destruction. It was shown 
that along with increasing power of main- 
taining individual life, which evolution 
brings, there goes increasing power of per- 
petuating the species by fostering progeny, 
and that in this direction evolution reaches 
its limit when the needful number of younir, 
preserved to maturity, are then fit for a life 
that is complete in fulness and duration ; 
and here it turns out that parental conduct is 
called good or bad as it approaches or falls 
short of this ideal result. Lastly, we infer- 
red that establishment of an associated state 
both makes possible and requires a form of 
conduct such that life may be completed in 
each and in his offspring, not only without 
preventing completion of it in others, but 
with furtherance of it in others ; and we have 
found above that this is the form of conduct 
most emphatically termed good. Moreover, 
just as we there saw that evoiuiion becomes 
the highest possible when the conduct simul- 
taneously achieves the greatest totality of 
life in self, in offspring, and in fellow-men ; 
so here we see that the conduct called good 
rises to the conduct conceived as best when 
it fulfils all three classes of ends at the same 
time. , 

§ 9. Is there any postulate involved in 
these judgments on conduct ? Is there any 
assumption made in calling good the acts 
conducive to life, in self or others, and bad 
those which directly or indirectly tend tow- 
ard death, special or general? Yes ; an 
assumplion of extreme significance has been 
made — an assumption underlying all moral 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



483 



estimates. 

The question to be definitely raised and an. 
Bwered before entering on any ethical discus, 
sion, is the question of late much agitated : 
Is life worth living? Shall we take the pes- 
simist view ? or shall we take the optimist 
view ? or shall we, after weighing pessimis- 
tic and optimistic arguments, conclude that 
the balance is in favor of a qualified opti- 
mism ? 

On the answer to this question depends 
entirely every decision concerning the good- 
ness or badness of conduct. By those who 
think life is not a benefit but a misfortune, 
conduct which prolongs it is to be blamed 
rather than praised : the eudiug of an un- 
desirable existence being the thing to be 
wished, that which causes the ending of it 
must be applauded ; while actions furthering 
its continuance, either in self or others, 
must be reprobated. Those who, on the 
other baud, take an optimistic view, or who, 
if not pure optimists, yet hold that in life the 
good exceeds the evil, are committed to op- 
posite estimates, and must regard as con- 
duct to be approved that which fosters life in 
self and others, and as conduct to he disap- 
proved that which injures or endangers life 
in self or others. 

The ultimate question, therefore, is : Has 
evolution been a mistake, and especially 
thatevolution which improves the adjustment 
of acts to ends in ascending stages of organ- 
ization ? If it is held that there had better 
not have been any animate existence at all, 
and that the sooner it comes to an end the 
better, then one set of conclusions with re- 
spect to conduct emerges. If, contrariwise, 
it is held that there is a balance in favor of 
animate existence, and if, still further, it is 
held that in the future this balance may be 
increased, then the opposite set of conclu- 
sions emerges. Even should it be alleged 
that the worth of life is not to be judged by 
its intrinsic character, but rather by its 
extrinsic sequences— by certain results to be 
anticipated when life has passed — the ulti- 
mate issue reappears in a new shape. For 
though the accompanying creed may nega- 
tive a deliberate shortening of life that is 
miserable, it cannot justify a gratuitous 
lengthening of such life. Legislation con- 
ducive to increased longevity would, on the 
pessimistic view, remain blamable, while it 
would be praiseworthy on the optimistic 
view. 

But now have these irreconcilable c inions 
anything in common ? Men being divisible 
into two schools differing on this ultimate 
question, the inquiry arises : Is there any- 
thing which their radically opposed views 
alike take for granted ? In the optimistic 
proposition, tacitly made wheu using the 
words good and bad after the ordinary man- 
ner, and in the pessimistic proposition 
overtly made, which implies that the words 
good and bad should be used in the reverse 
senses, does examination disclose any joint 
proposition — any proposition which, con- 
ruined in both of them, may be held more 



certain than either — any universally asserted 
proposition ? 

§ 10. Yes, there is one postulate in which 
pessimists and optimists agree. Both their 
arguments assume it to be self-evident that 
life is good or bad according as it does or 
does not bring a surplus of agreeable feel- 
ing. The pessimist says he condemns life 
because it results in more pain than pleas- 
ure. The optimist defends life in the belief 
that it brings more pleasure than pain. Each 
makes the kind of senliency which accom- 
panies life the test. They agree that the 
justification for life as a stale of being turns 
on this issue — whether the average con- 
sciousness iises above indifference- point into 
pleasurable feeling or falls below it into 
painful feeling. The implication common to 
their antagonist views is, that conduct should 
conduce to preservation of the individual, of 
the family, and of the society, only suppos- 
ing that life brings more happiness than mis- 
ery. 

Changing the venue cannot alter the 
verdict. If either the pessimist, while say- 
ing that the pains of life predominate, or 
the optimist, while saying that the pleas- 
ures predominate, urges that the pains 
borne here are to be compensated by pleas- 
ures received hereafter, and that so life, 
whether or not justified in its immediate 
results, is justified in its ultimate lesults, 
the implication remains the same. The de- 
cision is still reached by balancing pleasures 
against paius. Animate existence would be 
judged by both a curse if to a suiplus of 
misery borne here were added a surplus of 
misery to be borne hereafter. And for either 
to regard animate existence as a blessing, if 
heredts pains were held to exceed its pleas- 
ures, he must hold that hereafter its pleas- 
ures will exceed its pains. Thus there is 
no escape from the admission that in calling 
good the conduct which subserves life, arid 
bad the conduct which hinders or destroys it, 
and in so implying that life is a blessing and 
not a curse, we are inevitably asserting that 
conduct is good or bad according as its total 
effects are pleasurable or painful. 

One theory only is imaginable, in pur- 
suance of which other interpretations of good 
and bad can be given. This theory is that 
men were created with the intention that 
they snould be sonrces of misery to them- 
selves, and that they are bound to continue 
living that their Creator may have the satisfac 
tion of contemplating their misery. Though 
this is not a theory avowedly entertained by 
many — though it is not formulated by any in 
this distinct way, yet not a few do accept it 
under a disguised form. Inferior creeds arc 
pervaded by the belief lhat the sight of 
suffering is pleasing to the gods. Derived 
from bloodthirsty ancestors, such gods are 
naturally conceived as gratified by the in- 
fliction of pain : when living they delighted 
in torturing other beings, and witnessing 
torture is supposed still to give them delight. 
The implied conceptions long survive. It 
needs but to name Indian fakirs who kan^ 



484 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



oil hooks, and Eastern dervishes who gasli 
themselves, to show that in societies consid- 
erably advanced are still to be found many 
who think that submission to anguish brings 
divine favor. And without enlarging on 
fasts and penances, it will be clear that there 
has existed, and still exists, among Christian 
peoples, the belief that the Deity whom Jeph- 
thah thought to propitiate by sacrificing his 
daughter may be propitiated by self-in- 
flicted pains. Further, the conception ac- 
companying this, that acts pleasing to self 
are offensive to God. has survived along 
with it, and still widely prevails ; if not in 
* formulated dogmas, yet in beliefs that are 
manifestly operative. 

Doubtless in modern days such beliefs 
have assumed qualified forms. The satisfac- 
tion which ferocious gods were supposed to 
feel in contemplating tortures has been in 
large measure transformed into the satisfac- 
tion felt by a deity in contemplating that 
self-infliction of pain which is held to fur- 
ther eventual happiness. But clearly those 
who entertain this modified view are ex- 
cluded from the class whose position we are 
here considering. Restricting ourselves to 
this class — supposing that from the savage 
who immolates victims to a caDnihal god 
there are descendants among the civilized 
who hold that mankind were made for 
suffering, and that it is their duty to con- 
tinue living in misery for the delight of their 
Maker, we can only recognize the fact that 
devil-worshippers are not yet extinct. 

Omitting people of this class, if there are 
any, as beyond or beneath argument, we find 
that all otheis avowedly or tacitly hold that 
the final justification for maintaining life 
can only be the reception from it of a sur- 
plus of pleasurable feeling over painful feel- 
ing, and that goodness or baduess can be 
ascribed to acts which subserve life or hin- 
der life only on this supposition. 

And here we are brought round to those 
primary meanings of the words good and 
bad which we passed over when consider- 
ing their secondary meanings. For on re- 
membering that we call good and bad the 
things which immediately produce agreeable 
and disagreeable sensations, and also the sen- 
sations themselves — a good wine, a good ap- 
petite, a bad smell, a bad headache — we see 
that, by referring directly to pleasures and 
pains, these meanings harmonize with those 
which indirectly refer to pleasures and pains. 
If we call good the enjoyable state itself, as 
a good laugh — if we call good the proximate 
cause of an enjoyable state, as good music — 
if we call good any agent which conduces 
immediately or remotely to an enjoyable 
state, as a good shop, a good teacher — if we 
call good, considered intrinsically, each act 
so adjusted to its end as to further self- 
preservation aud that surplus of enjoy- 
ment wdiich makes self-preservatiou de- 
sirable — if we call good every kind of 
conduct which aids the lives of others, 
and do this under the belief that life 
brings more happiness than misery, then it 



becomes undeniable that, taking into ac 
count immediate and remote effects on all 
persons, the good is universally the pleasura- 
ble. 

§ 11. Sundry influences — moral, theolog- 
ical, aud political — conspire to make people 
disguise from themselves this truth. As in 
narrower cases so in this widest case they 
become so preoccupied with the means by 
which an end is achieved as eventually to 
mistake it for the end. Just as money, 
which is a means of satisfying wants, comes 
to be regarded by a miser as the sole thing to 
be worked for, leaving the wants unsatisfied,, 
so the conduct men have found preferable 
because most conducive to happiness has 
come to be thought of as intrinsically prefer- 
able: not only to be made a proximate end 
(which it should be), but to be made aa ul- 
timate end, to the exclusion of the true 
ultimate end. And yet cross-examination 
quickly compels every one to confess the true 
ultimate end. Just as the miser, asked to 
justify himself, is obliged to allege the power 
of money to purchase desirable things as bis 
reason for prizing it, so the moralist who 
thinks this conduct intrinsically g*od and 
that intrinsically bad, if pushed home, has no 
choice but to fall back on their pleasure- 
giving and pain-giving effects. To prove 
this it needs but to observe how impossible ' 
it would be to think of them as we do if 
their effects were reversed. 

Suppose that gashes and bruises caused 
agreeable sensations, and brought in their 
train increased power of doing work and re- 
ceiving enjoyment ; should we regard as- 
sault in the same manner as at present ? Or 
suppose that self-mutilation, say by cutting 
off a hand, was both intrinsically pleasant 
and furthered performance of the processes 
by which personal welfare and the welfare 
of dependents is achieved ; should we hold, 
as now, that deliberate injury to one's own 
body is to be reprobated? Or, again, sup- 
pose that picking a man's pocket excited 
in him joyful emotions by brightening his 
prospects ; would theft be counted among 
crimes, as in existing law-books and moral 
codes? In these extreme cases, no one can 
deny that what we call the badness of ac- 
tions is ascribed to them solely for the reason 
that they entail pain, immediate or remote, 
and would not be so ascribed did they entail 
pleasure. 

If we examine our conceptions on their ob- 
verse side, this general fact forces itself ou 
our attention with equal distinctness. Imag-' 
ine that ministering to a sick person always 
increased the pains of illness. Imagine that 
an orphan's relatives who took charge of it 
thereby necessarily brought miseries upon it.' 
Imagine that liquidating another man's, 
pecuniary claims on you redounded to his 
disadvantage. Imagine that crediting a man 
with noble behavior hindered his social wel- 
fare and consequent gratification. What 
should we say to these acts which now fall 
into the class we call praiseworthy? Should, 
we not contrariwise class them as blame- 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



485 



■worthy ? 

Using, then, as our tests these most pro- 
nounced forms of good and bad conduct, we 
find it unquestionable that our ideas of their 
goodness and badness really originate from 
our consciousness of the certainly or proba- 
bility that they will produce pleasures or 
pains somewhere. And this truth is brought 
out with equal clearness by examining the 
standards of different moral schools ; for an- 
alysis shows that every one of them derives 
its authority from this ultimale standard. 
Ethical systems are roughly distinguishable 
according as they take for their cardinal 
ideas (1) the character of the agent ; (2) the 
nature of his motive; (3) the quality of his 
deeds ; and (4) the results. Each of these 
may be characterized as good or bad ; and 
those who do not estimate a mode of life by 
its effects on happiness, estimate it by the 
implied goodness or badness in the agent, in 
his motive, or in his deeds. We have per- 
fection in the agent set up as a test by which 
conduct is to be judged. Apart from the 
agent we have his feeling considered as 
moral. And apart from the feeling we have 
his action considered as virtuous. 

Though the distinctions thus indicated 
have so little definitcness that the words 
marking them are used interchangeably, yet 
there correspond to them doctrines partially 
unlike one another, which we may here con- 
veniently examine separately, with the view 
of showing that all their tests of goodness 
are derivative. 

§ 12. It is strange that a notion so abstract 
as that of perfection, or a certain ideal com- 
pleteness of nature, should ever have been 
thought one from which a system of guid- 
ance can be evolved ; as it was iu a general 
way by Plato and more distinctly by Jona- 
than Edwards. Perfection is synonymous 
with goodness in the highest degree ; and 
hence to define good conduct in terms of 
perfection is indirectly to define good con- 
duct in terms of itself. Naturally, there- 
fore, it happens that the notion of perfection, 
like the notion of goodness, can be framed 
only in relation to ends. 

We allege imperfection of any inanimate 
thing, as a tool, if it lacks some part needful 
for effectual action, or if some pait is so 
shaped as not to fulfil its purpose in the best 
manner. Perfection is alleged of a watch if 
it keeps exact time, however plain its case ; 
and imperfection is alleged of it because of 
inaccurate time-keeping, however beautifully 
it is ornamented. Though we call things 
imperfect if we detect in them any injuries 
or Haws, even when these do not detract 
from efficiency, yet we do this because they 
imply that inferior workmanship or that 
wear and tear with which inefficiency is 
commonly joined in experience, absence of 
minor imperfections being habitually associ- 
ated with absence of major imperfections. 

As applied to living things, the word per- 
fection has the same meaning. The idea of 
perfect shape in a race-horse is derived by 
generalization from those observed traits of 



race-horses which have usually gone along 
with attainment of the highest speed ; and 
the idea of perfect constitution in a race- 
horse similarly refers to the endurance which 
enables him to continue that speed for the 
longest time. With men, physically consid- 
ered, it is the same : we are able to furnish 
no other test of perfection thau that of com- 
plete power in all the organs to fulfil their 
respective functions. That our conception 
of perfect balance among the internal parts 
and of perfect, proportion among the exter- 
nal parts originates thus, is made clear by 
observing that imperfection of any viscus, 
as lungs, heart, or liver, is ascribed for no 
other reason than inability to meet in full 
the demands which the activities of the or- 
ganism make gu it, and on observing that 
the conception of insufficient size or of too 
great size iu a limb is derived from accu- 
mulated experiences respecting that ratio 
among the limbs which furthers in the high-, 
est degree the performance of all needful 
actions. 

And of perfection in mental nature we 
have no other measure. If imperfection of 
memory, of judgment, of temper is alleged,; 
it is alleged because of inadequacy to the re- 
quirements of life : and to imagine a perfect 
balance of the intellectual poweis and of the 
emotions is to imagine that proportion among 
them which insures an entire discharge of 
each and every obligation as the occasion 
calls for it. 

Bo that the perfection of man, considered 
as an agent, means the being constituted for 
effecting complete adjustment of acts to end3 
of every kind. And since, as shown above, 
the complete adjustment of acts to ends 
is that which both secures and constitutes 
the life that is most evolved, alike in breadth 
and length, while, as also shown, the justi- 
fication for whatever increases life is the re- 
ception from life of more happiness than 
misery, it follows that conduciveness to 
happiness is the ultimate test of perfection, 
iu a man's nature. To be fully convinced of 
this it needs but to observe how the propo- 
sition locks when inverted. It needs but to 
suppose that every approach toward perfec- 
tion involved greater misery to self, cr 
others, or both, to show by opposition that 
approach to perfection really means ap- 
proach to that which secures greater hap- 
piness. 

§ 13. Pass we now from the view of those 
who make excellence of being the standard 
to the view of those who make virluousness 
of action the standard. 1 do not here refer 
to moralists who, having decided empirically 
or rationally, inductively or deductively, that 
acts of certain kinds have the character wc 
call virtuous, argue that such acts are to 
be performed without regard to proximate 
consequences : these have ample justifica- 
tion. Jiut I refer to moralists who suppose- 
themselves to have conceptions of viitucas 
an end underived from any other end — who 
think that the idtaof virtue is not resolvabl* 
into simpler ideas. ...... •„• 



486 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



This is the doctrine which appears to have 
been entertained by Aristotle. I say ap- 
pears to have been, because his statements 
are far from consistent with one another. 
Recognizing happiness as the supreme end 
of human endeavor, it would at first sight 
seem that he cannot be taken as typical of 
those who make virtue the supreme end. 
Yet he puis himself in this category by seek- 
ing to define happiness in terms of virtue, 
instead of defining virtue in terms of hap- 
piness. The impel feet separation of words 
from things which characterizes Greek 
speculation in general seem3 to have been 
the cause of this. In primitive thought the 
name and the object named are associated 
in such wise that the one i3 regarded as a 
part of the other — so much so, that knowing 
a savage's name is considered by him as hav- 
ing some of his being, and a consequent 
power to work evil on him. This belief in a 
real connection between word and thing, 
continuing through lower stages of progress, 
and long surviving in the tacit assumption 
that the meanings of words are intrinsic, 
pervades the dialogues of Plato, and is trace- 
able even in Aristotle. For otherwise it is 
not easy to see why he should have so in- 
completely dissociated the abstract idea of 
happiness from particular forms of hap- 
piness. Naturally where the divorcing of 
words as s^'mbois from things as symbol- 
ized is irapei feet, there must be difficulty iu 
giving to abstract words a sufficiently ab- 
stract meaning. If in the first stages of lan- 
guage the concrete name cannot be separated 
in thought from the concrete object it be- 
longs to, it is inferable that, in the course of 
forming successively higher grades of ab- 
stract names, there will have to be resisted 
the tendency to interpret each more abstract 
name in terms of some one class of the less 
abstract names it covers. Hence, I think, 
the fact that Aristotle supposes happiness to 
be associated with some one order of human 
activities, rather than with all orders of 
human activities. Instead of including in 
it the pleasurable feelings accompanying 
actions that constitute mere living, which 
actions he says man has in common with 
vegetables, and instead of making it include 
the mental states which the life of external 
perception yields, which ho Bays man has in 
common with animals at large, he excludes 
these from his idea of happiness, and in- 
cludes in it only the modes of consciousness 
accompanying rational life. Asserting that 
the proper work of man " consists in the 
active exercise of the mental capacities con- 
formably to reason," he concludes that 
" the supreme good of man will consist in 
performing this work with excellence or vir- 
tue : herein he will obtain happiness." 
And he finds confirmation for his view in its 
correspondence with views previously enun- 
ciated, saying, "our notion nearly agrees 
with theirs who place happiness in virtue ; 
for we say that it consists in the action of 
virtue — that is, not merely in the possession. 
\»ut iu the use." 



Now the implied belief that virtue can be 
defined otherwise than in terms of happiness 
(for else the proposition is that happiness is 
to be obtained by actions conducive to hap- 
piness) is allied to the Platonic belief that 
there is an ideal or absolute good, which 
gives to particular and relative goods their 
property of goodness ; and an argument an- 
alogous to that which Aristotle uses against 
Plato's conception of good may be used 
against his own conception of virtue. As 
with good so with virtue — it is not singular 
but plural : in Aristotle's own classification, 
virtue, when treated of at large, is trans- 
formed into virtues. Those which he calls 
virtues must be so called in consequence of 
some common character that is either intrin- 
sic or extrinsic. We may class things to- 
gether either because; they are made alike by 
all having in themselves some peculiarity, as 
we do vertebrate animals because they all 
have vertebral columns, or we may class 
them together because of some community 
in their outer relations, as when we group 
saws, knives, mallets, harrows, under the 
head of tools. Are the virtues classed as 
such because of some intrinsic community 
of nature ? Then there must be identifiable 
a common trait in all the cardinal virtues 
which Aristotle specifies — " Courage, Tem- 
perance, Liberality, Magnanimity, Magnifi- 
cence, Meekness, Amiability or Friendliness. 
Trntlif nlness, Justice." What now is the 
trait possessed in common by magnificence 
and meekness ? and if any such common trait 
can be disentangled, is it that which also 
constitutes the essential trait in truthful- 
ness ? The answer must be — No. The vir- 
tues, then, not being classed as such because 
of an intrinsic community of character, must 
be classed as such because of something ex- 
trinsic ; and this something can be nothing 
else than the happiness which Aristotle says 
consists in the practise of them. They are 
united by their common relation to this re- 
sult, while they are not united by their in- 
ner natures. 

Perhaps still more clearly may the infer- 
ence be drawn thus : If virtue is primordial 
and independent, no reason can ha given why 
there should be any correspondence between 
virtuous conduct and conduct that is pleas- 
ure-giving in its total effects on self, or 
others, or both ; and if there is not a neces- 
sary correspondence, it is conceivable that 
Hie conduct classed as virtuous should bo 
pain-giving in its total effects. That wo 
may ste the consequence of so conceiving it, 
let us take the two virtues considered as typ- 
ically such in ancient times and in modern 
times — courage and chastity. By the hypo- 
thesis, then, courage, displayed alike in self- 
defence and in defence of country, is to be 
conceived as not only entailing pains inci- 
dentally, but as being necessarily a cause of 
misery to the individual and to the state ; 
while, by implication, the absence of it re- 
dounds to personal and general well-being. 
Similarly, by the hypothesis, we have to con- 
ceive that irregular sexual relations are 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



487 



directly and indirectly beneficial — that aduU 
tery is conducive to domestic harmony and 
the careful rearing of children, while mar- 
ital relations, in proportion as they are per- 
sistent, generate discord between husband 
and wife, and entail on their offspring suffer- 
ing, disease, and death. Unless it is as- 
serted that courage and chastity could still be 
thought of as virtues, though thus productive 
of misery, it must be admitted that the con. 
ception of virtue cannot be separated from 
the conception of happiness-producing con- 
duct ; and that as this holds of all the vir- 
tues, however otherwise unlike, it is from 
their conduciveness to happiness that they 
come to be classed as virtues. 

§ 14. When from those ethical estimates 
which take perfection of nature or virtu- 
ousuess of action as tests we pass to thoso 
which take for test rectitude of motive, we 
approach the intuitional theory of morals ; 
and we may conveniently deal with such 
estimates by a criticism on this theory. 

By the intuitional theory I here mean not 
that which recognizes as produced by the in- 
herited effects of continued experiences the 
feelings of liking and aversion we have to 
acts of certain kinds, but I mean the theory 
which regards such feelings as divinely 
giveD, and as independent of results experi- 
enced by self or ancestors. " There is there- 
fore," says Hutcheson, " as each one by 
close attention and reflection may convince 
himself, a natural and immediate determina- 
tion to approve certain affections, and 
actions consequent upon them ;" and since, 
in common with others of his time, he be- 
lieres in the special creation of man and all 
other beings, this " natural sense of imme- 
diate excellence" he considers as a super 
naturally derived guide. Though be says 
that the feelings and acts thus intuitively rec- 
ognized as good " all agree in one general 
character, of tending to the happiness of 
others," yet he is obliged to conceive this as 
a preordained correspondence. Neverthe- 
less, it may be shown that conduciveness to 
happiness, here represented as an incidental 
trait of the acts which receive these innate 
moral approvals, is really the test by which 
these approvals are recognized as moral. 
The iuluitionists place confidence in these 
verdicts of conscience, simply because they 
Vaguely, if not distinctly, perceive them to 
be consonant with the disclosures of that 
ultimate test. Observe the proof. 

By the hypothesis, the wrougness of mur- 
der is known by a moral intuition which the 
human mind was originally constituted to 
yield, and the hypothesis therefore negatives 
the admission that this sense of its wrong- 
flcss arises, immediately or remotely, from 
the consciousness that "murder involves de- 
duction from happiness directly and indi- 
rectly. But if you ask an adherent of this 
doctrine to contrast his intuition with that of 
the Fijian, who, considering murder *n hon- 
orable action, is restless until he has distin- 
guished himself by killing some one, and if 
vou inquire o/ him in what way the civilized 



intuition is to be justified in opposition to the 
intuition of the savage, no course is open 
save that of showing how conformity to the 
one conduces to well-being, while conform- 
ity to the other entails suffering, individual 
and general. When asked why the moral 
sense which tells him that it is wrong to take 
another man's goods should be obeysd 
rather than the moral sense of a Turcoman, 
who proves how meritorious he considers 
theft to be by making pilgrimages to the 
tombs of noted robbers to make offerings, 
the intuitionist can do nothing but urge that 
certainly under conditions like ours, if not 
also under conditions like those of the Tur- 
comans, disregard of men's claims to their 
property not only inflicts immediate misery, 
but, involves a social state inconsistent with 
happiness. Or if, again, there is required 
from him a justification for his feeling of re- 
pugnance to lying, in contrast with the feel- 
ing of an Egyptian, who prides himself on 
skill in lying (even thinking it praiseworthy 
to deceive without any further end than that 
cf practising deception), he can do no more 
than point to the social prosperity furthered 
by entire trust between man and man , and 
the social disorganization that follows uni- 
versal untruthfulness — consequences that are 
necessarily conducive to agreeable feelings 
and disagreeable feelings respectively. 

The unavoidable conclusion is, then, that 
the intuitionist does not and cannot ignore 
the ultimate derivations of right and wrong 
from pleasure and pain. However much he 
may be guided, and rightly guided, by the 
decisions of conscience respecting the char- 
acters of acts, he has come to have confi- 
dence in these decisions, because he perceives 
vaguely but jwsitively that conformity to 
them furthers the welfare of himself and 
others, and that disregard of them entails in 
the long run suffering on all. Require him 
to name any moral-sense judgment by which 
he knows as Tight some kind of act that will 
bring a surplus of pain, taking into account 
the totals in this life and in any assumed other 
life, and you find him unable to name one — 
a fact proving that underneath all these in- 
tuitions respecting the goodness or badness 
of acts there lies the fundamental assump- 
tion that acts are good or bad according as 
their aggregate effects increase men's happi- 
ness or increase their misery. 

§ 14. It is curious to see how the devil- 
worship of the savage, surviving in various 
disguises among the civilized, and leaving as 
one of its products that asceticism which 3a 
many forms and degrees still prevails widely, . 
is to be found influencing in marked ways 
men who have apparently emancipated them- 
selves, not only from primitive superstitions, 
but from more developed superstitions. 
Yiews of life and conduct which originated 
with those who propitiated deified ancestors 
by self-tortures enter even still into the ethi- 
cal theories of many persons who have years 
since cast away the theology of the past, and 
suppose themselves to be no longer influenced 
by it. 



488 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



■ In the writings of one who reject? dogmatic 
Christianity together with the Hebrew cult 
which preceded it, a career of conquest cost- 
ing tens of thousands of lives is narrated 
with a sympathy comparable to that rejoic- 
ing which tlie Hebrew traditions show us 
over destruction of enemies iu the name of 
God. You may find, too, a delight in con- 
templating the exercise of despotic power, 
joined with insistance on the salutariness of 
a slate in which the wills of slaves and citi- 
zens are humbly subject to the wills of mas- 
ters and rulers — a sentiment also reminding 
us of that ancient Oriental life which biblical 
narratives portray. Along with this worship 
of the stroug man — along with this justifica- 
tion of whatever force may be needed for 
carrying out his ambition — along with this 
yearning for a form of society in which 
supremacy of the few is unrestrained and the 
•virtue of the many consists in obedience to 
them, we not unnaturally find repudiation 
of the ethical theory which takes, in some 
shape or other, the greatest happiness as the 
end of conduct : we not unnaturally find this 
utilitarian philosophy designa'ed by the con- 
temptuous title of " pig-philosophy." And 
then, serving to show what comprehension 
there has been of the philosophy so nick- 
named, we are told that not happiness but 
blessedness must be the end. 

Obviously, the implication is that blessed- 
ness is not a kind of happiness ; and this 
implication at once suggests the question, 
"What mode of feeling is it? If it is a state 
of consciousness at all, it is necessarily one 
of three states — pain fid, indifferent, or pleas- 
urable. Does it leave the possessor at tho 
zero point of sentiency ? Then it leaves him 
just as he would be if he had not got it. 
Does it not leave him at the zero point? 
Then it must leave him below zero or above 
zero. 

Each of these possibilities may be con- 
ceived under two forms. That to which the 
term blessedness is applied may be a partic- 
ular state of consciousness — one among the 
many states that occur ; and on this supposi- 
tion we have to recognize it as a pleasurable 
state, an indifferent state, or a painful state. 
Otherwise blessedness is a word not applica- 
ble to a particular state of consciousness, but 
characterizes the aggregate of its states ; and 
in (his case the average of the aggregate is 
to be conceived as one in which the pleasur- 
able predominates, or one in which the pain-, 
ful predominates, or one in which pleasures 
and pains exactly cancel one another. Let 
us take in turn these two imaginable appli- 
cations of the word. 

"Blessed are the merciful," "Blessed 
are the peacemakers," "Blessed is' he that 
considereth the poor," are saying3 which 
we may fairly take as conveying the accept- 
ed meaning of blessedness. What now shall 
we say of one who is, for the time being, 
blessed in performing an act of mercy ? Is 
his mental state pleasurable ? If so the hy- 
pothesis is abandoned : blessedness is a par- 
ticular form of happiness- Is the stole in- 



different or painful ? In that case the blessed 
man is so devoid of sympathy that relieving 
another from pain or the fear of pain leaves 
him either wholly unmoved or gives him an 
unpleasant emotion. Again, if one who is 
blessed in making peace receives no gratifi- 
cation from the act, then seeing men 'injure 
each other does not affect him at all, or 
gives him a pleasure which is changed into a 
pain when he prevents the injury. Once 
more, to say that the blessedness of one who 
" considereth the poor" implies no agreeable 
feeling is to say that his consideration for 
the poor leaves him without feeling or entails 
on him a disagreeable feeling. So that if 
blessedness is a particular mode of con- 
sciousness temporarily existing as a concom- 
itant of each kind of beneficent action, those 
who deny that it is a pleasure or constituent 
of happiness confess themselves either not 
pleased by the welfare of others or dis- 
pleased by it. 

Otherwise understood, blessedness must, 
as we have seen, lefer to the totality of feel- 
ings experienced during the life of one who 
occupies himself with the actions the word 
connotes. This also presents the three pos- 
sibilities — surplus of pleasures, surplus of 
pains, equality of the two. If the pleasur- 
able states are in excess, then the blessed life 
can be distinguished from any other pleasur- 
able life only by the relative amount or tho 
quality of its pleasures : it is a life which 
makes happiness of a certain kind and de- 
gree its end ; and the assumption that 
blessedness Is not a form of happiness 
lapses. If the blessed life is one in which tho 
pleasures and pains received balance oue an- 
other, so producing an average that is in- 
different, or if it is one in which the pleas- 
ures arc outbalanced by the pains, then the 
blessed life has tlie character which the pes- 
simist alleges of life at large, and therefore 
regards it as cursed. Annihilation is best, 
he wHl argue, since if an average that is in- 
different is the outcome of the blessed life, 
annihilation at once achieves it, and if a 
surplus of suffering is the outcome of this 
highest kind of life called blessed, still more 
should life in general be ended. 

A possible rejoinder must be named and 
disposed of. While it is admitted that the 
particular kind of consciousness accompany- 
ing conduct that is blessed is pleasuiabli", 
it may be contended that pursuance of this 
conduct and receipt of the pleasure brings 
by the implied self-denial and persistent 
effort, and perhaps bodily injury, a suffering 
that exceeds* it in amount. And it may then 
be urged that blessedness, characterized by 
this excess of aggregate painsover aggregate 
pleasures, should nevertheless be pursued as 
an end, rather than the happiness constituted 
by excess of pleasures over pains. But now, 
defensible though this conception of blessed- 
ness may be when limited to one individual, 
or some individuals, it becomes indefensible 
when extended to all individuals ; as it must 
be if blessedness is taken for the end of con- 
duct. -To see this we need but ask far what 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



489 



purpose are these pains in excess of pleas- 
ures to be borne. Blessedness being the 
ideal state for all persons, and the self-sac- 
rifices made by each person in pursuance of 
this ideal state having for their end to help 
all other persons in achieving the like ideal 
state it, results that the blessed though pain- 
ful state of each is to be acquiredby fur- 
thering the like blessed though painful states 
of others ; the blessed consciousness is to be 
constituted by the contemplation of their 
consciousnesses iu a condition of average 
suffering. Does any one accept this infer- 
ence ? If not, his reject iou of it involves the 
admission that the motive for bearing pains 
in performing acts called blessed is not the 
obtaining for others like pains of blessedness, 
but the obtaining of pleasures for others, 
and that thus pleasure somewhere is the 
tacitly-implied ultimate end. 

In brief, then, blessedness has for its neces- 
sary condition of existence increased hap- 
piness, positive or negative, in some con- 
sciousness or other, and disappears utterly if 
we assume that the actions called blessed 
arc known to cause decrease of happiness in 
others as well as in the actor. 

§ 15. To make clear the meaning of the 
general argument set forth in this chapter, its 
successive parts must be briefly summarized. 

That which in the last chapter we found 
to be highly evolved conduct is that which 
in this chapter we find to he what is called 
good conduct ; and the ideal goal to the 
natural evolution of conduct there recog- 
nized we here recognize as the ideal stand- 
ard of conduct ethically considered. 

The acts adjusted to ends, which while 
constituting the outer visible life from mo- 
ment to moment further tiie continuance of 
life, we saw become, as evolution pro- 
gresses, better adjusted ; until finally they 
make the life of each individual entire in 
length and breadth, at the same time that 
they efficiently subserve the rearing of youug, 
and do both these not only without hindering 
other individuals from doing the like, but 
While giving aid to them iu doing the like. 
And here we see that goodness is asserted of 
such conduct under each of these three as- 
pects. Other things equal, well-adjusted, self- 
conserving acts we call good ; other things 
equal, we call good the acts that are well 
adjusted for bringing up progenj' capable of 
complete living ; and other things equal, we 
ascribe goodness to acts which fuither the 
complete living of others. 

This judging as good conduct which con- 
duces to life in each and all, we f< iund to in- 
volve the assumption that animate existence 
is desirable. By the pessimist, conduct 
which subserves life cannot consistently be 
called good : to call it good implies some 
form of optimism. Wo saw, however, that 
pessimists and optimists both start with the 
postulate that life is a blessing or a curse, 
according as the average consciousness ac- 
companying it is pleasurable or painful. 
And since avowed or implied pessimists, and 
optimists of one or otln. r shade, taken 



together constitute all men, it results that 
this postulate i3 universally accepted. 
Whence it follows that if we call good the 
conduct conducive to life, we can do so only 
with the implication that it is conducive to a 
surplus of pleasures over pains. 

The truth that conduct is considered by 
us as good or bad, according as its aggregate 
results, to self or others or both, are pleasur- 
able or painful, we found on examination to be 
involved in all the current judgments on con- 
duct — the proof being that reversing the ap- 
plications of the words creates absurdities. 
And we found that every other proposed 
standard of conduct derives its authority 
from this staudaid. Whether perfection of 
nature is the assigned proper aim, or virtu- 
ousness of action or rectitude of motive, we 
saw that definition of the perfection, the vir- 
tue, the rectitude inevitably brings us down 
to happiness experienced in some form, at 
some time, by some person, as the fwnda- 
mental idea. Nor could we discover anv in- 
telligible conception of blessedness, sav^ one 
which implies a raising of consciousness, in- 
dividual or general, to a happier state, either 
by mitigating pains or increasing pleasures. 

Even with those who judge of conduct 
from the religious point of view rather than 
from the ethical point of view it is the 
same. Men who seek to propitiate God by 
inflicting pains on themselves, or refrain 
from pleasures to avoid offending him, do so 
to escape greater ultimate pains or to get 
greater ultimate pleasures. If by positive or 
negative suffering here, they expected to 
achieve more suffering hereafter, they would 
not do as they do. That which they now 
think duty they would not think duty if it 
promised eternal misery instead of eternal 
happiness. Nay, if there be any who believe 
that human beings were created to be un- 
happy, and that they ought to continue liv- 
ing to display their unhappiness for the sat- 
isfaction of their creator, such believers are 
obliged to use this standard of judgment ; 
for the pleasure cf their diabolical god is the 
end to be achieved. 

So that no school can avoid taking for the 
ultimate moral aim a desirable stale of feel- 
ing called by whatever name — gratification, 
enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, 
at some time, to some being or beings, is an 
inexpugnable element of the conception. It 
is as much a necessary form of nigral intu- 
ition as space is a necessary form of iutellect- 
ual intuition. 

CHAPTER IV. 

WATS OF JUDGING CONDUCT. 

§ 17. Intellectual progress is by no one 
trait so adequately characterized as by de- 
velopment of thevidea of causation, since 
development of this idea involves develop- 
ment of so many other ideas. . Before any 
way can be made, thought and language 
must have advanced far enough to rendei 
properties or attributes thinkable 33 such, 
apart from objects ; which, in low stages of 
human intelligence, they are not. Again. 



490 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



even the simplest notion of cause, as We un- 
derstand it, can be reached only after many 
like instances have been grouped into a sim- 
ple generalization ; and through all ascend- 
ing steps, higher notions of causation imply 
wfder notions of generality. Further, as 
there must be clustered in the mind con- 
crete causes of many hinds before there 
can emerge the conception of cause, apart 
from particular causes, it follows that 
progress in abstractness of thought is im- 
plied. Concomitantly, there is implied 
the recognition of constant relations among 
phenomena, generating ideas of unifor- 
mity of sequence and of co-cxistence — the 
idea of natural law. These advances can go 
on only as fast as perceptions and resulting 
thoughts are made definite by the use_ of 
measures, serving to familiarize the mind 
with exact correspondence, truth, certainty. 
And only when growing science accumulates 
examples of quantitative relations, foreseen 
and verified throughout a widening range of 
phenomena, does causation come to be con- 
ceived as necessary and universal. Bo that 
though all these cardinal conceptions aid one 
another in developing, we may properly say 
that the conception of causation especially 
depends for its development on the develop- 
ments of the rest, and therefore is the best 
measure of intellectual development at large. 

How slowly, as a consequence of its de- 
pendence, the conception of causation 
evolves, a glance at the evidence shows. We 
hear with surprise of the savage who, falling 
down a precipice, ascribes the failure of his 
foothold to a malicious demon ; and we 
smile at the kindred notion of the ancient 
Greek, that his death was prevented by a 
goddess who unfastened for him the thong 
of the helmet by when his enemy was dtag- 

fing him. But daily, -without surprise, we 
ear men who describe themselves as saved 
from shipwreck by " Divine interposition," 
who speak of having " providentially" 
missed u train which met with a fatal disas- 
ter, and who call it a "mercy" tD have 
escaped injury from a falling chimney-pot — 
men who, in such cases, recognize physical 
causation no more than do the uncivilized or 
semi-civilized. The Veddah who thinks that 
failure to hit an animal with his arrow re- 
sulted from inadequate invocation of an an- 
cestral spirit, and the Christian priest who 
says prayers over a sick man in the expecta- 
tion that the course of his disease will so be 
stayed, differ only in respect of the agent 
from whom they expect supernatural aid and 
the phenomena to be altered by him: the 
necessary relations among causes and effects 
are tacitly ignored by the last as much as by 
the first. Deficient belief in causation is, in- 
deed, exemplified even hi those whose dis- 
cipline has been specially fitted to generate 
this belief— even in men of science. For a 
generation after geologists hid become uni- 
formitariaus in geology, they remained catas- 
trophists in biology ; while recognizing none 
but natural agencies in the genesis of the 
earth's crust, they ascribed to supernatural 



agency the gentsis of the organisms on Ita 
surface. Nay more — among'those who artf 
convinced that living things in general have 
been evolved by the continued interaction 
of forces everywhere operating, there aro 
some who make an exception of man, or 
who, if they admit that his body has been 
evolved in the same manner as the bodies of 
other creatures, allege that his mind has been 
not evolved but specially created. If, then, 
universal and necessary causation is only 
now approaching full recognition, even by 
those whose investigations are daily reillus- 
trating it, we may expect to find it very little 
recognized among men at large, whose cul- 
ture has not been calculated to impress them 
with it, and we may expect to find it least 
recognized by them in respect of those 
classes of phenomena amid which, in con- 
sequence of their complexity, causation is 
most difficult to trace — the psychical, tho 
social, the moral. 

Why do 1 here make these reflections on 
what seems an irrelevant subject ? I do it 
because, on studying the various ethical theo- 
ries, I am struck with the fact that they are 
all characterized either by entire absence of 
the idea of causation or by inadequate pres- 
ence of it. Whether theological, political, 
intuitional, or utilitarian, they all display, if 
not in the same degree, still each in a largo 
degree, the defects which result from this 
lack. We will consider them in the order 
named. 

§ 18. The school of morals properly to bo 
considered as the still extant representative 
of the most ancient school, is that which rec- 
ognizes no other rule of conduct than tho 
alleged will of God. It originates with tho 
savage, whose only restraint beyond fear of 
his fellow-man is fear of an ancestral spirit, 
and whose notion of moral duty as distin- 
guished from his notion of social prudence 
arises from this fear. Here the ethical doc- 
trine and the religious doctrine are identi- 
cal — have in no degree differentiated. 

This primitive form of ethical doctrine, 
changed only by the gradual dying out of 
multitudinous minor supernatural agents and 
accompanying development of one universal 
supernatural agent, survives in great strength 
down to our own day. Religious creeds, estab- 
lished and dissenting, all embody the belief 
that right and wrong are right and wrong sim- 
ply in virtue of Divine enactment. And this 
tacit assumption has passed from systems of 
theology into systems of morality ; or rather 
let us say that moral systems in early stages 
of development, little differentiated from the 
accompanying theological systems, have par- 
ticipated in this assumption. We see this 
in the works of the Stoics, as well as in 
the works of certain Christian moralists. 
Among recent ones 1 may instance the " Es- 
says on the Principles of Morality," by Jon- 
athan Dymoud, a Quaker, which makes 
" the authority of the Deity the sole ground 
of duty, and his communicated will the only 
ultimate standard of right aud wrong." 
Nor is it by writers belonging to so rela- 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



401 



lively unphilosophical a sect only that this 
view is held ; it is held with a difference by 
writers belonging to sects contrariwise dis- 
tinguished. For these assert that in the ab- 
sence of belief iu a deity there would be no 
moral guidance ; and tins amounts to assert- 
ing tbat moral truths have no other origin 
than the will of God, which, if not consid- 
ered as revealed in sacred writings, must be 
considered as revealed in conscience. 

This assumption, when examined, proves 
to be suicidal. If there are no other origins 
for right and wrong than this enunciated or 
intuited Divine will, then, as alleged, were 
there no knowledge of the Divine will, the 
acts now known as wrong would not be 
known as wrong. Bat if men did not know 
suoh acts to he wrong because contrary to 
the Divine will, and so, in committing them, 
did not offend by disobedience, and if they 
could not otherwise know them to be wrong, 
then they might commit them indifferently 
with the acts now classed as right : the re- 
sults, practically considered, would be the 
same. In so far as secular matters are con. 
corned, there would be no difference be- 
tween the two : for to say that in the affairs 
of life any evils would arise from continu- 
ing to do the acts called wrong and ceasing to 
do the acts called right, is to say that these 
produce in themselves certain mischievous 
consequences and certain beneficial conse- 
quences ; which is to say there is another 
source for moral rules limn the revealed or 
inferred Divine will : they may be establish- 
ed by induction from these observed conse- 
quences. 

From this implication I see no escape. It 
must be cither admitted or denied lhat the 
acts called good and the acts called bad nat- 
urally conduce, the one to human well- 
being and f he other to human ill-being 13 
it admitted ? Then the admission amounts 
to an assertion that the conduciveness is 
shown by experience, and this involves 
abandonment of the doctrine lhat there is no 
origin for morals apart from Divine injunc- 
tions. Is it denied that acts classed as 
good and bad differ in their effects? Then 
it is tacitly affirmed that human affairs would 
go on just as well in ignorance of the dis- 
tinction, and the alleged need for command- 
ments from God disappears. 

And here we see how entirely wanting is 
the conception of cause. This notion that 
such and such actions are made respectively 
good and bad simply by Divine injunction, is 
tantamount to the notion that such and 
such actions have not in the nature of things 
such and such kinds of effects. If there Is 
not an unconsciousness of causation there is 
an ignoring of it. 

§ 19. Following Plato and Aristotle, who 
make state enactments the sources bf right 
and wrong, and following Hobbes, who 
holds that there can be neither justice nor 
injustice till a regularly constituted coercive 
power exists to issue and enforce commands, 
tiot a few modern thinkers hold that there is 
•o other origin for good and bad in conduct 



than law. And this implies the Belief that 
moral obligation originates with Acts of Par- 
liament, and can be changed this way or that 
way by majorities. They ridicule the idea 
that men have any natural rights, and allege 
that rights are wholly results of convention ; 
the necessary implication being that duties 
are so too. Before considering whether this 
theory coheres with outside truths, let us ob- 
serve how far it is coherent within itself. 

In pursuance of his argument that rights, 
and duties originate with istablished social 
arrangements, Hobbes says : 

"Where 110 covenant hath preceded, there hath no- 
right been transferred, and every man has right to ito- 
everything; and consequently no action can be un- 
just. But when a covenant is mane, then to break it 
is nnj d; and the de8nition of INJUSTICE is no- 
other tlian the not performance 0/ covenant. And 
whatsoever is not unjust is just. . . . Therefore, 
before the names of just and unjust can have place,, 
there must be some coercive power to compel men; 
equally to the performance of their covenants, by thc.- 
terror of come punishment greater than the benefit 
they expect by the breach of their covenant."'— Zctfia- 
than, xv. 

In this paragraph the essential propositions, 
are: justice is fulfilment of covenant; ful- 
filment of covenant implies a power enforc- 
ing it : " just and unjust can have no place" 
unless men are compelled to perform their 
covenants. But this is to say that men can- 
not perform their covenants without compul- 
sion. Grant that, justice is performance of 
covenant. Now suppose it to be performed^ 
voluntarily : there is justice. In such case, 
however, theie is justice in the absence of" 
coercion ; which is contrary to the hypothe- 
sis. The only conceivable rejoinder is aui 
absurd one : voluntary performance of cov- 
enant is impossible. Assert this, and the- 
doctrine that right and wrong come into ex- 
istence with the establishment of sovereignty 
is defensible. Decline to assert it, and the- 
doctrine vanishes. 

From inner incongruities pass now to> 
outer ones. The justification for his doc- 
trine of absolule civil authority as the souice* 
of rules of conduct, Hobbes seeks iu the mis- 
eries entailed by the chronic war between! 
man and man which must exist in the ab- 
sence of society ; holding that under any- 
kind of government a better life is possible- 
than in the slate of nature. Now whether 
we accept the gratuitous and baseless theory 
thai men surrendered their liberties to a sov- 
ereign power of some kind, with a view to* 
the" promised increase of satisfactions, or 
whether we accept the rational theory, in- 
ductively based, that a state of political sub- 
ordination gradually became established 
through experience of the increased satisfac- 
tions "derived under it, it equally remain* 
obvious lhat the acts of the sovereigu power 
have no other warrant than their subservi- 
ence to the purpose for which it came into 
existence. The necessities which initiate 
government themselves prescribe" the action* 
of government. If its actions do not re- 
spond to the necessities, they are unwar- 
ranted. The authority of law is, then, by 
the hypothesis, derived, and can never 



492 THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



transcend the authority of that from which, 
it is derived. If general good, or welfare, or 
utility is the supreme end, and if state en- 
actments are justified as mean3 to this 
supreme end, then state enactments have 
such authority only as arises from con.lu- 
civeness to this supreme end. When they 
are right, it is only because the original au- 
thority indorses them, and they are wrong 
if they do not bear its indorsement. Tiiat is 
to say, conduct cannot be made good or bad 
Ivy law ; but its goodness or badness is * o the 
last determined by its effects as naturally 
furthering or not furthering the lives of cit- 
izens. 

Still more when considered in the con- 
crete than when considered in the abstract 
do the views of Hobbes and his disciples 
prove to be inconsistent. Joining in tbe 
general belief that without such security for 
life as enables men to go fearlessly about 
their business, there can be neither happiness 
nor prosperity, individual or general, they 
agree that measures for preventing murder, 
manslaughter, assault, etc., are requisite, 
unci they advocate this 01 that penal system 
as furnishing the best deterrents ; so argu- 
ing, both in respect of the evils and the rem- 
edies, that such and such causes will, by 
the nature of things, produce such and such, 
effects. They recognize as inferable a priori 
the truth that men will not lay by property 
unless they can count with great probability 
on reaping advantages from it ; that conse- 
quently where robbery is unchecked, or 
where a rapacious ruler appropriates what- 
ever earnings his subjects do not effectually 
hide, production will scarcely exceed imme- 
diate consumption, and that necessarily 
there will be none of that accumulation of 
capital required for social development, with, 
all its aids to welfare. In neither case, how- 
ever, do they perceive that they are tacitly 
asserting the need for certain restraints on 
■conduct as deducible from the necessary 
conditions to complete life 1n t lie social 
state, and are so making the authority of 
law derivative and not original. 

If it be said by any belonging to this 
school, that certain mo> - al obligations, to be 
distinguished as cardinal, must be admitted 
to have a basis deeper than legislation, and 
that it is for legislation not to create but 
merely to enforce them — if, I say, admitting 
this, they go on to allege a legislative origin 
for minor claims and duties ; then we have 
the implication that whereas some kinds of 
conduct do, in the nature of things, tend to 
work out certain kinds of results, other 
kinds of conduct do not, in the nature of 
things, teud to work out certain kinds of re- 
sults. While of these acts the naturally good 
or bad consequences must be allowed, it may 
be denied of those acts that they have natu- 
rally good or bad consequences. Only after 
asserting this can it be consistently asserted 
that acts of the last class are made right or 
wrong by law. For if such acts have any 
intrinsic tendencies to produce beneficial or 
mischievous effects, then these intrinsic ten- 



dencies furnish the warrant for legislative 
requirements or interdicts ; and to say that 
the requirements or interdicts make them 
right or wrong, is to say that they have no 
iut.riusie tendencies to produce beneficial or 
mischievous effects. 

Here, then, we have another theory be- 
traying deficient consciousness of causation. 
An adequate consciousness of causation 
yields the irresistible belief that from the 
most serious to the most trivial actions ol 
men in society there must flow conse- 
quences which, quite apart from legal agency, 
conduce to well being or ill- being in greater 
or smaller degrees. If murders are socially 
injurious, whether forbidden bylaw or not— 
if one man's appropriation of another's gains 
by force biings special and general evils, 
whether it is or is not contraiy to a ruler's 
edicts — if non-fulfilment of 'contract, il 
cheating, if adulteration, work mischiefs on 
a community in proportion as they are com- 
mon, quite irrespective of piohibitions, 
then is it not manifest that the like holds 
throughout all the details of men's behavior 1 
Is it not clear that when legislation insists on 
cci tain acts which have naturally beneficial 
effects, and forbids others that have natu- 
rally injurious effects, the acts are not made 
good or hud by legislation, but the legisla- 
tion derives its authority from thenatuial 
effects of the acts ? Non-recognition of this 
implies non-recognition of natural causation. 

§ 20. Nor is it otherwise with the pure in- 
tuitionists, who hold that moral perceptions 
are innate in the original sense — thinkers 
whose view is that men have been divinely 
endowed with moral faculties, not that 
these have resulted from inherited modifica- 
tions caused by accumulated experiences. 

To affirm that we know some things to be 
Tight and other things to be wrong, by viitue 
of a supernaturally given conscience, and 
thus tacitly to affirm that we do not other- 
wise know right from wrong, is tacitly to 
deny any natural relations between acts and 
results. For if there exist any such rela- 
tions, then we may ascertain by induction 
or ded union, or both, what these are. And 
if it be admitted that because of sucli natural 
relations, happiness is produced by this kind 
of conduct, which is therefore to be ap. 
proved, while misery is produced by that 
kind of conduct, which is therefore to bo 
condemned, then it is admitted that the 
Tightness or wrongness of actions" is deter- 
minable, and must finally lie determined by 
the goodness or badness of the effects that 
flow from them ; which is contiary to the 
hypothesis. 

It may, indeed, be rejoined that effects are 
deliberately ignored by this school ; which 
teaches that courses recognized by moral in- 
tuition as right must be pursued without re- 
gard to consequences. But on inquiry it 
turns out that the consequences to be disre- 
garded are particular consequences, and not 
general consequences. When, for example, 
it is said that property lost by another ought 
to be restored irrespective of evil to lk« 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



493 



finder, who possibly may, by restoring it, 
lose that which, would have preserved him 
from starvation, it is meant that, in pursu- 
ance of the principle, the immediate and 
special consequences must be disregarded, 
not the diffused and remote consequences. 
By which wo are shown that though the 
theory forbids overt recognition of causation, 
there is an unavowed recognition of it. 

And this implies the trait to which I am 
drawing attention. The conception of nat- 
ural causation is so imperfectly developed 
that there is only an indistinct consciousness 
that throughout the whole of human con- 
duct necessary relations of causes and ef- 
fects prevail, and that from them are ulti- 
mately derived all moral rules, however 
much these may be proximately derived 
from moral intuitions. 

§21. Strange to say, even the utilitarian 
school, which at first sight appears to be 
distinguished from the rest by recognizing 
natural causation, is, if not so far from com- 
plete recognition of it, yet very far. 

Conduct, according to its theory, is to be 
estimated by observation of results. When, 
in sufficiently numerous cases, it has beeu 
found that behavior of this kind works evil 
while behavior of that kind works good, 
these kinds of behavior are to be judged as 
wrong and right respectively. Now though 
it seems that the origin of moial rules "in 
natural causes is thus asserted by implica- 
tion, it is but partially asserted. The impli- 
cation is simply that we are to ascertain 
by induction that such and such mischiefs or 
benefits do go along with such and such 
acts, and are theu Co infer that the like re- 
lations will hold in future. But acceptance 
of these generalizations and the infere-nces 
from them decs not amount to recognition 
of causation in the full sense of the word. 
So long as only some 1 elation between cause 
and effect in conduct is recognized, and not 
(he relation, a completely scientific form of 
kuovvledge has not been reached. At pres- 
ent, utilitarians pay no attention to this dis- 
tinction. Eveu when it is pointed out, they 
disregard the fact that empirical utilitarian- 
ism is but a transitional form to be passed 
through on the way to rational utilitarianism. 

In a letter to Mr; Mill, written some six- 
teen ytars ago, repudiating the title anti- 
ulilitarian which he had applied to me (a let- 
ter subsequently published in Mr. Bain's 
work on "Mental and Moral Science"). I 
endeavored to make clear the difference above 
indicated, and I must here quote certain 
passages from that letter. 

The view for which I contend is, that morality 
properly so-called— the science of right conduct— has 
for its object todetermineAcw and why certain modes 
of conduct are detrimental, and certain other modes 
beneficial. These good and bad results cannot be ac- 
cidental, but must be necessary consequences of the 
constitution of things ; and I conceive it to be the 
business of moral science to deduce from the laws of 
life aud the conditions of existence what kinds of 
action necessarily tend to produce happiness and 
what kinds to produce nnbappiuess. Having done 
this, its deductions are to be recognized as laws of 
conduct ; and are to be conformed to irrespective of a 
direct estimation of happiness or misery. 



Perhaps an analogy will mo6t clearly show my 
meaning. During its early stages, planetary astrono- 
my consisted of nothing more than accumulated ob- 
servations respecting the positions and motions of the 
sun and planets ; from which accumulated observe 
tious it came by and by to be empirically predicted, 
with an approach to truth, that certain of the heavenly 
bodies would have certain positions at certain times. 
But tlit modern science of planetary astronomy con- 
sists of deductions from the law of gravitation — de- 
ductions showing why the celestial bodies necessarily 
occupy certain places at certain times. Now tlt« 
kind of relation which thus exists between ancient 
and modern astronomy is analogous to the kind of re- 
lation which, 1 conceive, exists bet a een the expendi- 
ency-morality and moral science properly so called. 
And rite objection which I have to the current utili- 
tarianism is, that it recognizes no more developed 
form of morality — does not. see that it has reached but 
the initial stage of moral science. 

Doubtless if utilitarians are asked whether 
it can be by mere chance that this kind of 
actiou works evil and that works good, they 
will answer — No ; they will admit that such 
sequences are parts of a necessary order 
among phenomena. But though this truth 
is beyond question, and though if there are 
causal relations between acts and their re- 
sults, rules of conduct can become scientific 
only when they are deduced from these 
causal relations-, there continues to be entire 
satisfaction with that form of utilitarianism 
in which these causal relations are practically 
ignored. It is supposed that in future, as 
now, utility is to be determined only by ob- 
servation of results, and that there is no pos- 
sibility of knowing by deduction from fun- 
damental principles what conduct must be 
detrimental and what conduct must be bene- 
ficial. 

§ 22. To make more specific that concep- 
tion of ethical science here indicated, let me 
present it under a concrete aspect, begin-, 
uing with a simple illustration, aud compli- 
cating this illustration by successive steps. 

If, by tying its main artery, we siop most 
of the blood going to a limb, theu, for as 
long as the limb performs its function, those 
parts which are called into play must be 
wasted faster than they are repaired ; whenco 
eventual disablement. The l elation between 
due receipt of nutritive matters through its 
arteries and due discharge of its duties by 
the limb is a part of the physical order. If, 
instead of cutting off the supply to a partic- 
ular limb, we bleed the patient largely, so 
drafting away the materials needed for re- 
pairing not one limb but all limbs, and not 
limbs on\j but viscera, there results both a 
muscular debility and an enfeeblement of the 
vital functions. Here, again, cause and 
effect are necessarily related. The mischief 
that results from great depletion results apart 
from any Divine command, or political 
enactment, or moral intuition. Now ad- 
vance a step. Suppose the man to be pre- 
vented from taking in enough of the solid 
and liquid food containing those substances 
continually abstracted from his blood in re- 
pairing his tissues : suppose he has cancer of 
the oesophagus and cannot swallow — what 
happens? By this indirect depletion, as by 
direct depletion, he is inevitably made inca- 
pable of performing the actions of one in 



494 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



health. In this case, as in the other cases, 
the connection between cause and effect is 
one that cannot be established or altered by 
any authority external to the phenomena 
themselves. Again, let us say that instead 
of being stopped after passing his mouth, 
that which he would swallow is stopped be- 
fore reaching his mouth ; so that day after 
day the man is required to waste his tissues 
in getting food, and day after day the food 
he has got to meet this waste he is forcibly 
prevented from eating. As before, the prog- 
ress toward death by starvation is inevitable 
— the connection between acts and effects i3 
independent of any alleged theological or po- 
litical authority. And similarly if, being 
forced by the whip to labor, no adequate re- 
turn in food is supplied to him, there are 
equally certain evils, equally independent of 
sacred or secular enactment. Pass now to 
those actions more commonly thought of as 
Ihe occasions for rules of conduct. Let us 
assume the man to be continually robbed of 
that which was given him in exchange for 
his labor, and by which lie was to make up 
for ucrvo-muscular expenditure and renew 
his powers. No less than before is the con- 
nection between conduct and consequence 
rooted in the constitution of things : un- 
changeable by state-made law, and not need- 
ing establishment by empirical generaliza- 
tion. If the action by which the man is 
affected is a stage further away from the re- 
fiults, or produces results of a less decisive 
kind, still we see the same basis for morality 
in the physical order. Imagine that payment 
for his services is made partly in bad coin, 
or that it is delayed beyond the date agreed 
upon, or that what he buys to eat is adulter- 
ated with innutritive matter. Manifestly, 
by any of these deeds which we condemn as 
unjust, and which are punished by law, there 
is, as before, an interference with the normal 
adjustment of physiological repair to physio- 
logical waste. Nor is it otherwise when we 
pass to kinds of conduct still more remotely 
operative. If he is hindered from en forcing 
his claim, if class predominance prevents 
him from proceeding, or if a bribed judge 
gives a verdict contrary to evidence, or if a 
■witness swears falsely, have not these deeds, 
though they affect him more indirectly, the 
name original cause for their wrongness ? 
Even with actions which work diffused and in- 
definite mischiefs it is the same. Suppose that 
the man, instead of being dealt witii fraudu- 
lently, is calumniated. There is, as before, 
a binderance to the carrying on of life-sus, 
taining activities, for the loss of character 
detrimentally affects his business. Nor is 
this all. The mental depression caused par- 
tially incapacitates him for energetic activi- 
ty, and perhaps brings on ill-health. So 
that maliciously or carelessly propagating 
false statements tends both to diminish his life 
and to diminish his ability to maintain life. 
Hence its flagiliousness. Moreover, if we 
trace to their ultimate ramifications the effects 
wrought by any of these acts which morality 
called intuitive reprobates ; if we ask what 



results not to the individual himself only, 
but also to his belongings; if we observe 
how impoverishment hinders the rearing oi 
his children, by entailing underfeeding or in. 
adequate clothing, resulting perhaps in the 
death of some and the constitutional injury 
of others — we see that, by the necessary con- 
nections of things, these acts, besides tending 
primarily to lower the life of the individual 
aggressed upon, tend, secondarily, to lower 
the lives of all his family, and,* thirdly, to 
lower the life of society at large, which is 
damaged by whatever damages its units. 

A more dist'mct meaning will now be seen 
in the statement that the utilitarianism which 
recognizes only the principles of conduct 
reached by induction is but preparatory to 
the utilitarianism which deduces these prin- 
ciples from the processes of life as carried on 
under established conditions of existence. 

§ 22. Thus, then, is justified the allegation 
made at the outset, that, irrespective of their 
distinctive characters and their special ten- 
dencies, all the current methods of ethics have 
one general defect — they neglect ultimate 
causal connections. Of course I do not 
mean that they wholl}' ignore the natural 
consequences of actions, but I mean that 
they recognize them only incidentally. 
They do nut erect into a method the ascer- 
taining of necessary relations between causes 
aud effects, and deducing rules of conduct 
from formulated statements of them. 

Every science begins by accumulating ob- 
servations, and piesently generalizes these 
empirically ; but only when it reaches the 
stage at which its empirical generalizations 
are included in arational generalization does 
it become developed science. Astronomy has 
already passed through its successive stages : 
first collections of facts, then inductions 
from them, aud, lastly, deductive interpreta- 
tions of these, as corollaries from a universal 
principle of action among masses in space. 
Accounts of structures and tabulations of 
strata, grouped and compared, have led grad- 
ually to the assigning of various classes of 
geological changes to igneous and aqueous 
actions ; and it is now tacitly admitted that 
geology becomes a science proper only as 
fast as such changes are explained in terms 
of those natural processes which have arisen 
in the cooling and solidifying earth, exposed 
to the sun's heat aud the action of the moon 
upon its ocean. The science of life has 
been and is still exhibiting a like series of 
steps, the evolution of organic forms at 
large is being affiliated on ptrysical actions 
in operation from the beginning, and the 
vital phenomena each orgauism presents are 
coming to be understood as connected sets 
of changes, in parts formed of matters that 
are affected by certain forces and disengage 
other forces. So is it with mind. Early 
ideas concerning thought aud feeling ignored 
everything like cause, save in recognizing 
those effects of habit which were forced on 
men's attention and expressed in proverbs ; 
but there are growing up interpretations of 
thought and feeling as correlates of the ac- 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



495 



tions and reactions of a nervous structure 
that is influenced by outer changes and 
works in the body adapted changes ; the 
implication being that psychology becomes a 
science as fast as these relations of phe- 
nomena are explained as consequences of 
ultimate principles. Sociology, too, repre- 
sented down to recent times only by stray 
ideas about social organization, scattered 
through the masses of worthless gossip fur- 
nished us by historians, is coming to be rec- 
ognized by some as also a science, and such 
adumbrations of it as have from time to time 
appeared in the shape of empirical generali- 
zations are now beginning to assume the 
character of generalizations made coherent 
by derivation from causes lying in human 
nature placed under given conditions, 
Clearly then, ethics, which is a science deal- 
ing with the conduct of associated human be- 
ings, regarded under one of its aspects, has 
to undergo a like transformation, and at 
present undeveloped, can be considered a de- 
veloped science only when it has undergone 
this transformation. 

A preparation in the simpler sciences is 
presupposed. Ethics has a physical aspect, 
since it treats of human activities which, in 
common with all expenditures of energy, 
conform to t lie law of the persistence of en- 
ergy : moral principles must conform to 
physical necessities. It has a biological as- 
pect, since it concerns certain effects, inner 
and outer, individual and social, of the vital 
changes going on in the highest type of ani- 
mal. It has a psychological aspect, for its 
subject-matter is an aggregate of actions that 
are prompted by feelings and guided by in- 
telligence. And it lias a sociological aspect, 
for these actions, some of them directly and 
all of them indirectly, affect associated 
beings. 

What is this implication ? Belonging un- 
der one aspect to each of these sciences — 
physical, biological, psychological, sociolog- 
ical—it can find its ultimate interpretations 
only in those fundamental truths which are 
common to all of them. Already we have 
concluded in a general way that conduct at 
large, including the conduct ethics deals with, 
is to he fully understood onty as an aspect of 
evolving life ; and now we are brought to 
this conclusion in a more special way. 

£ 23. Here, then, wc have to enter on the 
consideration of moral phenomena as phe- 
nomena of evolution, being forced to doihi3 
by finding that they form a part of the aggre- 
gate of phenomena which evolution has 
wrought out. If the entire visible universe 
has been evolved ; if the solar system as a 
whole, the earth as a part of it, the life in 
general which 1 ho earth bears,. as weil as that 
of each individual organism ; if the mental 
phenomena displayed by all creatures?, up to 
the highest, in common with the phenomena 
presented by aggregates of these highest ; if 
one and all conform to the laws of evolu- 
tion — then the necessary implication is that 
those phenomena of conduct in these highest 
creatures with which morality is concerned. 



also conform. 

The preceding volumes have prepared the 
way for dealing with morals as thus con- 
ceived. Utilizing the conclusions they con- 
lain, let us now observe what data arc fur- 
nished by these. We will take in succession 
the physical view, the biological view, the 
psychological view, and the sociological view. 

CHAPTER V. 

THE PHYSICAL VIEW. 

§ 21. Every moment we pass instantly 
from men's perceived actions to the motives 
impiied by them, and so are led to formulate 
these actions in mental terms rather than in 
bodily terms. Thoughts and feelings are re- 
ferred to when we speak of any one's deeds 
with praise or blame ; not those outer mani- 
festations which reveal the thoughts and feel- 
ings. Hence we become oblivious of the 
truth that conduct, as actually experienced, 
consists of changes recognized by touch, 
bight, and hearing. 

This habit of contemplating only the phys- 
ical face of conduct is so continued that an 
effort is required to contemplate only the 
physical face. Undeniable as it is that an- 
other's behavior to us is made up of move- 
ments of his body and limbs, of his facial 
muscles, and of his vocal apparatus, it yet 
seems paradoxical to say that these are the 
only elements of conduct really known by 
us, while the elements of conduct which we 
exclusively think of as constituting it are 
not known but inferred. 

Here, however, ignoring for the time being 
the inferred elements in conduct, we have to 
deal with the perceived elements — we have 
to observe its traits considered as a set of 
combined motions. Taking the evolution 
point of view, and remembering that while 
an aggregate evolves not only the matter 
composing it, but also the motion of that mat- 
ter passes from an indefinite incoherent homo- 
geneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity, 
we have now to ask whether conduct, as it 
rises to its higher forms, displays in increas- 
ing degrees these characters, and whether 
it does net display them in the greatest de- 
gree when it reaches that highest toim which 
we call moral. 

§ 25. It will be convenient to deal first 
with the trait of increasing coherence The 
conduct of lowly organized creatures is 
broadly contrasted with the conduct of 
highly organized creatures, in having its suc- 
cessive portions fei'bly connected. The ran- 
dom movements which an animalcule makes 
have severally no reference to movements 
made a moment before, nor do they affect 
in specific ways the movements made imme- 
diately after. To-day's wanderings of a fish 
in search of food, though perhaps showing, 
by their adjustments to catching different 
kinds of prey at different hours, a slightly 
determined order, are unrelated to the wan- 
derings of yesterday and to-morrow. But 
such more developed creatures as birds 
show us, in the building of nests, the sitting 
on eggs, the rearing of chicks, and the aid- 



496 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



ing of them after they fly, sets of motions 
■which form a dependent series extending 
over a considerable period. And on observ- 
ing the complexity of the acts performed in 
fetching and fixing the fibres of the nest, or 
in catching and bringing to the young each 
portion of food, we discover in the combined 
motions lateral cohesion as well as longi- 
tudinal cohesion. 

Man, even in his lowest state, displays in 
his conduct far more coherent combinations 
of motions. By the elaborate manipulations 
gone through in making weapons that 
are to serve for the chase next year, or in 
building canoes and wigwams for permanent 
uses — by acts of aggression and defence 
which are connected with injuries long since 
received or committed, the savage exhibits 
an aggregateof motions which, in some of its 
parts, holds together over great periods. 
Moreover, if we consider the many move- 
ments implied by the transactions of each 
day, in the wood, on the water, in the camp, 
in the family, we see that this coherent ag- 
gregate of movements is composed of many 
minor aggregates that are severally coherent 
within themselves and with one another. In 
civilized man this trait of developed conduct 
becomes more conspicuous still. Be his 
business what it may, its processes involve 
relatively numerous dependent motions, and 
day by day it is so carried on as to show con- 
nections between present motions and mo- 
tions long gone by, as well as motions anti- 
cipated in the distant future. Besides the 
many doings, related to one another, which 
the farmer goes through in looting after his 
cattle, directing his laborers, keeping an eye 
on his duiry, buying his implements, selling 
his produce, elc, the business of getting 
his lease involves numerous combined move- 
ments on which the movements of subse- 
quent years depend ; and in manuring his 
fields with a view to larger returns, or put- 
ting down drains with the like motive, he is 
performing acts which aie parts of a cohe- 
rent combination relatively extensive. That 
the like holds of the shopkeeper, manufac- 
turer, banker, is manifest ; and this increased 
coherence of conduct among the civilized 
will strike »s even more when we remember 
how its parts are often continued in a con- 
nected arrangement through life, for the pur- 
pose of making a fortune, founding a family, 
gaining a seat in Pailiament. 

Now mark that a greater coherence among 
its component motions broadly distinguishes 
the conduct we call moral from the conduct 
we call immoral. The application of the 
word dissolute to the last and of the word 
self- restrained to the first implies this — im- 
plies that conduct of the lower kind, consti- 
tuted of disorderly acts, lias its parts rela- 
tively loose in their relations with one an- 
other ; while conduct of the higher kind, 
habitually following a fixed order, so gains a 
characteristic unity and coherence. In pro- 
portion as the conduct is what we call moral, 
it exhibits comparatively settled connections 
between antecedents and consequents ; for 



the doing right implies that under given con- 
ditions the combined motions constituting 
conduct will follow in a way that can bo 
specified. Contrariwise, in the conduct of 
one whose principles are not high, the 
sequences of motions are doubtful. He may 
pay the money or he may not ; be may keep 
his appointment or he may fail ; he may tell 
the truth or he may lie. The words trust- 
worthiness and untrustworthiness, as used to 
characterize the two respectively, sufficiently 
imply that the actions of the one can be 
foreknown while those of the other cannot ; 
and this implies that the successive move- 
ments composing the one bear more conslaut 
relations to one another than do those com- 
posing the other — are more coherent. 

§ 36. Indefiniteness accompanies incohe- 
rence in conduct that is little evolved, and 
throughout the ascending stages of evolving 
conduct there is an increasingly definite co- 
ordination of the motions constituting it. 

Such changes of form as the rudest pro- 
tozoa show us are utterly vague — admit, of no 
precise description ; and though in higher 
kinds the movements of the parts are more 
definable, yet the movement of the, whole in 
respect of direction is indeterminate — there 
is no adjustment of it to this or the other 
point in space. In such ccelenterate animals 
as polypes we see the parts moving in ways 
which lack precision ; and in one of the lo- 
comotive forms.as a medusa, the course taken, 
otherwise at random, can be described only 
as one which carries it toward the light, 
where degrees of light and darkness are pres- 
ent. Among annulose creatures the contrast 
between the track of a worm, turning this 
way or that at hazard, and the definite course 
taken by a bee in its flight from flower to 
flower or back to the hive, shows us the 
same thing — the bee's acts in building cells 
and feeding larvaj further exhibiting pre- 
cision in the simultaneous movements as well 
as in the successive movements. Though the 
motions made by a fish in pursuing its prey 
have considerable definiteness, yet they are 
of a simple kind, and are in this respect con- 
trasted with the many definite motions of 
body, head, and limbs gone through by a 
carnivorous mammal in the course of way- 
laying, running down, and seizing a herbi- 
vore ; and further, the fish shows us none of 
those definitely adjusted sets of motions 
which in the mammal subserve the rearing of 
young. 

Much greater defiuiteness, if not in the 
combined movements forming single acts, 
still in the adjustments of many combined 
acts to various purposes, characterizes hu- 
man conduct, even in its lowest stages. In 
making and using weapons, and in the 
manceuvrings of savage warfare, Dumerous 
movements, allprecise in their adaptations to 
proximate ends, are arranged for the achieve- 
ment of remote ends, with a precision not 
paralleled among lower creatures. The lives 
of civilized men exhibit this trait far mon* 
conspicuously. Each industrial art exempli- 
fies the effects of movements which are 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



497 



severally definite, and which are definitely 
arranged in simultaneous and successive or- 
der. Business transactions of every kind are 
characterized by exact relations between the 
sets of motions constituting acts and the pur- 
poses fulfilled, in time, place, and quantity. 
Further, the daily routine of each person 
shows us in its periods and amounts of activ- 
ity, of rest, of relaxation, a measured arrange- 
ment which is not shown us by the doings 
of the wandering savage, who has no fixed 
times for hunting, sleeping, feeding, or any 
one kind of action. 

Moral conduct differs from immoral con- 
duct in the same manner and in a like degree. 
The conscientious man is exact in all his 
transactions. He supplies a precise weight 
for a specified sum ; he gives a definite qual- 
ity in fulfilment of understanding ; he pays 
the full amount he bargained to do. In 
times as well as iu Quantities*, his acts an- 
swer completely to anticipations. If he has 
made a business contractile is to the day ; if 
an appointment he is to the minute. Simi- 
larly in respect of truth : his statements cor- 
respond accurately with the facts. It is 
thus too in his family life. He maintains 
marital relations that arc definite iu contrast 
with the relations that result from breach of 
the marriage contract ; and as a father, fit- 
ting his behavior with care to the nature of 
each child and to the occasion, he avoids the 
too much and the too little of praise or blame, 
reward or penalty. Nor is it otherwise in 
his miscellaneous acts. To say that lie deals 
equitably with those he employs, whether 
they behave well or ill, is to say that he ad- 
justs his acts to their deserts ; and to say 
that he is judicious iu his charities, is to say 
that he portions out his aid with discrimina- 
tion instead of distributing it indiscriminately 
to good and bad, as do those who have no 
adequate sense of their social responsibilities. 
That progress toward rectitude of conduct is 
progress toward duly proportioned conduct, 
and that duly proportioned conduct is rela- 
tively definite, we may see from another 
poiut of view. One of the traits of conduct 
we call immoral is excess, while modera- 
tion habitually characterizes moral conduct. 
Now excesses imply extreme divergences of 
actions from some medium, while mainten- 
ance of the medium is implied by modera- 
tion ; whence it follows that actions of the 
hist kind can be defined more neaily than 
those of the first. Clearly conduct which, 
being unrestrained, runs into great and in- 
calculable oscillations, therein differs from 
restrained conduct of which, by implication, 
the oscillations fall within narrower limits. 
And falling within narrower limits necessi- 
tates relative definiteuess of movements. 

£ 27. That throughout the ascending forms 
of life, along with increasing heterogeneity 
of structure and function, there goes increas- 
iag heterogeneity of conduct — increasing di- 
versity in the sets of external motions and 
combined sets of such motions — needs not be 
shown in detail. Nor need it be shown that 
becoming relatively great in the motions con- 



stituting the conduct of the uncivilized man, 
this heterogeneity has become still greater in 
those which the civilized mau goes thiough. 
We may pass at once to that further degree 
of the like contrast which we see on ascend- 
ing from the conduct of the immoral to that 
of the moral. 

Instead of recognizing this contrast, most 
readers will be inclined to identify a moral 
life with a life little varied in its activities. 
But here we come upon a defect in the cur- 
rent conception of morality. This compara- 
tive uniformity in the aggregate of motions, 
which goes along with morality as com- 
monly conceived, is not only not moral but 
is the reverse of moral. The better a mau 
fulfils every requirement of life, alike as re- 
gards his own body and mind, as regards the 
bodies and minds of those dependent on him, 
and as regards the bodies and minds of his 
fellow-citizens, the more varied do his activ- 
ities become. The more fully he does all 
these things, the more heterogeneous must 
be his movements. 

One who satisfies personal needs only goes 
through, other things equal, less multiform 
processes than one who also administers to 
the needs of wife and children. Supposing 
there are uo other differences, the addition 
of family relations necessarily renders the 
actions of the man who fulfils the duties of 
husband and parent more heterogenous than 
those of the man who has no such duties to 
fulfil, or, having them, does not fulfil them ; 
and to say that his actions are more heter- 
ogeneous is to say that there is a greater het- 
erogeneity in the combined motions he goes 
through. The like holds of social obliga- 
tions. These, in proportion as a citizen duly 
performs them, complicate his movements 
considerably. If he is helpful to inferiors 
dependent, on him, if he takes a part iu polit- 
ical agitation, if he aids in diffusing knowl- 
edge, lie, in each of these ways, adds to his 
kinds of activity— makes his sets of move- 
ments more multiform ; so differing from the 
man who is the slave of one desire or group 
of desires. 

Though it is unusual to consider as having 
a moral aspect those activities which culture 
involves, yet to the few who hold that due 
exercise oi: all the higher faculties, intellectual 
and aesthetic, must be included in the con- 
ception of complete life, here identified with 
the ideally moral life, it willbematiifest that 
a further heterogeneity is implied by them. 
For each of such activities, constituted by 
that play of these faculties which is event- 
ually added to their life-subserving uses, 
adds to the multiformity of the aggregated 
motions. 

Brieflj', then, if the conduct is the best pos- 
sible on every occasion, it follows that as the 
occasions are endlessly varied the acts will 
be endlessly vaiied to suit — the heterogeneity 
in the combinations of motions will be ex-, 
treme. 

§28. Evolution iu conduct, considered un- 
der its moral aspect, is, like all other evolu- 
tion, toward equilibrium, 1 do not mean 



498 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



that it is toward the equilibrium reached at 
death, though this is, of course, the final 
state which the evolution of the highest man 
lias in common with all lower evolution, 
but I mean that it is toward a moving equi- 
librium. - 

We have seen that maintaining life, ex- 
pressed in physical terms, is maintaining a 
balanced combination of iuternal actions in 
face of external forces tending to overthrow 
it ; and we have seen that advance toward 
a higher life has been an acquirement of 
ability to maintain the balance for a longer 
period, by the successive additions of organic 
appliances which by their actions counteract, 
more and more fully, the disturbing forces. 
Here, then, we are led to the conclusion that, 
the life called moral is one in which this 
maintenance of the moving equilibrium 
reaches completeness, or approaches most 
nearly to completeness. 

This truth is clearly disclosed on observing 
how those physiological rhythms which 
vaguely show themselves when oiganization 
begins become more regular as wed as more 
various in their kinds" as oiganization ad- 
vances. Periodicity is but feebly marked in 
the actions, inner and outer, of the ludest 
types. Where life is low there is passive 
dependence on the accidents of the environ- 
ment ; and this entails great irregularities in 
the vital processes. The taking iu of food 
by a polype is at intervals now short now 
very long, as circumstances determine ; and 
the utilization of it is by a slow dispersion of 
the absorbed part through the tissues, aided 
only by their regular movements of the creat- 
ure's body, while such aeration as is effected 
is similarly without a trace of rhythm. Much 
higher up we still find very imperfect peri- 
odicities ; as iu the inferior mollusks, which, 
though possessed of vascular systems, have 
no proper circulation, but merely a slow 
movement of the crude blood, now in one 
direction through the vessels, and then, after 
a pause, in the opposite direction. Only 
with well-developed structures do there come 
a rhythmical pulse and a rhythm of the res- 
piratory actions. And then iu birds and 
mammals, along with great rapidity and reg- 
ularity in these essential rhythms, and along 
with a consequently great vital activity and 
therefore great expenditure, comparative reg- 
ularity in the rhythm of the alimentary 
actions is established, as well as in the 1 hythm 
of activity and test, since the rapid waste to 
which lapid pulsation and respiration aie in- 
strumental necessitates tolerably regular sup- 
plies rif nutriment, as well as recurring in- 
tervals of sleep, during which repair may 
overtake waste. And from these stages the 
moving equilibrium characterized by such 
interdependent rhythms is continually made 
better by the counteracting of more and 
more of those actions which tend to per- 
turb it. So is it as we ascend from savage 
to civilized, and from the lowest among the 
civilized t > the highest. The 1 hythm of ex- 
ternal actions required to maintain the rhythm 
of internal actions becomes. at once more. 



complicated and more complete, making 
them into a better moving equilibrium. Tho 
irregularities which their conditions of exist- 
ence entail on primitive men continually 
cause wide deviations from the mean slate 
of the moving equilibrium — wide oscillations 
which imply imperfection of it for the time 
being, and bring about its premature over- 
throw. In such civilized men as we call a 11- 
conducted, frequent perturbations of tho 
moving equilibrium are caused by those ex- 
cesses characterizing a career in winch the 
periodicities are much broken ; and a com- 
mon result is that the rhythm of the iuternal 
actions being often deraDged, the moving 
equilibrium, reudered 1>3' so much imperfect, 
is generally shortened in duration ; while 
one in whom the iuternal rhythms are best 
maintained is one by whom the external ac- 
tions required to fulfil all needs and duties, 
severally performed on the recurring occa- 
sions, conduce to a moving equilibrium that 
is at once involved and prolonged. 

Of course the implication is that the man 
who thus reaches the limit of evolution ex- 
ists iu a society congruous with his natuie — 
is a man among men similarly constituted, 
who are sevei ally in harmony with that social 
environment which they have formed. This 
is, indeed, the only possibility. For the pro- 
duction of the highest type of man can go 
on only^ari passu with the production of tho 
highest type of society. The implied con- 
ditions are those before described as accom- 
panying the most evolved conduct — con- 
ditions under whicti each can fulfil all his 
needs and rear the due number of progeny, 
not only without hindering others from do- 
ing the like, but while aiding them in doing 
the like. And evidently, considered under 
its physical aspect, the conduct of the indi- 
vidual so constituted and associated with 
like individuals is one in which all the ac- 
tions, that is the combined motions of all 
kinds, have become such as duly to 'meet 
every daily process, every ordinary occur- 
rence, and every contingency iu his environ- 
ment. Complete life in a complete society 
is but another name for complete equilibrium 
between the co-ordinated activities of each 
social unit and those of the aggregate of units. 

§29. Even to readers of preceding vol- 
umes, and still more to other leaders, there 
will seem a strangeness, or even an absurdity, 
in this presentation of moral conduct in phys- 
ical terms. It has been needful to make it 
however. If that redistribution of matter 
and motion constituting evolution goes on in 
all aggregates, its laws must be fulfilled in 
the most developed being as in every other 
thing, and his actions, when decompose 1 
into motions, must exemplify its laws. Tins 
we find that they do. There is an entire cui- 
respondence between moral evolution and 
evolution as physically defined. 

Conduct as actually known to us in per* 
ception, and not as interpreted into the ac- 
companying feelings and ideas, consists of 
combined motions. On ascending through 
JJie various grades of animate creatures, wo 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



499 



Cud these combined motions characterized 
by increasing coherence, increasing definite- 
ness considered singly and in their co- 
ordinated groups, and increasing heteroge- 
neity ; and in advancing from lower to 
higher types of man. as well a3 in advancing 
from the less moral to the more moral type 
of man, these traits of evolving conduct be- 
come more marked still. Farther, we see 
that the increasing coherence, definiteness, 
and heterogeneity of the combined motions 
are instrumental to the better maintenance of 
a moving equilibrium. Where the evolution 
is small this is very imperfect and soon cut 
short ; with advancing evolution, bringing 
greater power and intelligence, it becomes 
more steady and longer continued in face of 
adverse actions ; in the human race at large 
it is comparatively regular and enduring, 
and its regularity and enduringuess are great- 
est in the highest. 

CHAPTER VI. 

THE BIOLOGICAL VIEW. 

§ 30. The truth that the ideally moral 
man is one in whom the moving equilibrium 
is perfect, or approaches nearest to perfec- 
tion, becomes, when translated into physio- 
logical language, the truth that he is one in 
whom the functions of all kinds are duly ful- 
filled. Each function has some relation, 
direct or indirect, to the needs of life — the 
fact of its existence as a result of evolution 
being itself a proof that it has been entailed, 
immediately or remotely, by the adjustment 
of inner actions to outer actions. Conse- 
quently, non-fulfilment of it in normal propor- 
tion is non-fulfilment of a requisite to com- 
plete life. If there is defective discharge of 
the function, the organism experiences some 
detrimental result caused by the inadequacy. 
It the discharge is in excess, there is entailed 
a reaction upon the other functions which 
in some way diminishes their efficiencies. 

It is true that during full vigor, wliile the 
momentum of the organic actions is great, 
the disorder caused by moderate excess or 
defect of any one function soon disappears — 
the balance is re-established. But it is none 
the less true that always some disorder results 
ftom excess or defect, that it influences every 
function, bodily and mental, and that it con- 
stitutes a lowering of the life for the time 
being. 

Beyond the temporary falling short of com- 
plete life implied by undue or inadequate 
discharge of a function, there is entailed, as 
an ultimate result, decreased length of life. 
If some function is habitually performed in 
excess of the requirement or in defect of the 
requirement; -and if, as a consequence, there 
is au often-repeated perturbation of the func- 
tions at large, there results some chronic 
derangement, in the balance of the func- 
tions. Necessarily reacting on the struc- 
tures, and registering in them its accumulat- 
ed effects, this derangement works a general 
deterioration ; and when the vital energies 
iK'gin to decline, the moving equilibrium, 
further from perfection than it would else 



have been, is sooner overthrown — death is 
more or less premature. 

Hence the moial man is one whose func- 
tions — many and varied in their kinds, as we 
have seen — are all discharged in degrees duly 
adjusted to the conditions of existence. 

§ 31. Strange as the conclusion looks, it 
is nevertheless a conclusion to be here drawn, 
that the performance of every function is, in 
a sense, a moral obligation. 

It is usually thought that morality requires 
us only to restrain such vital activities as, in 
our present stale, are often pushed to excess, 
or such as conflict with average welfare, 
special or general ; but it also requires us to 
carry on these vital activities up to their 
normal limits. All the animal fuuetions, in 
common with all the higher functions, have, 
as thus understood, their imperativeness. 
While recognizing the fact that in our state 
of transition, characterized by very imper- 
fect adaptation of constitution to conditions, 
moral obligations of supreme kinds often 
necessitate conduct which is physically in- 
jurious, we must also recognize the fact 
that, considered apart from other effects, it 
is immoral so to treat the body as in any way 
to diminish the fulness or vigor of its 
vitality. 

Hence results one test of actions. There 
may in every case be put the questions, Doe3 
the action lend to maintenance of complete 
life for the time being? and does it tend to 
prolongation of life to its full extent? To 
auswer yes or no to either of these' ques- 
tions is implicitly to class the action as right 
or wrong in respect of its immediate bear- 
ings, whatever it may be in respect of its re- 
mote beaiings. 

The seeming paradoxicalness of this state- 
ment results from the tendency, sodilficult of 
avoidance, to judge a conclusion which pre- 
supposes an ideal humanity by its applica- 
bility to humanity as now existing. The 
foregoing conclusion refers to that highest 
conduct in which, as we have seen, the evo- 
lution of conduct terminates — that conduct 
in which the making of all adjustments of 
acts to ends subserving complete individual 
life, together with all those subserving main- 
tenance of offspring and preparation of them 
for maturity, not only consist with the mak- 
ing of like adjustments by others, but fur- 
thers it. And this conception of conduct in 
its ultimate form implies the conception of 
a nature having such conduct for its spon- 
taneous outcome — the product of its normal 
activities. So understanding the matter, it 
becomes manifest that under such conditions, 
any falling short of function, a3 well as any 
excess of function, implies deviation from 
the best conduct or from perfectly moral 
conduct. 

§ 32. Thus far in treating of conduct from 
the biological point of view, we have con- 
sidered its constituent actions under their 
physiological aspects only, leavinsr out of 
sight their psychological aspects. We have 
recognized the bodily changes and have ig- 
nored the accompanying mental changes. 



500 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



And at first sight it seems needful for us 
here to do this, since taking account of 
states of consciousness apparently implies 
an inclusion of the psychological view in the 
biological view. 

This 13 not so however. As was pointed 
out in the " Principles of Psychology" (§§ 52, 
53) we enter upon psychology proper only 
when we begin to treat of mental states and 
their relations, considered as leferring to ex- 
ternal agents and their relations. While wo 
concern ourselves exclusively with modes of 
mind as correlaiives of nervous changes, we 
are treating of what was there distinguished 
as aestho-physiology. We pass to psychol- 
ogy only when we consider the correspond- 
ence between the connections among sub- 
jective states and the connections among ob- 
jective actions. Here then, without trans- 
gressing the limits of our immediate topic, 
we may deal with feelings and functions in, 
their mutual dependencies. 

We cannot omit doing this, because the 
psychical changes which accompany many 
of the physical changes in the organism are 
biological factors in two ways. Those 
feelings, classed as sensations, which, 
directly initiated in the bodily framework, 
go alang with certain states of the vital 
organs, and more conspicuously with certain 
states of the external organs, now serve 
mainly as guides to the performance of 
.functions, but partly as stimuli, and now 
serve inainty as stimuli, but in a smaller de- 
gree as guides. Visual sensations which, as 
co-ordinated, enable us to direct our move- 
ments, also, if vivid, raise the rate of respira- 
tion ; while sensations of cold and heat, 
greatly depressing or raising the vital actions, 
serve also for purposes of discrimination. 
Bo, too, the feelings classed as emotions, 
which are not localizable in the bodily f rame- 
woik, act iu more general ways, alike as 
guides and stimuli — having influences over 
the peiformance of functions more potent 
eveu than have most sensations. Fear, at 
the same time that it urges flight and evolves 
the forces spent in it, also affects the heart 
and the alimentary canal ; while joy, prompt- 
ing persistence in the actions bringing it, 
simultaneously exalts the visceral processes. 

Hence, in treating of conduct under its bio- 
logical aspect, we are compelled to consider 
that interaction of feelings and functions 
which is essential to animal life in all its 
more developed forms. 

§ 33. In the " Principles of Psychology," 
§ 124. it was shown that necessanl} r , 
Throughout the animate world at large," pains 
are the correlatives of actions injurious to 
the organism, while pleasures are the correla- 
tives of actions conducive to its welfare," 
since " it is an inevitable deduction from the 
hypothesis of evolution that races of sen- 
1 ient creatures could have come into existence 
under no other conditions." The argument 
was as follows : 

If we substitute Tor the word pleasure the oquiva- 
lent phrase — a feeling which we seek to bri Hfjp into 
consciousness and re lain there, and if we substitute 



for the word pain the equivalent phrase— a feelio,? 
which we seek to get out of consciousness and to 
keep out, we see at once that, if the states of con- 
sciousness which a creature endeavors to mainta n aro 
the correlatives of injurious actions, and if tne stak-9 
of consciousness which it endeavors to expel are the 
correlatives of beneficial actions, it must quickly dis- 
appear through persistence in the injurious and avoid- 
ance of the beneficial. In other words, those races of 
beings only can have survived in which, on the aver- 
age, agreeable or desired feelings went along with ac- 
tivities conducive to the maintenance of life, while 
disagree ible and habitually avoided feelings went 
along with activities directly or indirectly destructive 
of life; and there must ever have been, other things 
equal, the most numerous and loutc-continued survi- 
vals among races in which these adjustments of feel- 
ings to actions were the best, tending ever to bring 
about perfect adjustment. 

Fit connections between acts and results 
must establish themselves in living things 
eveu before consciousness arises, and after 
the rise of consciousness these connections 
can change in no other way than to become 
better established. At the very outset, lifa 
is maintained by persistence in acts which 
conduce to it, and desistance from acts 
which impede it ; and whenever sentiency 
makes its appearance as an accompaniment, 
its forms must be such that in the one case 
the produced feeling is of a kind that will be 
sought — pleasure — and in the other case is of 
a kind that will be shunned — pain. Ob- 
serve the necessity of these relations as ex- 
hibited in the concrete. 

A plant which envelops a buiied bono 
with a plexus of rootlets, or a potato which 
directs its blanched shoots towaid a grating 
through which light comes into the cellar, 
shows us that tho changes which outer 
agents themselves set up in its tissues aro 
changes which aid the utilization of these 
agents. If we ask what would happen if a 
plant's roots grew not toward the place 
where there was moisture but away from it, 
or if its leaves, enabled by light to assimilate, 
nevertheless bent themselves toward the 
darkness, we see that death would result in 
the absence of the existing adjustments. This 
general relation is still better shown in an in- 
sectivorous plant, such as the Dioncea viua- 
cipula, which keeps ils ttap closed round an- 
imal matter but not round other matter. 
Here it is manifest that the stimulus arising 
from the first part of the absorbed substance 
itself sets up those actions by which the mass 
of the substance is utilized for the plant's bene- 
fit. When we pass from vegetal organisms to 
unconscious animal organisms, we see a hko 
connection between proclivity and advantage. 
On observing how the tentacles of a polype 
attach themselves to and begin to close round 
a living creature, or some animal substance, 
while they are indifferent to the touch of 
other substance, wc are similarly shown that 
diffusion of some of the nutritive juices into 
the tentacles, which is an incipient assimila- 
tion, causes the motions effecting prehen- 
sion. And it is obvious that life would cease 
were these relations reversed. Nor is it oth- 
erwise with this fundamental connection be- 
tween contact with food and taking in of 
food, among conscious creatures, up to the 
very highest. Tasting a substance implies the 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



501 



passage of its molecules through the mucous 
membrane of the tongue and palate ; and 
this absorption, when it occurs with a sub- 
stance serving for food, is hut a commence- 
ment of the absorption earned on throughout 
the alimentary canal. Moreover, the sensa- 
tion accompanying this absorption, when it is 
of the kind produced hy food, initiates at the 
place where it is strongest, in front of the 
pharynx, an automatic act of swallowing, in 
a manner rudely analogous to that in which 
the stimulus of absorption in a polype's ten- 
tacles initiates prehension. 

If from these processes and relations that 
imply contact between a cieature's surface 
and the substance it takes in, we turn to those 
set up hy diffused particles of the substance, 
constituting to conscious cieafures its odor, 
we meet a kindred, general tiulh. Just as, 
after contact, some molecules of a mass of 
food are absorbed by the part touched, and 
excite the act of prehension, so are ab- 
sorbed such of its molecules as, spreading 
through the water, Teach the organism, ard, 
being absorbed by it, excite those actions by 
which contact with the mass is effected. If 
the physical stimulation caused by the dis- 
persed particles is not accompanied by con- 
sciousness, Lstill the motor changes set up 
must conduce to survival of the organism if 
they are such as tnd in contact, and there 
must be relative innutrition and mortality of 
organisms in which the produced contrac- 
tions do not briDg about this result. Nor 
can it be questioned that whenever and 
wherever the physical stimulation has a con- 
comilant sentieucy, ibis must be such as 
consists with and conduces to movement 
toward the nutritive matter ; it must be not 
a repulsive but an attractive sentiency. And 
this which holds with the lowest conscious- 
ness must hold throughout, as we see it do 
in all such superior creatures as are drawn 
lo their food by cdor. 

Besides those movements which cause 
locomotion, those which effect seizure must 
no less certainly become thus adjusted. The 
molecular changes caused by absorption of 
nutritive matter from organic substance in 
contact, or from adjacent organic substance, 
initiate motions which are indefinite where 
the oiganiziilion is low, aud which become 
more defini/e with the advance of organiza- 
tion. At the outset, while the undifferentiated 
protoplasm is everywhere absorbent and 
everywhere contractile, the changes of form 
initiated by the physical stimulation of ad- 
jacent nutritive matter are vague, and in- 
effectually adapted to utilization of it, but 
gradually, along -with the specialization into 
parts that are contractile and parts that are 
absorbent, these motions become better 
adapted ; for necessarily individuals in which 
they are least adapted disappear faster than 
those in which they are most adapted. Rec- 
ognizing this necessity, we have here espe- 
cially to recognize a further necessity. The 
relation between these stimulations and ad- 
justed contractions must be such that in- 
crease of the one causes increase of the 



other, since the directions of the discharges 
being once established, greater stimulaiion 
causes greater contraction, and the greater 
contraction causing closer contact with the 
stimulating agent, causes increase of stimu- 
lus, and is thereby itself further increased. 
And now we reach the corollaiy which more 
particularly concerns us. Clearly as fast as 
an accompanying sentiency arises, this can- 
not be one that is disagreeable, prompting 
desistauce, but must be one that is agreeable, 
prompting persistence. The plcusurable sen- 
sation must be itself the stimulus to the con- 
traction by which the pleasurable sensation 
is maintained and increased, or must be so 
bound up with the stimulus that the two in- 
crease together. And this relation, which we 
see is directly established in the case of a 
fundamental function, must be indirectly es- 
tablished with all other functions, since 
non-establishment of it in any particular case 
implies, in so far, unfitness to the conditions 
of existence. 

In two ways, then, it is demonstrable that 
there exists a primordial connection between 
pleasure-giving acts and continuance or in- 
crease of life, and, by implication, betweeu 
pain-giving acts and deoiease or loss of life. 
On the one hand, setting out with the lowest 
living things, we see that the beneficial act 
and the act which there is a tendency to per- 
form are originally two sides of the same, 
and cannot be disconnected without fatal re- 
sults. On the other hand, if we contemplate 
developed creatures as now existing, we seo 
that each individual aud species is from day 
to day kept alive by pursuit of the agreeablu 
and avoidance of the disagreeable. 

Thus approaching the facts from a different 
side, analysis brings us down to another faco 
of that ultimate truth disclosed by analysis 
in a preceding chapter. We found it was no 
more possible to frame ethical conceptions 
from which the consciousness of pleasure of 
some kind, at some time, to some being, is 
absent, than it is possible to frame the con- 
ception of an object from which the con- 
sciousness of space is absent. And now we 
see tiiat this necessity of thought originates 
in the very nature of sentient existence. 
Sentient existence can evolve only on con- 
dition that pleasure-giving acts are life-sus- 
taining acts. 

§ 31. Notwithstanding explanations al- 
ready made, the naked enunciation of this as 
an ultimate truth, underlying all estimations 
of right and wrong, will in many, if n>t in 
most, cause astonishment. Having ia view 
certain beneficial results that are preceded 
by disagreeable states of consciousness, such 
as those commonly accompanying labor, an J 
having in view the injurious results that fol- 
low the receipt of certain gratifications, such 
as those which excess in drinking produces, 
the majority tacitly or avowedly believe that 
the bearing of pains is on the whole bene- 
ficial, and that the receipt of pleasures is on 
the whole detrimental. The exceptions st 
fill their minds as to exclude the rule. 

When asked, they are obliged to admit 



502 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



lhat the pains accompanying wounds, bruises, 
sprains, are the concomitants of evils, alike 
to the sufferer and to those around him, and 
that, the anticipations of such pains serve as 
deterrents from careless or dangerous acts. 
They cannot deny that the tortures of burn- 
ing or scalding, and the miseries which in- 
tense cold, starvation, and thirst produce, are 
indissolubly connected with permanent or 
temporary mischiefs, tending to incapacitate 
one who bears them for doing things that 
should be done, either for his own welfare or 
the welfare of others. The agony of incipi- 
ent suffocation they are compelled to recotr- 
nize as a safeguard to life, and must allow 
that avoidance of it is conducive to all that 
life can bring or achieve. Nor will they 
refuse to own that on? who is chained in a 
cold, damp dungeon, in darkness and 
silence, is injured in health and efficiency, 
alike by the positive pains thus inflicted on 
him and by the accompan3'iug negative paius 
due to absence of light, of freedom, of com- 
panionship. Conversely, they do not doubt 
that, notwithstanding occasional excesses, the 
pleasure which accompanies the taking of 
food goes along with physical benefit, and 
that the benefit is the greater the keener the 
satisfaction of appetite. They have no 
choice but to acknowledge that the instincts 
and sentiments which so overpowenntrly 
prompt marriage, and those which find their 
gratification in the fostering of offspring, 
work out an immense surplus of benefit after 
deducting all evils. Nor dare they question 
that the pleasuie taken in accumulating prop, 
erty leaves a large balance of advantage, 
private and public, after making all draw- 
backs. Yet many and conspicuous as are 
the cases in which pleasures and pains, sen- 
sational and emotional, serve as incentives to 
proper acts and deterrents from improper 
acts, these pass unnoticed, and notice is 
taken only of those cases in which men are 
directly or indirectlj' misled by them. The 
well-working in essential matters is ignored, 
and the ill-working in unessential matteis is 
alone iccognized. 

Is it replied that the moie intense pains 
anil pleasures, which have immediate refer- 
ence to bodily needs, guide us rightly, 
while the weaker pains and pleasures, not 
immediately connected with the maintenance 
of life, guide us wrongly V Then the impli- 
cation is that the system of guidance by 
phasures and pains, which has answered 
with all types of creatwes below the human, 
fails with I lie human Or rather, the admis- 
sion being that with mankind it succeeds in 
so far as fulfilment of certain imperative 
wants goes, it fails in respect of wants that 
are not imperative. Those who think tins 
are required, in the fiist place, to show us 
how the line is to be drawn between the two, 
and then to show us why the system which 
succeeds in the lower will not succeed in the 
hiirher. 

§ 35. Doubtless, however, after all lhat 
has been said, there will be raised afresh the 
game difficulty— there will be instanced the 



mischievous pleasures and the beneficent 
paiiis. The drunkard, the gambler, the 
thief, who seveially pursue gratifications, 
will be named in proof that the pursuit of 
gratifications misleads, while the self-sacri- 
ficing relative, the worker who perseveres 
through weariness, the Lonest man who 
stints himself to pay his way, will be named 
in proof that disagreeable modes of conscious- 
ness accompany acts that are really bene- 
ficial. But after recalling the fact pointed 
out in § 20, that this objection does not tell 
against guidance by pleasures and pains at 
large, since it merely implies that special and 
proximate pleasures and paius must be dis- 
regarded out of consideration for remote and 
diffused pleasures and pains, and after ad- 
mitting lhat in mankind, as at present consti- 
tuted, guidance by proximate pleasuies and 
pains fails throughout a wide range of cases, 
I go on to set foith the inteipretation biology 
gives of these anomalies, as being not neces- 
sary and permanent, but incidental and tem- 
porary. 

Already, while showing lhat among inferior 
creatures pleasures aud pains have all along 
guided the conduct by which life has been 
evolved and maintained, 1 have pointed out 
that since theoonduions of existence foreach 
species have been occasionally changing, 
there have been occasionally arising partial 
misadjuslments of the feelings to the require- 
ments necessitating readjustments. This 
general cause of derangement operating on 
all sentient beings has been operating on 
human beings in a manner unusually decided, 
persistent, and involved. It needs but to 
contrast the mode of life followed by primi- 
tive men, wandering in the forests and living 
on wild food, with the mode of life followed 
by rustics, artisans, traders, and professional 
men in a civilized community, to see that 
the constitution, bodily and mental, well-ad- 
justed to the one is ill adjusted to the other. 
It needs but to observe the emotions kept 
awake in each savage tribe, chronically 
hostile to neighboring tribes, and then to 
observe the emotions which peaceful pro- 
duction and exchange bring into play, 
to see that the two arc not only unlike 
but opposed. And it needs but to note 
how- during social evolution, the ideas and 
sentiments appropriate to the militant ac- 
tivities carried on by coercive co-opei ation 
have beeu at variance with the ideas and 
sentiments appropriate to the industrial ac- 
tivities carried on by voluntary co opeiatiou, 
to see that there has ever beeu within each 
society, and still continues, a conflict be- 
tween the two moral natures adjusted lo 
these two unlike modes of life. Manifestly, 
then, this readjustment of constitution to 
conditions, involving readjustment of pleas- 
ures and pains for guidance, which all creat- 
ures from time to time undergo, has been 
in the human race during civilization es- 
pecially difficult, not only because of the 
greatness of the change from small nomadic 
groups to vast settled societies, and from pred- 
atory habits to peaceful habits, but also be- 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



503 



cause Hie old life of enmity between societies 
lias been maintained along with the new life 
of amity within each society. While there 
co-exist two waysof life so radically opposed 
as the militant and the industrial, human 
nature cannot become properly adapted to 
cither. 

That hence results such failure of guidance 
by pleasures and pains as is daily exhibited, 
We discover on observing in what parts of 
conduct the failure is most conspicuous. As 
above shown, the pleasurable and painful 
sensations are fairly well adjusted to the 
peremptory physical requirements ; the ben- 
efits of conforming to the sensations which 
prompt us inrcspectof nutrition, respiration, 
maintenance of temperature, etc., immensely 
exceed the incidental evils, and such mis- 
adjustments as occur may be ascribed to the 
change from the outdoor life of the primitive 
man to the indoor life which the civilized man 
is often compelled to lead. It is the emo- 
tional pleasures and pains which are in so 
considerable a degree out of adjustment to 
the needs of life us carried on in society ; and 
it is of these that the readjustment is made, 
in the way above shown, so tardy because so 
difficult. 

From the biological point of view, then, we 
see that the connections between pleasure and 
beneficial action and between pain and det- 
rimental action, which arose when sentient 
existence began, arid have continued among 
animate creatures up to man, are geneially 
displayed in him also throughout the lower 
and more completely oignDized part of his 
nature, and must be mote and more fully 
displayed throughout the higher part of his 
nature, as fast as his adaptation to the con- 
ditions of social life increases. 

§ 36. Biology has a further judgment to 
pass on the relations of pleasures and pains to 
welfare. Beyond the connections between 
acts beneficial to the organism and the pleas- 
ures accompanying performance of them, 
and between actsdetiimental to the organism 
and the pains causing desistauee from them, 
there are connections between pleasure iu 
general and physiological exaltation, and be- 
tween pain in general and physiological _ de- 
pression. Every pleasure incieases vitality ; 
every pain decreases vitality. Every pleas- 
ure raises the tide of life ; every pain lowers 
the tide of life. Let us consider, first, the 
pains. 

By the general mischiefs that result from 
submission to pains, I do not m.-an those 
arising from the diffused effects of local or- 
ganic lesions, such as follow an aneurism 
caused by intense effort spite of protesting 
sensations, or such as follow the varicose 
veins brought on by continued disregard of 
fatigue in the legs, or such as follow the 
atrophy set up iu muscles that are^ persistently 
exerted when extremely weary ; but I mean 
the general mischiefs caused by that consti- 
tutional disturbance which pain forthwith 
sets up. These are conspicuous when the 
pains are acute, whether they be sensational 
or emotional. Bodily agony long borne pro- 



duces death by exhaustion. More frequently 
arresting the action of the heart for a time, 
it causes that temporary death we call faint- 
ing. On other occasions vomiting is a con- 
sequence. And where such mam l est de- 
rangements do not result, we still, in the pal- 
lor and trembling, trace the general prostra- 
tion. Bej'ond the actual loss of life caused 
by subjection 1o intense cold, there are de- 
pressions of vitality less marked caused by 
cold less extreme — temporary enfeeblement 
following too long an immersion in icy 
water ; enervation and pining away conse- 
quent on inadequate clothing. Similarly is 
it with submission to great heat : we have 
lassitude reaching occasionally to exhaustion ; 
we have, in weak persons, fainting, suc- 
ceeded by temporary debilitation ; and in 
steaming tropical jungles, Europeans contract 
fevers which when not fatal often entail life- 
loag incapacities. Consider, again, the evils 
that follow violent exertion continued in 
spite of painful feelings — now a fatigue 
which destroys appetite or arrests digestion 
if food is taken, implying failure of the rep- 
arative processes when they are most 
needed, and now a prostration of the heart, 
here lasting for a time, and there, where the 
transgression has been repeated day after 
day, made permanent — reducing the rest of 
life to a lower level. No less conspicuous are 
the depressing effects of emotional pains. 
There are occasional cases of death from 
grief, and in other cases the mental suffering 
which a calamity causes, like bodily suffer- 
ing, shows its effects by syncope. Often a 
piece of bad news is succeeded by sickness, 
and continued anxiety will produce loss of 
appetite, perpetual indigestion, and dimin- 
ished strength. Excessive fear, whether 
aroused by physical or moral danger, will in 
like manner arrest for a time the processes 
of nutrition, and not uufrequently in preg- 
nant women brings on miscarriage ; while, 
in less extreme cases, the cold perspiration 
and unsteady hands indicate a general lower- 
ing of the vital activities, entailing partial in- 
capacity of body or mind or both. How 
greatly emotional pain deranges the visceral 
actions is shown \isby the fact that incessant 
worry is not unfrequeully followed by jauu- 
dice. And here, indeed, ihe relation between 
cause and effect happens to have been proved, 
by direct experiment. Making such arrange- 
ments that the bile-duct of a dog delivered 
its product outside the body, Claude Bernard 
observed that so long as lie petted the dog 
and kipt him in good spirits, secretion went 
on at its normal rate ; but on speaking 
angrily, and for a time so treating him as to 
produce depression, the flow of bile was ar- 
rested. Should it be said that evil results of 
such kinds are proved to occur only when 
the pains, bodily or mental, are great, the 
reply is that in healthy persons the injurious 
perturbations caused by small paius, though 
not easily traced, are still produced, and 
that in those whose vital powers are much 
reduced by illness slight physical irrilations- 
and trifling moral annoyances often causa 



504 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



relapses. 

Quite opposite r.re the constitutional effects 
of pleasure. It sometimes, though rarely, 
happens that in feeble persons intense pleas- 
ure — pleasure that is almost pain— gives a 
nervous shock that is mischievous ; hut it 
does not clo this in those who are undebilitat- 
ed by voluntary or enforced submission to ac- 
tions injurious to the organism. In the nor- 
mal order, pleasures, great and small, are 
stimulants to the processes by which life is 
maintained. Among the sensations may be 
instanced those produced by bright light. 
Sunshine is enlivening in comparison with 
gloom — even a gleam excites a wave of pleas- 
ure ; and experiments have shown that sun- 
shine raises the rate of respiration — raised 
respiration being an index of raised vital ac- 
tivities in general. A warmth that is agree- 
able in degree favors the heart's action, aud 
furthers t'.ie various functions to which this 
is instrumental. Though those who aie in 
full vigor and fitly clothed can maintain 
their temperature in winter, and can digest 
additional food to make up for the loss of 
heat, it is otherwise with the feeble, and as 
vigor declines the beneficence of warmth 
becomes conspicuous. That benefits accom- 
pany ttie agreeable sensations produced by 
fresh air, aud the agreeable sensations that 
accompany muscular action afier due rest, 
and the agreeable sensations caused by rest 
after exeitiou. cannot be questioned. Re- 
ceipt of these pleasures conduces to the main 1 
lenaiue of the body in fit condition for all 
the purposes of life. More manifest still are 
the physiological benefits of emotional pleas 
ures. Every power, bodily and mental, is 
increased by " good spirils," which is our 
name for a general crnotionnl satisfaction. 
The truth that the fundamental vital actions 
^ those of nutrition — are furthered by 
laughter-moving conversation, or lather by 
the pleasurable feeling causing laughter, is 
one of old standing ; and every dyspeptic 
knows that in exhilarating company a large 
and varied dinner, including not very digest 
ibie things, may be eaten with impunity, and 
indeed with benefit, while a small, carefully 
chosen dinner of simple things, eaten in soli- 
tude, will be followed hy indigestion. This 
striking effect on the alimentary system is 
accompanied by effects, equally ceitain 
though less manifest, on the circulation and 
the respiration. Again, one who, released 
from daily labors and auxielies, receives de- 
lights from fine scenery, or is enlivened by 
the novelties he sees abroad, comes back 
showing by toned-up face and vivacious 
manner the greater energy with which he is 
prepared to pursue his avocation. Invalids 
especially, on whose narrowed margin of vi- 
tality the influence of conditions is most vis- 
ible, habitually show the benefits derived 
from agreeable states of feeling. A lively 
social circle, the call of an old friend, or 
even removal to a brighter room, will, by the 
induced cheerfulness, much improve the 
physical s'.ate. In brief, as every medical 
man knows, there is no such tonic as happi- 



ness. 

These diffused physiological effects of 
pleasures aud pains, which ate joined wilh 
the local or special physiological effects, are 
indeed obviously inevitable. We have seen 
(" Principles of Psychology," 123-125) 
that while craving, or negative pain, accom- 
panies the under-activity of an organ, and 
while positive pain accompanies its over- 
activity, pleasure accompanies its normal ac- 
tivity. We have seen that by evolution no 
other relations could be established, since, 
through all inferior types of cieatures, if de- 
fect or excess of function produced no dis- 
agreeable sentiency, and medium function 
no agreeable sentiency, there would be noth- 
ing to insure a proportioned performance of 
function. And as it is one of the laws of 
nervous action that each stimulus, beyond a 
direct discharge to the particular organ acted 
on, indirectly causes a general discharge 
throughout the nervous system (" Principles 
of Psychology," §§ 21, 39), it results that 
the rest of the organs, all influenced as they 
are by the nervous system, participate in the 
stimulation. ISo that beyond the aid, more 
slowly shown, which the organs yield to one 
another through the physiological division of 
labor, there is the aid, more quickly shown, 
which mutual excitation gives. While there 
is a benefit to be presently felt by the whole 
organism from the due performance of each 
function, there is an immediate benefit from 
the exaltation of its functions at large caused 
by the accompanying plcasuic ; and from 
pains, whether of excess or defect, there also 
come these double effects, immediate and 
remote. 

§ 37. Non-recognition of these general 
truths vitiates moral speculation at large. 
From the estimates of right and wrong 
habitually framed, these physiological effects 
wrought on the actor by his feelings are en- 
tirely omitted. It is tacitly assumed that 
pleasures and pains have no reactions on the 
body of the recipient, affecting his fitness for 
the duties of life. The only reactions rec- 
ognized are those on character, respecting 
which the current supposition is that ac- 
ceptance of pleasures is detrimental aud sub- 
mission to pains beneficial. The nation, re- 
motely descended from the ghost-theory of 
the savage, that mind and body are indepen- 
dent, has, Linong its various implications, this 
belief that states of consciousness are in no 
wise related to bodily states. " You have 
had your gratification — it is past ; and you 
are as you were before," says the moralist to 
one. And to another he says, " You have 
borne the suffering — it is over ; and there 
the matterends." Bolh statements are false. 
Leaving out of vieAV indirect results, the di- 
rect lesults are that the one has moved a step 
away from death and the other has moved a 
Step toward death. 

Leaving out of view, I say, the indirect 
results It is these indirect results, here for 
the moment left out of view, which the 
moralist lias exclusively in view, being so 
occupied by them that he ignores the direct 



TDE DATA OF ETHICS 



605 



results. The gratification, perhaps pur- 
chased at undue cost, perhaps enjoyed when 
work should have been done, perhaps 
snatched from the rightful claimant, is con- 
sidered only in relation to remote injurious 
effects, aud uo set-off is made for immediate 
heDcficial effects. Conversely, from positive 
and negative pains, home now in the pursuit 
of some futuie advantage, now in discha r ae 
of responsibilities, now in performing a gen- 
erous act, the distant good is alone dwelt on 
and the proximate evil ignored. Conse- 
quences, pleasurable and painful, experienced 
by the actor forthwith, ate of no impor- 
tance, and they become of importance only 
when anticipated as occurring hereafter to 
the actor or to other persons. And further, 
future evils borne by the actor arc considered 
of no account if they result from self-denial, 
and are emphasized only when they result 
from self-gratification. Obviously, estimates 
so framed are erroneous ; and obviously, the 
pervading judgments of conduct based fin 
such estimates must be distorted. JIark the 
anomalies of opinion prrduci d. 

If, as the sequence of a malady contracted 
,n pursuit of illegitimate gratification, an at- 
tack of iritis iujuics vision, the mischief is to 
be counted among those entailed by immoral 
conduct ; but if, regardless of protesting 
sensations, the eyes aie used in study too 
soon after ophthalmia, and there follows 
blindness for years or lor life, entailing not 
only personal unhappiness but a btuden on 
others, moralists are silent. The bioken leg 
which a diunkard's accident causes counts 
among those miseries brought ou self and 
family by intemperance, which form the 
ground for reprobating it ; but if anxiety to 
fulfil duties prompts the continued use of a 
fprained knee spite of the pain, and brings 
on a chronic lameness involving lack of ex- 
eicise, conscqueut ill-health, inefficiency, 
aoxiely. and unhappiness, it is supposed that 
ethics has no verdict to give in the matter. 
A student who is plucked because he has 
spent in amusement the lime and money that 
should have gone in study, is blamed for 
thus making parents unhappy and preparing 
for himself a miserable future ; but another 
who, thinking exclusively of claims on him, 
reads night after night v ith hot, or aching 
head, and, breaking down, cannot take his 
degree, but returns home shattered in health 
and unable to support himself, is named with 
pity only, as not subject to auy moral judg- 
ment, or rather the moral judgment passed 
is wholly favorable. 

Thus recognizing the evils caused by some 
kinds of conduct only, men at latge, and 
moralists as exponents of their beliefs, ignore 
the suffering and death daily caused around 
them by disregard of that guidanee which 
has established itself in the course of evolu- 
tion. Led by the tacit assumption, common 
to pagan stoics and Christian ascetics, that 
we are so diabolically organized that pleas- 
ures are injurious and pains beneficial, 
people on all sides yield examples of lives 
blasted by persisting inactions against which 



their sensations rebel. Here is one who, 
drenched to the skin and sitting in a cold 
wind, pooh-poohs his shiverings aud gets 
rheumatic fever with subsequent heart- 
disease, which makes wot tldess the short life 
remaining to him. Here is another who, dis- 
regarding painful feelings, works too soon 
after a debilitating illness, and establishes 
disordered health that lasts for the rest of 
his days, and makes him useless to himself 
and others. Now the account is of a youth 
who, persisting in gymnastic feats spite of 
scarcely bearable straining, bursts a blood- 
vessel, and. Ions; laid on the shelf, is per- 
manently damaged ; while now it is of a 
man in middle life who, pushing muscular 
effort to painful excess, suddenly brings on 
hernia. In this family is a case of aphasia, 
spreading paralysis, and death, caused by 
eating too little and doing too much ; in that, 
softening of the brain has been brought on 
by ceaseless mental efforts against which the 
feelings hourly protested ; ami in others les3 
serious brain affections have been contracted 
by over-study continued regardless of dis- 
comfort and the cravings for fresh air and 
exercise. Even without accumulating special 
examples, the truth is forced on us by the 
visible traits of classes. The careworn man 
of business too long at his office, the cadaver- 
ous barrister poring half the night over his 
briefs, the feeble factory hands and un- 
healthy seamstresses passing long hours in 
bad air, the anaemic, flat-chested school girls 
bending over many lessons and forbidden 
boisterous play, no less than Sheffield grind- 
ers who die of suffocating dust, and peasants 
crippled with rheumatism due to exposure, 
show us the widespread miseries caused by 
persevering in actions repugnant to the sen- 
sations and neglecting actions which the sen- 
sations prompt. Nay the evidence is still 
more extensive and conspicuous. What are 
the puny, malformed children seen in 
poverty-stricken districts but children whose 
appetites for food and desires for wtirmlh 
have not been adequately satisfied ? What 
are populations stinted ingrowth and prema- 
turely aged, such as parts of France show us, 
but populations iujured by work in excess 
and food in defect — the one implyiug posi- 
tive pain, the other negative pain '! What is 
the implication of that greater mortality 
which occurs among people who are weak- 
ened by privations, unless it is that bodily 
miseries conduce to fatal illnesses ? Or once 
more, what must we infer from the frightful 
amount of disease and death suffered by 
aimies in the field, fed on scanty and bad 
provisions, lying on damp ground, exposed 
to extremes of heat and cold, inadequately 
sheltered from rain, aud subjec t to exhaust- 
ing efforts, unless it be the terrible mischiefs 
caused by continuously subjecting the body 
to treatment which the feelings protest 
against ? 

It matters not to the argument whether the 
actions entailing such effects are voluntary 
or involuntary. It matters not, from the bio- 
logical point of view, whether the motives 



606 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



prompting them are high or low. The vital 
functions accept no apologies ou (he ground 
that neglect of them was unavoidable, or that 
the reason for neglect was noble. The di- 
rect and indirect sufferings caused by non- 
conformity to the laws of life are the same 
whatever induces the nonconformity, and 
cannot be omitted in any rational estimate of 
conduct. If the purpose of ethical inquiry 
is to establish rules of right living, and if 
the rules of right living are those of which 
the total results, individual and general, di- 
rect and indirect, are most conducive to hu- 
man happiness, then it is absurd to ignore 
the immediate results and recognize only the 
remote results. 

§ 38. Here might he urged the necessity 
for preluding the study of moral science by 
the study of biological science. Here might 
be dwelt on the error men make in thinking 
they can understand those special phenomena 
of human life with which ethics deals, while 
paying little or no aitenlion to the general 
pheuomena of human life, and while utterly 
ignoring the pheuomena of iife at large. 
And doubtless there would be truth in the 
inference, that such acquaintance with the 
world of living things as discloses the part 
which pleasures and pains have played in 
organic evolution would help to rectify these 
one-sided conceptions of moralists. It can- 
not be held, however, that lack of this 
knowledge is the sole cause, or the main 
cause, of their one-sidedness. For facts of 
the kind above instanced, which, duly at- 
tended to, would prevent such distortions of 
moral theory, are facts which it needs no 
biological inquiries to learn, but which are 
daily thrust before the eyes of all. The 
truth is, rather, that the general consciousness 
is so possessed by sentiments and ideas at 
variance with the conclusions necessitated 
by familiar evidence, that the evidence gets 
no attention. These adverse sentiments and 
ideas have several roots. 

There is the theological root. As before 
shown, from the worship of cannibal ances- 
tors who delighted in Avitnessing tortures, 
there resulted the primitive conception of 
deities who were propitiated by the bearing 
of pains, and consequently angered by the 
receipt of pleasures. Through the religions 
of the scmicivilizcd, in which this concep- 
tion of the divine nature remains conspicuous, 
it has persisted, in progressively modified 
forms, down to our own limes, and still col- 
ors the beliefs both of those who adhere to 
the current creed and of those wiio nominally 
reject it. There is another root in the primi- 
tive and still-surviving militancy. "While 
social antagonisms continue to generate war, 
which consists in endeavors to inflict pain 
and death while submitting to the risks of 
pain and death, and which necessarily in- 
volves great privations, it is needful that 
physical suffering, whether considered in it- 
self or in the evils it bequeaths, should be 
thought little of, and that among pleasures 
recognized as most worthy should be those 
which victory brings. Nor does partially 



developed industrialism fail to furnish & 
root. With social evolution, which implies 
transition from the life of wandering hunters 
to the life of settled peoples engaged in la- 
bor, and which therefore entails activities 
widely unlike those to which the aboriginal 
constitution is adapted, there comes an under- 
cxercisc of faculties for which the social 
state affords no scope, and an overtaxing of 
faculties required for the social state— the 
one implying denial of certain pleasures, and 
the other submission to certain pains. 
Hence, along witli that growth of population 
which makes the struggle for existence in- 
tense, bearing of pains^and sacrifice of pleas- 
ures is daily necessitated. 

Now, always and everywhere, there arises 
among men a theory conforming to their 
practice. The savage nature, originating the 
conception of a savage deity, evolves a theory 
of supernatural control sufficiently stringent 
and cruel to influence his conduct. With 
submission to despotic government severe 
enough in its restraints to keep in order bar- 
barous natures, there grows up a theory of 
divine right to rule and the duty of absolulo 
submission. Where war is made the business 
of life by the existence of warlike neighbors, 
virtues which are required for war come to 
be regarded as supreme virtues ; while, con- 
trariwise, when industrialism has grown 
predomnant, the violence and the deception 
which warriors glory in come to be held 
criminal. In like manner, then, there arises 
a tolerable adjustment of the actually ac- 
cepted (not the nominally accepted) theory of 
right living to living as it is daily carried 
on. If the life is one that necessitates habit- 
ual denial of pleasures and bearing of pains, 
there grows up an answering ethical system 
under which the receipt of pleasures is 
tacitly disapproved and the. bearing of pains 
avowedly approved. The mischiefs entailed 
by pleasures in excess are dwelt on, while 
the benefits which normal pleasures bring 
are ignored, and the good results achieved 
by submission to pains are fully set forth, 
while the evils arc overlooked. 

But while recognizing the desirableness of, 
and indeed the necessity for, systems of eth- 
ics adapted, like religious systems and politi- 
cal systems, to their respective times and 
places, we have here to regard the fiist as, 
like the others, transitional. We must infer 
that, like a purer creed and a better govern- 
ment, a truer ethics belongs to a more ad- 
vanced social state. Led, d priwi, to con- 
clude that distortions must exist, we are en- 
abled to recognize as such the distortions 
we find — answering in nature, as these do, 
to expectation. And there is forced on us 
the truth that a scientific morality arises only 
as fast as the one sided conceptions adapted 
to transitory conditions are developed into 
both-sided conceptions. The science of right 
living has to take account of all consequences 
in so far as they affect happiuess, personally 
or socially, directly or indirectly, and by as 
much as it ignores any class of consequences 
by so much docs it fail to be science- 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



507 



^ 3!). Like the pl^'sical view, then, the 
biological view corresponds with the view 
gained by looking at conduct in general 
from the standpoint of evolution. 

That which was physically defined as a 
moving equilibrium, we define biologically as 
a balance of functions. The implication of 
such a balance is that the several functions 
in their kinds, amounts, and combinations, 
nre adjusted to the several activities which 
maintain and constitute complete life ; and 
to be so adjusted is to have reached the goal 
toward which the evolution of conduct con- 
tinually tends. 

Passing lo the feelings which accompany 
the performance of functions, we see that of 
necessity, during the evolution of organic 
life, pleasures have become the concomitants 
of noinial amounts of fuuclious, while pains, 
positive and negative, have become the con- 
comitants of excesses and defects of func- 
tions. ADd though in every species derange- 
ments of these relations are often caused by 
ch:viges of conditions, they ever re-establish 
themselves, disappearance of the species be- 
ing the alternative. 

Mankind, inheriting from creatures of 
lower kinds such adjustments between feel- 
ings and functions as concern fundamental 
bodily requirements, and daily forced by 
peremptory feelings to do the things which 
maintain life and avoid those which bring 
immediate death, has been subject to a 
change of conditions uuusually great and in- 
volved This has considerably deranged the 
guidance by sensations, and has deranged in 
a much greater degree the guidance by emo- 
tions. The result is that in many cases pleas- 
ures are not connected with actions which 
must be performed, nor pains with actions 
which must be avoided, but contrariwise. 

Several influences have conspired to make 
men ignore the well-working of these lela- 
tions between feelings and functions, and to 
observe whatever of ill-working is seen in 
them. Hence, while the evils which some 
pleasures entail are dilated upon, the benefits 
habitually accompanying receipt of pleasures 
are unnoticed ; at the same time that the 
benefits achieved through certain pains are 
magnified, while the immense mischiefs 
which pains bring are made little of. 

The ethical theories characterized by these 
perversions are products of, and are appro- 
priate to, the forms of social life which the 
imperfectly adapted constitutions of men 
produce. But with the progress of adapta- 
tion, bringing faculties and requirements 
into harmony, such incongruities of experi- 
ence, and consequent distortions of theory, 
must diminish ; until, along with complete 
adjustment of humanity to the social state, 
will go recognition of the truths that actions 
are completely right only when, besides being 
conducive to future happiuess, special and 
general, they are immediately pleasurable, 
and that painfulness, not only ultimate but 
proximate, is the concomitant of actions 
which are wrong. 

So that, from the biological point of view, 



ethical science becomes a specification of the 
conduct of associated men who are severally 
so constituted that the various self-preserving 
activities, the activities required for rearing 
offspriog, and those which social welfare de- 
mauds, are fulfilled in the spontaneous ex- 
ercise of duly proportioned faculties, each 
yielding when in action its quantum of pleas- 
ure ; and who are, by consequence, so con- 
stituted that excess or defect in any one of 
these actions brings its quantum of paiu, iui 
mediate and remote. 

CHAPTER VII. 

TIJE PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW. 

§ 40. The last chapter, in so far as it dealt- 
with feelings in their relations to conduct,.' 
recognized only their physiological aspects 
their psychological aspects were passed over. 
In this chapter, conversely, we are not con- 
cerned with the constitutional conncotions- 
between feelings, as incentives or deterrents, . 
and physical benefits to be gained or mis- 
chiefs to be avoided, nor with the reactive > 
effects of feelings on the state of the organ- 
ism, as fitting or unfitting it. for future ac- 
tion. Here we have to consider represented i 
pleasures and pains, sensational and emo- 
tional, as constituting deliberate motives — an- 
forming factors in the conscious adjustments . 
of acts to ends. 

§ 41. The rudimentary psychical act, not 
yet differentiated from a physical act, im- 
plies an excitation and a motion. In a creat- 
ure of low type the touch of food excites • 
prehension. In a somewhat higher creature 
the odor from nutritive matter sets up mo- - 
rton of the body toward the matter. And 1 
where rudimentary vision exists, sudden ob- 
scuration of light, implying the passage of ' 
something large, causes convulsive muscular 
movements which mostly carry the body ' 
away from the source of danger. Iu each) 
of these cases we may distinguish four fac- 
tors. There is (a), that properly of the ex- 
ternal object which primarily affects the 
organism — the taste, smell, or opacity ; and, . 
connected with such property there is in the ■ 
external object that character (b) which . 
renders seizure of it or escape from it ben- 
eficial. Within the oiganism there is (c) the 
impression or sensation which the property 
(a) produces, serving as stimulus ; and theie • 
is, connected with it, the motor change (d), 
by which seizure or escape is effected. Now 
psychology is chiefly concerned with the- 
connection between the relation a b and the 
relation c d, umler all those forms which they 
assume in the course of evolution. Each of 
the factors and each of the relations grows 
more involved as organization advances. In- 
stead of being single, the identifying attri- 
bute a often becomes, in the environment of 
a superior animal, a cluster of attributes;, 
such as the size, form, colors, motions, dis- 
played by a distant creature that is danger- 
ous. The factor b, with which this combi- 
nation of attributes is associated, becomes 
the congeries of characters, powers, habils, 



608 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



which constitute it an enemy. Of the sub- 
jective factors, c becomes a complicated set 
of visual sensations co-ordinated with one 
another and with the ideas and feelings es- 
tablished by experience of such-enemies, and 
constituting the motive to escape ; while d 
becomes the intricate, and often prolonged, 
series of runs, leaps, doubles, dives, etc., 
made in eluding the enemy. In human "life 
we find the same four outer and inner fac- 
tors, si ill more multiform and entangled in 
their compositions and connections. The en- 
tire assemblage of physical al tributes, a. prc- 
«ented by an estate that is advertised for sale, 
passes enumeration ; and the assemblage of 
■various utilities, b, going along with these at- 
tributes, is also beyond brief specification. 
The perceptions and ideas, likes and dislikes, 
c, set up by the aspect of the estate, and 
'which, compounded and recompounded, 
"eventually form the motive for buying it, 
make a whole too large and complex for de- 
scription ; and the transactions, legal, pecu- 
niary, and other, gone through in making 
the purchase and taking possession, are 
scarcely less numerous and elaborate. Nor 
must we overlook the fact that as evolution 
progresses, not only do the factors increase 
in complexity but also the relations among 
them. Originally, a is directly and simply 
•conuected 'with 6, while a is directly and 
simply connected with d. But eventually, 
the connections between a and b and be- 
tween c and d become very indirect and in- 
volved. On the one hand, as the first illus- 
tration shows us, sapidity and nutritiveness 
are closely bound together, as are also the 
stimulation caused by the one and the con- 
tiaetion which utilizes the other. But, as 
We see in the last illustration, the connection 
between the visible traits of an eslate and 
1hose characters which constitute its value 
is at once remote and complicated, while 
the transition from the purchaser's highly 
composite motive to the numerous actions of 
sensory and motororgans, severally intricate, 
Which effect the purchase, is through an en- 
tangled plexus of thoughts and feelings con- 
stituting his decision. 

■ After this explanation will be apprehended 
a truth otherwise set forth in the "Princi- 
ples of Psychology." Mind consists of 
feelings and the relations among feelings. By 
composition of the relations and ideas of re- 
lations, intelligence arises. By composition 
«f the feelings and ideas of feeliugs, emo- 
tion arises. And, Other things equal, the 
evolution of either is great in proportion as 
the composition is great. One of the neces- 

; .sary implications is that cognition becomes 
higher in proportion as it is remoter from 
reflex action, while emotion becomes higher 
in proportion as it is remoter from sensation. 

. And now of the various corollaries from 
this broad view of psychological evolution, 
let us observe those which concern the mo- 
tives and actions that are classed as moral and 
immoral. 

§ 42. The mental process by which, in any 
case, the adjustment of acts to ends is 



effected, and which, undor its higher forms, 
becomes the subject-matter of ethical judg- 
ments, is, as above implied, divisible into the 
rise of a feeling or feelings constituting the 
motive and the thought or thoughts through 
which the motive is shaped and finally issues 
in action. The first of these elements, orig- 
inally an excitement, becomes a simple sensa- 
tion ; then a compound sensation ; then a 
cluster of partially presentative and partially 
representative sensations, forming an incipi- 
ent emotion ; then a cluster of exclusively 
ideal or representative sensations, forming an 
emotion proper ; then a cluster of such cms* 
ters, forming a compound emotion ; and 
eventually becomes a still more involved emo- 
tion, composed of the ideal forms of such 
compound emotions. The other element, be- 
ginning with that immediate passage of a 
single stimulus into a single motion, called 
reflex action, presently comes to be a set of 
associated discharges of stimuli producing 
associated motions, constituting instinct. 
Step by step arise more entangled combina- 
tions of stimuli, somewhat variable in their 
modes of union, leading to complex motions 
similarly variable in their adjustments ; 
whence occasional hesitations in the sensori- 
motor processes. Presently is reached a 
stage at which the combined clusters of im- 
pressions, not all present together, issue in 
actions not all simultaneous, implying rep- 
resentation of results, or thought. After- 
ward follow stages in which various thoughts 
have time to pass before the composite mo- 
tives produce the appropriate actions. Until 
at last arise those long deliberations dining 
which the probabilities of various conse- 
quences are estimated and the promptings 
of the correlative feelings balanced, consti- 
tuting calm judgment. That under either 
of its aspects the later forms of this mental 
process are the higher, ethically considered 
as well as otherwise considered, will be 
readily seen. 

For from the first, complication of sent iency 
has accompanied better and more numerous 
adjustments of acts to ends, as also has com- 
plication of movement, and complication of 
the co-ordinating or intellectual process unit- 
ing the two. Whence it follows that the 
acts characterized by the more complex 
motives and the more involved thoughts 
have all along been of higher authority for 
guidance. Some examples will make this 
clear. 

Here is an aquatic creature guided by thb 
odor of organic matter toward things serving 
lor food, but a cieature which, lacking any 
other guidance, is at the mercy of larger 
creatures coming near. Here is another 
which, also guided to food by odor, possesses 
ludimentary vision, and so is made to start 
spasmodically away from a moving body 
which diffuses this odor, in those cases where 
it is large enough to produce sudden obscu- 
ration of light — usually an enemy. Evidently 
life will frequently be saved by conforming 
to the later and higher stimulus instead of to 
the earlier and lower. Observe at a mora 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



609 



advanced stage a parallel conflict. This is a 
beast which pursues others for prey; and, 
either lacking experience or prompted by 
raging hunger, attacks one more powerful 
than itself and gets destroyed. C'onveisely, 
that is a beast which, prompted by a hunger 
"5t)iially keen, but ei ther By-individual experi- 
jnce or effects of inherited exper ience, made 
conscious of evil by the aspect of one more 
powerful than itself, is deterred from attack- 
ing, anil saves its life by subordinating the 
primary motive, consisting of craving sensa- 
tions, to the secondary motive, consisting 
of ideal feelings, distinct or vague. Ascend- 
ing at once from these examples of conduct- 
in animals to examples of human conduct, 
we shall see that the contrasts between in- 
ferior and superior have habitually the same 
traits. The savage of lowest type devours 
all the food captured by to-day's chase, and, 
hungry on the morrow, has perhaps for days 
to bear the pangs of starvation. The superior 
savage, conceiving more vividly the entailed 
sufferings if no game is to be found, is de- 
terred by his complex feeling from giving 
■way entirely to his simple feeling. Similarly 
are the two contrasted in the inertness which 
goes along with lack of forethought, and the 
activity which due forethought produces. 
The primitive man, idly inclined, and ruled 
by the sensations of the moment, will not ex- 
ert himself until actual pains have to be es- 
caped ; but tire man somewhat advanced, 
able more distinctly to imagine future grati- 
fications and sufferings, is prompted by the 
thought of these to overcome his love of ease 
— decrease of misery and mortality resulting 
from this predominance of the representative 
feelings over the preseutalive feelings. 
Without dwelling on the fact that among 
the civilized, those who lead the life of the 
senses are contrasted in the same way" with 
those whose lives are largely occupied with 
pleasures not of a sensual kind, let me point 
out that there are analogous contrasts between 
guidance by the less complex representative 
feelings, or lower emotions, and guidance by 
the more complex representative feelings, or 
higher emotions. When led by his acquisi- 
tiveness — a re-representative feeling which, 
acting under due control, conduces to wel- 
fare — the thief takes another man's property, 
his act is determined by certain imagined 
roximate pleasures of relatively simple 
iuds, rather than by less clearly imagined 
possible pains that are more remote arid of 
relatively involved kinds. But in the con- 
scientious man there is an adequate restrain- 
ing motive, still more rc-reprcsenlalive in its 
nature, including not only ideas of punish- 
ment, and not only ideas of lost reputation 
and ruin, but including ideas of the claims 
of the person owning the property and of 
the pains which loss of it will entail on him, 
all joined with a general aversion to acts in- 
jurious to others, which arises from the in- 
herited effects of experience. And here at 
the end we see, as we saw at the beginning, 
that guidance by the more complex feeling 
on the average conduces to welfare more than 



does guidance by the simpler feeling. 

The like holds with the intellectual co- 
ordinations through which stimuli issue in 
motions. The lowest actions, called reflex, 
in which an impression made on an afferent 
nerve pauses by discharge through an 
efferent uerve a contraction, shows us a very 
limited adjustment of acts to ends ; lire im- 
pression being simple, and the resulting mo- 
tion simple, the internal co-ordination is also 
simple. Evidently when there are several 
senses which can be together affected by an 
outer object, and when, according as such 
object is discriminated as of one or other 
kind, the movements made in response are 
combined in one or other way, the interme- 
diate co-ordinations are necessarily more in- 
volved. And evidently each farther step in 
the evolution of intelligence, always instru- 
mental to better self-preservation, exhibits 
this same general trait. The adjustments by 
which the more involved actions are made 
appropriate to the more involved circum- 
stances imply more intricate, and conse- 
quently more deliberate and conscious, co- 
ordinations ; until, when we come to civilized 
men, who in their daily business; taking into 
account many data and conditions, adjust 
their proceedings to vatiorrs consequences, 
we see that the intellectual actions, becoming 
of the kind we call judicial, are at once very 
elaborate and very deliberate. 

Observe, then, what follows respecting the 
relative authorities of motives. Throughout 
the ascent from low creatures up to man, 
and from the lowest types of man up to th« 
highest, self-preservation has been increased 
by the subordination of simple excitation , to 
compound excitations— the subjection of im- 
mediate sensations to the ideas ot sensations 
to come — the overruling of preservative feel- 
ings by representative feelings, and of repie- 
sentative feelings by re-representative feel- 
ings. As life has advanced, the accompany- 
ing sentiency has become increasingly ideal ; 
and among feelings produced by the com- 
pounding of ideas, the highest, and those 
which have evolved latest, are the reeom- 
pounded or doubly ideal. Hence it follows 
that as guides, the feelings have authorities 
p roportionate to the degrees in which they 
are removed by their complexity and their 
ideality from simple sensations and appetites. 
A further implication is made clear by study- 
ing the intellectual sides of these mental pro- 
cesses by which acts are adjusted to ends. 
Where they are low and simple, these com- 
prehend the guiding only of immediate acts 
by immediate stimuli — the entire transaction, 
in each case lasting but a moment, refers 
only to a proximate result. But with the 
development of intelligence and the growing 
ideality of the motives^ the ends to winch the 
acts are adjusted cease to be exclusively im- 
mediate. The more ideal motives concern 
ends that are more distant ; and with ap- 
proach to the highest types, present ends 
become increasingly subordinate to those fu- 
ture ends which the ideal motives have for 
their objects. Hence there arises a certain 
presumption in favor of a motive which re- 



610 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



fers to a remote good, in comparison with 
one which refers to a proximate good. 

§ 4:?. In the last chapter I hinted that be- 
sides the several influences there named as 
fostering the ascetic belief that doing things 
which are agreeable is detrimental while 
bearing disagreeable things is beneficial, 
there remained to be named an influence of 
deeper origin. This is shadowed forth in the 
foregoing paragraphs. 

For the general truth that guidance by 
such simple pleasures and pains as result 
from fulfilling or denying bodily desires, is, 
under one aspect, inferior to guidance by 
those pleasures and pains which the complex 
ideal feelings yield, has led to the belief that 
the promptings of bodily desires should be 
disregarded. "Further, the general I ruth that 
pursuit of proximate satisfactions is, under 
one aspect, inferior to pursuit of ultimate 
satisfactions, has led to the belief that proxi- 
mate satisfactions must not be valued. 

Ia the early stages of every science, the 
generalizations reached are not qualified 
enough. The discriminating statements of 
the truths formulated arise afterward, by 
limitation of the undiscriminating statements. 
As with bodily vision, which at first appreci- 
ates only the broadest traits of objects, and 
so leads to rude classings which developed 
vision, impressible by minor differences, has 
to correct ; so with mental vision in relation 
to general truths, it happens that at first the 
inductions, wrongly made all-embracing, 
have to wait for scepticism and critical ob- 
servation to restrict them, by taking account 
of unnoticed differences. Hence, we may 
expect to find the current ethical conclusions 
too sweeping. Let us note how, in three 
ways, these dominant beliefs, alike of pro- 
fessed moralists and of people at large, are 
made erroneous by lack of qualifications. 

In the first place, the authority of the 
lower feelings as guides is by no means al- 
ways inferior to the authority of the higher 
feelings, but is often superior. Daily occur 
occasions on which sensations must be 
obeyed rather than sentiments. Let any one 
think of sitting all night naked in a snow- 
storm, or going a week without food, or let- 
ting his head be held under water for ten 
minutes, and he will see that the pleasures 
and pains directly related to maintenance of 
life may not be wholly subordinated to the 
pleasures and pains indirectly related to 
maintenance of life. Though in many cases 
guidance by the simple feelings rather thau 
by the complex feelings is injurious, in other 
cases guidance by the complex feelings 
rather than by the simple feelings is fatal ; 
ttnd throughout a wide range of cases their 
relative authorities as guides are indetermi- 
nate. Grant that in a man pursued, the 
protesting feelings accompanying intense and 
prolonged effort must, to preserve life, be 
overruled by the fear of his pursuers ; it may 
yet happen that, persisting till he drops, the 
resulting exhaustion causes death, though, 
the pursuit having been abandoned, death 
would not otherwise have resulted. Grant 



that a widow left in poverty must deny her 
appetite, that she may give enough food to 
her children to keep them alive ; yet the de- 
nial of her appetite, pushed too far, may leave 
them not only entirely without food but 
without guardianship. Grant that, working 
his brain unceasingly from dawn till dark, 
the man in pecuniary difficulties must dis- 
regard rebellious bodily sensations in obe- 
dience to the conscientious desire to liquidate 
the claims on him ; yet he may carry this 
subjection of simple feelings to complex feel- 
ings to the extent of shattering his health, 
and failing in that end which, with less of 
this subjection, he might have achieved. 
Clearly, then, the subordination of lower feel- 
ings must be a conditional subordination. 
The supremacy of higher feelings must be a 
qualified supremacy. 

In another way does the generalization or- 
dinarily made err by excess. With the truth, 
that life is high in proportion as the simple 
presentative feelings are under the control of 
the compound representative feelings, it 
joins, as though they were corollaries, cer- 
tain propositions which are not coiollaries. 
The ennent conception is not that the lower 
must yield to the higher when the two con- 
flict, but that the lower must be disregarded 
even when there is no conflict. This ten- 
dency which the growth of moral ideas has 
generated, to condemn obedience to inferior 
feelings when superior feelings protest, has 
begotten a tendency to condemn inferior 
feelings considered intrinsically. " I really 
think she does things because she likes to do 
them," once said to me one lady concerning 
another — the foim of expression and the 
manner both implying the belief not only 
that such behavior is wrong, but also that 
every one must recognize it as wrong. And 
there prevails widely a notion of this kind. 
In practice, indeed, the not ion, js very gen- 
erally inoperative. Though it prompts vari- 
ous incidental asceticisms, as of those who 
think it alike manly aud salutary to go with- 
out a grcat-eoat in cold weather, or to per- 
severe through the winter in taking an out- 
of-door plunge, yet, generally, the pleasur- 
able feelings accompanying due fulfilment 
of bodily needs are accepted — acceptance 
being, indeed, sufficiently peremptory. But 
oblivious of these contradictions in their 
practice, men commonly betray a vague idea 
that there is something degrading or injuri- 
ous, or both, in doing that which is agreeable 
and avoiding that which is disagreeable. 
" Pleasant but wrong," is a phrase fre- 
quently used in a way implying that the twf 
are naturally connected. As above hinted, 
however, such beliefs result from a confuses 
apprehension of the general truth that the 
more compound and representative feeling 
are, on the average, of higher authority than 
the simple and presentative feelings. Ap- 
prehended with discrimination, this truth 
implies that the authority of trie simple, or- 
dinarily less than that of the compound but 
occasionally greater, is habitually to be ac- 
cepted when the compound do not oppose. 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



511 



Tn yet a third way is this principle of sub- 
ordination misconceived. One of tbe con- 
trasts between the earlier evolved feelings 
and the later evolved feelings is that they re- 
fer respectively to the more immediate effects 
of actions and to the more remote effects ; 
and, speaking generally, guidance by that 
which is ne,ar is inferior to guidance by that 
which is distant. Hence has resulted the be- 
lief that, irrespective of their kinds, the 
pleasures of the present must be sacrificed to 
the pleasures of the future. We see this in 
the maxim often impressed on children when 
eating their meals, that they should reserve 
the nicest morsel till tbe last — the check on 
improvident yielding to immediate impulse 
being here joined with the tacit teaching that 
the same gratifical ion becomes more valuable 
as it becomes more distant. Bueh thinking 
is traceable throughout daily conduct ; by 
no means indeed in all, but in Ihose who are 
distinguished as prudent and well regulated 
in their conduct. Hunyiug over his break- 
fast that he may catch the train, snatching a 
sandwich in the middle of the day, and eat- 
ing a late dinner when he is so worn out that 
he is incapacitated for e\ening recreation, 
the man of business pursues a life in which 
nut only the satisfactions of bodily desires, 
but also those of higher tastes and feelings 
are, as far as may be. disregarded, that dis- 
tant ends may be achieved ; and yet if you 
ask what are these distant ends, you find (in 
cases where there are no parental responsi- 
bilities) that they are included under the con- 
ception of more comfortable living in time 
to come. So ingrained is this belief that it 
is wrong to seek immediate enjoyments and 
right to seek remote ones only, that you may 
hear from a busy m;in who has been on a 
pleasure excursion a kind of apology for 
his conduct. He deprecates the unfavorable 
judgments of his friends by explaining that 
the state of his health had compelled him to 
take a holiday. Nevertheless, if you sound 
him with respect to his future, you find that 
his ambition is by and by to retire and devote 
himself wholly to tbe relaxations which he 
is now somewhat ashamed of taking. 

The general truth disclosed by the study 
of evolving conduct, sub-humau and human, 
that for the better preservation of life the 
primitive, simple, present-alive feelings must 
be' controlled by the later-evolved, compound, 
and representative feelings, has thus come, 
in the course of civilization, to be lecoguized 
by men, but necessarily at first iu too in- 
discriminate a way. The current concep- 
tion, while it errs by implying that the 
authority of the higher over the lower is un- 
limited, errs also by implying that the rule 
of the lower must be resisted even when it 
does not conflict with the rule of the higher, 
and further errs by implying that a gratifica- 
tion which forms a proper aim if it is remote 
forms an improper aim if it is proximate. 

§ 44. Withoutexplieitly saying so, we have 
been here tracing the genesis of the moral 
consciousness. For unquestionably the es- 
sential trait in the moral consciousness is the 



control of some feeling or feelings by some 
other feeling or feelings. 

Among the higher animals we may see, 
distinctly enough, the conflict of feelings and 
the subjection of simpler to more compound ; 
as wheu a dog is restrained from suatcUuig 
food by fear of the peualties which may 
come if he yields to his appetite, or as when 
he desist3 from scratching at a hole lest he 
should lose his master, who has walked ou. 
Here, however, though there is subordina- 
tion, there is not conscious subordination — 
there is no introspection revealing the fact 
that one feeling has yielded to auother. So 
is it even with human beings wheu little de- 
veloped mentally. The pre social man, wan- 
dering about in families, and ruled by such 
sensations and emotions as are caused by the 
circumstances of the moment, though occa- 
sionally subject to conflicts of motives, meets 
with comparatively few cases in which the 
advantage of postponing the immediate to 
the remote is forced ou his atteutiou ; nor 
has he the intelligence requisite for analyz- 
ing aud generalizing such of these cases as 
occur. Only as social evolution renders the 
life more complex, the restraints many and 
strong, the evils of impulsive conduct 
marked, and the comforts to be gained by 
providing for the future tolerably certain, 
can there come experiences numerous enoug'.i 
to make familiar the benefit of subordinating 
the simpler feelings to the mire complex 
ones. Only then, too, does there arise a 
sufficient intellectual power to make an in- 
duction from these experiences, followed by 
a sufficient massing of individual inductions 
into a public and traditional induction im- 
pressed on each generation as it grows up. 

And here we are inttoduced to certain 
facts of profound significance. This con- 
scious relinquishment of immediate and 
special good to gain distant and general good, 
while it is a cardinal trait of the self-restraint 
called moral, is also a cardinal trait of self- 
restraiuts other than those called moral — the 
restraints that originate from fear of the vis- 
ible ruler, of the invisible ruler, and of society 
at laige. Wheuever the individual refrains 
from doing that which the passing desire 
prompts, lest he should afterward suffer 
legal punishment or Divine vengeance, or 
public reprobation, or all of them, he sur- 
renders the near and definite pleasure rather 
than risk the remote and greater, though less 
definite pains, which taking it may briug 
on him; and, conversely, when he uudei- 
goes some present paiu, that he may reap 
some probable future pleasure, political, re- 
ligious, or social. But though all these four 
kinds of internal control have the common 
character that the simpler and less ideal feel- 
ings are consciously overruled by the more 
complex and ideal feelings, and though, at 
first, they are practically co-extensive an 1 
undistinguished, yet, in the course of social 
evolution, they differentiate, and eventually 
the moral control, with its accompanying 
conceptions aud sentiments, emerges as in- 
dependent. Let us glance at the leading 



512 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



aspects of the process. 

.'While, as in the rudest groups, neither 
jjolitical nor religious rule exists, the leading 
check to the immediate satisfaction of each 
desire as it arises is consciousness of the 
evils which the anger of fellow-savages may 
entail, if satisfaction of the desire is obtained 
at their cost. In this early stage the imagined 
pains which constitute the governing motive 
are those apt to be inflicted by beings of like 
nature, undistinguished in power : the polit- 
ical, religious, aud social restraints are as 
yet represented only by this mutual dread of 
vengeance. When special strength, skill, or 
courage makes one of them a leader in bat- 
tle, he necessarily inspires greater fear than 
any other, and there comes to be a more de- 
cided check on such satisfactions of the de- 
sires as will injure or offend him. Gradually 
as by habitual war chieftainship is estab- 
lished, the evils thought of as likely to arise 
from angering the chief, not only by aggres- 
sion upon him, but by disobedience to him, 
become distinguishable both from the smaller 
evils which other personal antagonisms cause 
aud from the more diffused evils thought of 
as arising from social reprobation. That is, 
political control begins to differentiate from 
the more indefinite control of mutual dread. 
Meanwhile there has been developing the 
ghost-theory. In all but the rudest groups, 
the double of a deceased man, propitiated at 
deaih aud afterward, is conceived as able to 
injure the survivors. Consequently, as fast 
as the ghost-theory becomes established and 
definite, there grows up another kind of 
check oa immediate satisfaction of the desires 
— a check constituted by ideas of the evils 
which ghosts may inflict if offended ; and 
when political headship gets settled, aud the 
sJiosts of dea I chiefs, thought of as more 
powerful and more relentless than other 
ghosts, are especially dreaded, there begins 
to take shape thij form of restraint dis- 
tinguished as religious. For a long time 
these three sets of restraints, with their cor- 
relative sanctions, though becoming separate 
in. consciousness, remain co-extensive, and 
do so because they mostly refer to one end — 
success in war. The duty of blood revenge 
is insisted on even while yet nothing to be 
called social organization exists. As the 
chief gaius predominance, the killing of ene- 
mies becomes a political duty ; and as the 
anger of the dead chief comes to be dreaded, 
the killing of enemies becomes a religious 
duty.. Loyalty to the ruler while lie lives 
and after he dies is increasingly 6hnwu by 
holding life at his disposal for purposes of 
war. The earliest enacted punishments are 
those, for insubordination and for breaches of 
observances which express subordination — 
all of them militant in origin ; while the Di- 
vine injunetions, originally traditions of the 
dead king's will, mainly refer to the destruc- 
tion of peoples with whom he was at enmity, 
and Divine anger or approval are conceived as 
determined by the degrees in which subjec- 
tion, to him is shown, directly by worship 
and indirectly by fulfilling these injunctions. 



The Fijian, who is said on entering the other 
world to commend himself by narrating Ids 
successes in battle, and who, when alive, & 
described as sometimes greatly distressed if 
he thinks he has not killed enemies enough 
to please his gods, shows us the resulting 
ideas and feelings, and reminds us of kin- 
dred ideas aud feelings betrayed by ancient 
races. To all which add that the control of 
social opinion, besides being directly exer- 
cised, as in the earliest stage, by praise of 
the brave and blame of the cowardly, comes 
to be indirectly exercised with a kindred 
general effect by applause of loyalty to the 
ruler and piety to the god. So that the three 
differentiated forms of control which grow 
up along with militant organization and ac- 
tion, while enforcing kindred restraints and 
incentives, also enforce one another ; and 
their separate aud joint, disciplines hate the 
common character that they involve the sac- 
rifice of immediate special benefits to obtain 
more distant and general benefits. 

At the same time there have been develop- 
ing under the Same three sanctions, restraints 
and incentives of another order, similarly 
characterized by subordination of the proxi- 
mate to the remote. Joint aggressions upon 
men outside the society cannot prosper if 
there are many aggressions of man on man 
within the society. War implies co-opera- 
tion, and co-operation is prevented by an- 
tagonisms among those who are to co-operate. 
We saw that in the primitive ungoverned 
group the main check on immediate satisfac- 
tion of his desires by each man is the fear of 
other men's vengeance if they are injured by 
taking the satisfaction, and through early 
stages of social development this dread of 
retaliation continues to be the chief motive to 
such forbearance as exists. But though long 
alter political authority has become estab- 
lished the taking of personal satisfaction for 
injuries persists, the growth of political 
authority gradually checks it. The fact that 
success in war is endangered if his followers 
fight among themselves, forces itself on the 
attention of the ruler. He has a strong mo- 
tive for restraining quarrels, and therefore 
for preventing the aggressions which cause 
quarrels ; and as his power becomes great- 
er he forbids the aggressions and inflicts 
punishments for disobedience. Presently, 
political restraints of this class, like those of 
the preceding class, are enforced by religious 
restraints. The sagacious chief, succeeding 
in war partly because he thus enforces order 
among his followers, leaves behind him t 
tradition of the commands he habitually gave. 
Dread of his ghost tends to produce regard 
for these commands, aud they eventually 
acquire sacredness. With further social evo- 
lution come, in like manuer, further inter- 
dicts, checking aggressions of less serious 
kinds ; until eventually there gtows up a 
body of civil laws. Aud then in the way 
shown arise beliefs concerning the Divine 
disapproval of these minor as well as of the 
major civil offences, ending, occasionally, 
in a set of religious injunctions harmonizing 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



513 



•with and enforcing the political injunctions ; 
while simultaneously there develops, as be- 
fore, asocial sanction for these Miles of in- 
ternal conduct, strengthening the political 
and religious sanctions. 

But now observe that while these three 
controls, political, religious, and social, sever- 
ally lead men to suboidiuate proximate sat- 
isfactions to remote satisfactions, and while 
they are in this respect like the moral con- 
trol, which habitually requires the subjection 
of simple presentative feelings to complex 
representative feelings and postponement of 
present to future, yet they do not constitute 
the moral control, but are only preparatory 
to it — are controls within which the moral 
control evolves. The command of the politi- 
cal ruler is at first obeyed, not because of its 
perceived rectitude, but simply because it is 
his command, which there will be a penalty 
for disobeying. The check is not a mental 
representation of the evil consequences 
which the forbidden act will, in the nature 
of tilings, cause, but it is a mental repre- 
sentation of the factitious evil consequences. 
Down to our own time we trace, in legal 
phrases, the original doctrine that the aggres- 
sion of one citizen on another is wrong, and 
will be punished, not so much because of 
the injury done him as because of the im- 
plied disregard of the king's will. Sim- 
ilarly, the sinfulness of breaking a Divine in- 
junction was universally at one time, and is 
still by many, held to consist in the disobe- 
dience to God rather than in the deliberate 
entailing of injury ; and even now it is a 
common belief that acts are right only if 
performed in conscious fulfilment of the 
Divine will; — nay, are even wrong if other- 
wise performed. The like holds, too, with 
that further control exercised by public 
opinion. On listening to the remarks made 
respecting cunformity to social rules, it is 
noticeable that breach of them is condemned 
not so much because of any essential impro- 
priety as because the world's authority is 
ignored. How imperfectly the truly moral 
control is even now differentiated from these 
controls within which it has been evolving, 
we see in the fact that the systems of mo- 
rality criticised at the outset severally identi- 
fy moral control with one or other of them. 
For moralists of one class derive moral rules 
from the commands of a supreme political 
power. Those of another class recognize 
no other origin for them than the revealed 
Divine will. And though men who lake 
social prescription for their guide do not 
formulate their doctrine, yet the belief, fre- 
quently betraj'ed, that conduct which society 
permits is not blameworthy implies that 
there are those who think right and wrong 
can be made such by public opinion. 

Before taking a further step we must put 
together the results of this analysis. The es- 
sential truths to be carried with us respecting 
these three forms of external control to which 
the social unit is subject are these : First, 
that they have evolved with the evolution of 
society, as meaus to social self-preservation, 



necessary under the conditions ; and that, by 
implication, they are in the main congruous 
with one another. Second, that the correla- 
tive internal restraints generated iu the social 
unit are representations of remote results 
which are incidental rather than necessary — 
a legal penalty, a supernatural punishment, a 
social reprobation. Third, that these results, 
simpler and more directly wrought by per- 
sonal agencies, can be more vividly conceived 
than can the results which, in the course of 
things, actions naturally entail ; and the con- 
ceptions of them are therefore more potent 
over undeveloped minds. Fourth, that as 
with the restraints thus generated is always 
joined the thought of external coercion, 
there arises the notion of obligation, which 
so becomes habitually associated with the 
surrender of immediate special benefits for 
the sake of distant and general benefits^ 
Fifth, that the moral control corresponds iu 
large measure with the three controls thus 
originating, in respect of its injunctions, 
and corresponds, too, in the general natute 
of the mental processes producing conformity 
to those injunctions, but differs in their 
special nature. 

§ 45. For now we are prepared to see that 
the restraints properly distinguished as moral 
are unlike these restraints out of which thry 
evolve, and with which they are long con- 
founded, in this— they refer not to the ex- 
trinsic effects of actions but to their intiinsio 
effects. The truly moral deterrent from 
murder is not constituted by a repiesentatiou 
of hanging as a consequence, or by a repre- 
sentatiou of tortures iu hell as a consequence, 
or by a representation of the horror and 
hatred excited id fellow-men, but by a rep- 
resentation of the necessary natuial results— 
the infliction of death-agony on the victim, 
the destruction of all his possibilities of hap- 
piness, the entailed sufferings to his belong- 
ings. Neither the thought of imprisonment, 
nor of Divine anger, nor of social disgrace is 
that which constitutes the moral check on 
theft, but the thought of injury to the per- 
son robbed, joined with a vague conscious- 
ness of the general evils caused by disregard 
of proprietary rights. Those who reprobate 
the adulterer on moral grounds have their 
minds tilled, not with ideas of an action for 
damages, or of future punishment following 
the breach of a commandment, or of loss of 
reputation, but they are occupied with ideas 
of unhappiness entailed on the aggrieved 
wife or husband, the damaged lives of chil- 
dren, and the diffused mischiefs which go- 
along with disregard of the marriage tie. 
Conversely, the man who is moved by a 
moral feeling to help another iu difficulty 
does not picture to himself any reward hero 
or hereafter, but pictures only the better con- 
dition he is trying to bring about. Oue who 
is morally prompted to fight against a social 
evil has neither material benefit nor popular 
applause before his mind, but only the mis- 
chiefs he seeks to remove and the increased 
well-being which will follow their removal. 
Throughout, then, the moral motive differs 



514 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



from the motives it is associated with in this, 
that instead of being constituted by represen- 
tations of incidental, collateral, non-necessary 
consequences of acts, it is constituted by rep- 
resentations of consequences which the acts 
naturally produce. These representations are 
not all distinct, though some of such are 
usually present, but they form an assem- 
blage of indistinct representations accumu- 
lated by experience of the results of like acts 
in the life of the individual, superposed on 
a still more indistinct but voluminous con- 
sciousness due to the inherited effects of such 
experiences in progenitors — forming a feel- 
ing that is at once massive and vague. 

And now we see why the moral feelings 
and correlative restraints have arisen later 
than the feelings and restraints that originate 
from political, teligious, i;iid social authori- 
ties, and have so slowly, and even yet so in- 
completely, disentangled themselves. For 
only by these lower feelings and restraints 
could be maintained the conditions under 
which the higher feelings and restraints 
evolve. It is thus alike with the self-regard- 
ing feelings and with the other-regarding 
feelings. The pains which improvidence 
will biing, and the pleasures to be gained by 
storing up things for future use and by 
laboring to get such things, can be habit- 
ually contrasted in thought only a3 fast 
as settled social arrangements make ac- 
cumulation possible ; and that theie may 
irise such settled arrangements, fear of the 
seen ruler, of the unseen ruler, and of 
public opinion must come into plaj'. Only 
after political, religious, and social restraints 
have produced a stable community can there 
be sufficient experience of the pains, positive 
and negative, sensational and emotional, 
which crimes of aggression cause, as to gen- 
erate that moral aversion to them constituted 
by consciousness of their intrinsically evil 
results. And more manifest still is it that 
such a moral sentiment as that of abstract 
equity, which is offended not only by mate- 
rial in juries dune to men, but also by political 
arrangements that, place theui at a disadvan- 
tage, can evolve only after the social stage 
reached gives familiar experience both of the 
pains flowing directly from injustices aui 
also of those flowing indirectly from the 
class privileges which make injustices easy. 

That the feelings called moral have the na- 
ture and origin alleged is further shown by 
the fact that we associate the name with 
Ihem in proportion to the degree in which 
they have these characters — firstly, of being 
, re-representative ; secondly, of being con- 
cerned with indirect ratner than with direct 
effects, and generally with remote rather 
than immediate ; and, thirdly, of referring to 
effects that are mostly general rather than 
special. Thus, though we condemn one man 
for extravagance and approve the economy 
shown by another man, we do uot class (heir 
acts as respectively vicious and virtuous: 
these words are too strong : the present and 
future results here differ loo little in concrete- 
Bess and ideality to make the words fully ap- 



plicable. Suppose, however, that the ex- 
travagance necessarily brings distress on 
wife and children — brings pains diffused 
over the lives of others as well as of self, 
and the viciousness of the extravagance be- 
comes clear. Suppose, further, that prompted 
by the wish to relieve his family from the mis- 
ery he has brought on them, the spendthrift 
forges a bill or commits some other fraud. 
Though, estimated apait, we characterize 
his overruling emotion as moral, and make 
allowance for him in consideration of it, yet 
his action, taken as a whole, we condemn as 
immoral : we regard as of superior authority 
the feelings which respond to nun's proprie- 
tary claims — feelings wiiich are re-represen- 
tative in a higher degiee and refer to more re- 
mote dilTused consequences. The difference, 
habitually recognized, between the relative 
elevations of justice and generosity well 
illustrates this truth. The motive causing 
a generous act has reference to effects of a 
more concrete, special, and proximate kind 
than has the motive to do justice, which, be- 
yond the proximate effects, usually them- 
selves less concrete than those that generally 
contemplates, includes a consciousness of the 
distant, involved, diffused effects of main- 
taining equitable relations. And justice we 
hold to be higher generosity. 

Comprehension of this long argument will 
be aided by here quoting a further passage 
from the before-named letter to Mr. Mill, 
following the passage already quoted from it. 

"To make any position fully understood, it seems 
needful to add that coi responding to the fundamental 
propositions of a developed moral science theiehave 
been and still are developing in the race certain fun- 
damental moral intuitions ; and that though these 
moral intniiions are the results of accumulated experii 
ences of utility, gradually organized and inherited, 
they have come to be quite independent of conscious 
experience. Just in the s;ime way that I believe the 
intuition of space, possessed by any living individual, 
to have arisen from organized and consul dated ex- 
periences of all antecedent individuals who be- 
queathed to him their slowly developed nervous or- 
ganizations—just as I believe that this intuition, re- 
quiring only to be made definite mid complete by per- 
sonal experiences, has practically become a form of 
thought, apparently quite independent of experience; 
so do 1 believe that the experiences of utility organ- 
ized and consolidated through all past generations of 
the human race have been producing corresponding 
nervous modifications, which, by continued transmis- 
sion and accumulation, have become in us ce tain 
faculties of moral intuition— certain emotions re- 
sponding to right and wrong conduct, which have no 
apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility. 
I also hold that just as the space intuition responds to 
the exact demonstrations of geonntry, and has its 
rou^h conclusions inlerpietid Mid verified by them, 
so will moral intuitions respond to the demonstrations 
of moral science, and v>ill have their rough conclu- 
sions interpreted and verified by them." 

To this, in passing, I will add only that 
the evolution hypothesis thus enables us ti» 
reconcile opposed moral theories, as it en- 
ables us to reconcile opposed theories of 
knowledge.. For as the doctiine of innate 
forms oMntellecliial intuition falls into har- 
mony with the experien'ial doctrine, when 
we recognize the production of intellectual 
faculties by inheritance of effects wrought 
by experience, so the doctrine of iunatu 
powers of moral perception becomes congru- 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



515 



ous with the utilitarian doctrine, when It is 
seen that preferences and aversions are ren- 
dered organic by inheritance of the effects of 
pleasurable and painful experiences in pro- 
genitors. 

§ 46. One further question has to be an- 
swered — How does there arise the feeling of 
moral obligation in general ? Whence comes 
the sentiment of duty, considered as distinct 
from the several sentiments which prompt 
temperance, providence, kindness, justice, 
truthfulness, etc. ? The answer is that it is 
an abstract sentiment generated in a manner 
analogous to that in which abstract ideas are 
generated. 

The idea of each color had oiiginally en- 
tire conciseness gi\ en to it by an object pos- 
sessing the color, as some of the unmodified 
names, such as orange and violet, show us. 
Tiie dissociation of each color from the ob- 
ject specially associated with it in thought 
at the outset went on as fast as the color 
came <o be associated in thought with objects 
unlike the first and unlike one another. The 
idea of orange was conceived in the abstract 
more fully in proportion as the various or- 
ange-colored objects remembered cancelled 
one another's diverse attributes, and left out- 
standing their common attribute. So is it if 
we ascend a stage and note how there arises 
the abstract idea of color apart from partic- 
ular colors. Were all things red the concep- 
tion of color in the abstract could not exist. 
Imagine that every object was either red or 
green, and it is manifest that the mental hab- 
it would be to think of one or other of these 
two colors in connection with anything 
named. But multiply the colors so that 
thought rambles undecidedly among the 
ideas of them that occur along with any ob- 
ject named, and there results the notion of 
indeterminate color— the common property 
which objects possess of affecting us by light 
from their sui faces as well as by their forms. 
For evidently the notion of this common 
property is that which remains constant 
while imagination is picturing every possible 
variety of col jr. It is the uniform trait in 
all colored things — that is, color in the ab- 
stract. Words referring to quantity f uruish 
cases of more marked dissociation of ab- 
stract from concrete. Grouping various 
things as small in comparison either with 
those of their kind or with those of other 
kinds, and similarly grouping some objects 
as comparatively great, we get the opposite 
abstract notions of smalluess and greatness. 
Applied as these are to innumerable very 
diverse things — not objects only, but forces, 
times, numbers, values — they have become 
so little connected with concretes that their 
abstract meanings are very vague. Further, 
we must note that an abstract idea thus 
formed often acquires an illusive indepen- 
dence, as we may perceive in the case of mo- 
tion, which, dissociated in thought from all 
particular bodies and velocities and directions, 
is sometimes referred to us though it could 
be conceived apart from somethiug moving. 
Now all this holds of the subjective as well 



as of the objective, and among other states 

of consciousness holds of the emotions aa 
known by introspection. By the grouping 
of those re-representative feelings above de- 
scribed, which, differing among themselves 
in other respects, have a component in com- 
mon, aud by the consequent mutual cancel- 
ling of their diverse components, this com- 
mon component is made relatively appre- 
ciable, and becomes an abstract feeling. 
Thus is produced the sentiment of moral 
obligation or duly. Let us observe its gene- 
sis. We have seen that during the progress 
of animate existence, the later-evolved, moro 
compound aud more representative feelings, 
serving to adjust the conduct to more dis- 
tant and general needs, have ail aloug had an 
authority as guides superior to that of the 
earlier and simpler feelings— excluding cases 
in which these last are intense. This superior 
authority, unrecognizable by lower types of 
creatures which cannot generalize;, and little 
recognizable by primitive men, who have 
but feeble powers of generalization, has be- 
come distinctly recognized as civilization and 
accompanying mental development have 
gone on. Accumulated experiences havo 
produced the consciousness that guidance by 
feelings which refer to remote and general 
results is usually more conducive to welfare 
than guidance by feelings to be immediately 
gratified. For what is the common charac- 
ter of the feelings that prompt honesty, 
truthfulness, diligence, providence, etc., 
which men habitually find to be better 
prompters than the appetites and simple im- 
pulses ? They are all complex, re-represen- 
lalive feelings, occupied with the future 
rather than the present. The idea of author- 
ilativeness has therefore come lo be connected 
with feelings having these traits — the implica- 
tion being that the lower and simpler feelings 
are without authority. And this idea of 
authoritativeness is one element in the ab- 
stract consciousness of duty. 

But there is another element — the element 
of cocrciveness. This originates from expe- 
rience of those several forms of restraint that 
have, as above described, established them- 
selves in the course of civilization — the polit- 
ical, religious, and social. To the effects of 
punishments inflicted by law and public 
opinion on conduct of certain kinds. Dr. 
Bain ascribes the feeling of moial obliga- 
tion. And I agree with him to the extent of 
thinking that by them is generated the sense 
of compulsion which the consciousutvs of 
duty includes, and which the word obliga- 
tion indicates. The existence of an earlier 
and deeper element, generated as above de- 
scribed, is, however, 1 think, implied by the 
fact that certain of the higher self- regarding 
feelings, instigating prudence aud economy, 
have a moral authority in opposition to the 
simpler self-regarding feelings — showing 
that apart from any thought of factitious 
penalties on improvidence, the feeling consti- 
tuted by representation of the natural penal- 
ties has acquired an acknowledged superior- 
ity. But accepting in the main the view that 



516 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



fears of the political and social penalties (to 
which, I think, the religious must be added) 
have generated that sense of coerciveness 
which goes along with the thought of post- 
poning present to future and personal desires 
to the claims of others, it here chiefly con- 
cerns us t > note that this sense of coerciveness 
becomes indirectly connected with the feel- 
ings distinguished as moral. For since the 
political, religious, and social restraining 
motives are mainly formed of represented 
future results, and since the moral restrain- 
ing motive is rnaitily formed of represented 
future results, it happens that the represen- 
tations, having much in common, and being 
often aroused at the same time, the fear 
joined with three sets of them becomes, by 
association, joined with the fourth. Think- 
ing of the extiinsic effects of a forbidden 
act excites a dread which continues pres- 
ent while the intrinsic effects of the act 
are thought of, and being thus linked 
with these intrinsic effects causes a vague 
sense of moral compulsion. Emerging as 
the moral motive does but slowly from amid 
the political, religious, and social motives, it 
long participates iu that consciousness of sub- 
ordination to some external agency which is 
joined with them, and only as it becomes 
distinct and predominant does it lose this as- 
sociated consciousness — only then does the 
feeling of obligation fade. 

This remark implies the tacit conclusion, 
which will be to most very startling, that the 
sense of duty or moral obligation is transi- 
tory, and will diminish as fast as moraliza- 
tion increases. Startling thovigh it is, this 
conclusion may be satisfactorily defended. 
Even now progress toward the implied ulti- 
mate slate is traceable. The observation is 
not infrequent that persistence in perform- 
ing a duty ends in making; it a pleasure ; and 
this amounts to the admission that while at 
first the motive contains an element of coer- 
cion, at last this element of coercion dies out, 
and the act is performed without any con- 
sciousness of being obliged to perform it. 
Tiie contrast between the youth on whom 
diligence is enjoined and the man of business 
so absorbed in affairs that he cannot be in- 
duced to relax, shows us how the doing of 
work, originally under the consciousness 
that it ought to be done, may eventually 
cease to have any such accompanying con- 
sciousness. Sometimes, indeed, the relation 
comes to be reversed, and the man of busi- 
ness persists in work from pure love of it 
when told that he ought not. Nor is it thus 
With self-regarding feelings only. That the 
maintaining and protecting of wife by hus- 
baud often result solely from feelings directly 
gratified by these actions, without any 
thought of must, and that the fostering of 
children by parents is in many cases made 
au absorbing occupation without any coercive 
feeling of ought, are obvious truths which 
nhow us that even now, with some of the 
fundamental other-regarding duties, the sense 
of obligation lias retreated into the back- 
ground of the mind. And it is in some de- 



gree so with other-regarding duties of a 
higher kind. Conscientiousness has in many 
outgrown that stage in which the sense of a 
compelling power is joined with rectitude of 
action. The truly honest man, here and 
there to be found, is not only without 
thought of legal, religious, or social com- 
pulsion, when he discharges an equitable 
claim on him, but he is without thought of 
self-compulsion. He does the right thing 
with a simple feeling of satisfaction in doing 
it, and is, indeed, impatient if anything pre- 
vents him from having the satisfaction of do- 
ing it. 

Evidently, then, with complete adaptation 
to the social state, that element in the moral 
consciousness which is expressed by the 
word obligation will disappear. The higher 
actions required for the haimonious carry- 
ing on of life will be as much matters of 
course as are those lower actions which the 
simple desires prompt. In their proper 
times and places and proportions, the moral 
sentiments will guide men just as spontane- 
ously and adequately as now do the sensa- 
tions. And though, joined with their regu- 
lating influence when this is called for, will 
exist latent ideas of the evils which noncon- 
formity would bring, these will occupy the 
mind no more than do ideas of the evils of 
starvation at the time when a healthy appe- 
tite is being satisfied by a meal. 

§ 47. This elaborate exposition, which the 
extreme complexity of the subject has neces- 
sitated, may have its leading ideas restated 
thus : 

Symbolizing by a and b related phenomena 
in the environment, which iu some way 
concern the welfare of the organism, and 
symbolizing by c and d the impressions, 
simple or compound, which the organism re- 
ceives from the one, and the motions, single 
or combined, by which its acts are adapted 
to meet the other, we saw that psychology 
in general is concerned with the connection 
between the relation a b and the relation c d. 
Further, we saw that by implication the 
psychological aspect of ethics is that aspect 
under which the adjustment of c d to a b 
appears, not as an intellectual co-ordination 
simply, but as a co-ordination in which 
pleasures and pains are auke factors and re- 
sults. 

It was shown that throughout evolution 
motive and act become more complex as the 
adaptation of inner related actions to outer 
related actions extends in range and variety ; 
win rice followed the corollary that the later- 
evolved feelings, more representative and 
re-representative in their constitution, and 
referring to remoter and wider needs, have, 
on the average, an authority as guides 
greater thus have the earlier and simplei 
feelings. 

After thus observing that even an inferior 
creature is ruled by a hierarchy of feelings 
so constituted that general welfare depends 
on a certain subordination of lower to 
higher, we saw that in man, as he passes into 
the social state, there arises the need for sun- 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



517 



dry additional subordinations of lower 10 
higher — co-operation being made possible 
only by them. To the restraints constituted 
by mental representations of the intrinsic 
effects of actions, -which, in their simpler 
forms, have been evolving from the begin- 
ning, are added the restraints caused by men- 
tal representations of extiiusic effects, in tbe 
shape of political, religious, and social penal- 
ties. 

With the evolution of society, made possi- 
ble by institutions maintaining order, and 
associating in men's minds tlie sense of obli- 
gation with prescribed acts and winh desist- 
ances from forbidden acts, there arose oppor- 
tunities for seeing the bad consequences nat- 
urally flowing from the conduct interdicted 
and the good consequences from the conduct 
required. Hence eventually grew up moral 
aversions and approvals — experience of the 
intrinsic effects necessarily here coming later 
than experience of the extrinsic effects, and 
therefore producing its results later. 

The thoughts and feelings constituting 
these moral aveisions and approvals, being 
all along; closely connected with the thoughts 
and feelings constituting fears of political, 
religious, and social penalties, necessarily 
came to participate in the accompanying 
cense of obligation. The coercive element 
in the consciousness of duties at large, 
evolved by converse with external agencies 
which enforce duties, diffused itself by asso- 
ciation through that consciousness of duty, 
properly called moral, which is occupied 
with intrinsic results instead of extrinsic re- 
Bults. 

But this self-compulsion, which at a rela- 
tively high stage becomes mure and mure a 
sabstituie for compulsion from without, 
must itself, at a still higher stage, practically 
disappear. If some action to which the-, 
special motive is insufficient is performed in 
obedience to the feeling of moral obligation, 
the fact proves that the special faculty con- 
cerned is not yet equal to its function — has 
not acquired such strength that the required 
activity has become its normal activity, yield- ; 
iug its due amount of pleasure. "With com- 
plete evolution, then, the sense of obligation, 
not ordinarily present in consciousness, will 
be awakened only on those extraordinary oc- 
casions that prompt breach of the laws other- 
wise spontaneously conformed to. 

And this brings us to the psychological as- 
pect of that conclusion which, in the last 
chapter, was reached under its biological as- 
pect. The pleasures and pains which the 
moral sentiments originate will, like bodily 
pleasures and pains, become incentives and 
deterrents, so adjusted in their strength to the 
nweds that the moral conduct will be the nat- 
iiial conduct. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

THE SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW. 

§ 48. Not for the human race only, but 
for every race, there are laws of right living. 
Given its environment and its structure, and 
there is for each kind of creature a *ct of ao- 



tions adapted in their kinds, amounts, and 
combinations, to secure the highest conserva- 
tion its nature permits. The animal, like 
the man, has needs for food, waruuii, activ- 
ity, rest, and so to th, which must be f ullilled 
in certain relati ve degrees to make its life 
whole. Maintenance of its race implies sat- 
isfaction of special desires, sexual and philo- 
progenitive, in due proportions. Hence there 
is a supposable f irmula for the activities of 
each species, which, could it be drawn out, 
would constitute a system of morality foi 
that species. But sucn a system of morality 
would have little or no reference to the wel- 
fare of others than sell and offspring. In- 
different to individuals of its own kind, as 
an inferior creature is, aud habitually hostile 
to individuals of other kinds, the formula for 
its life couid take no cognizance of the lives 
of those with which it came in contact ; or 
rather, such formula would imply thai main- 
tenance of its lite was at vaiiauce with main- 
tenance of iheir lives. 

But on ascending from beings of lower 
kinds to the highest kind of being, man, or, 
more strictly, on ascending from man m his 
pre-social stage to man in his social stage, 
the formula has to include an add.lioual fac 
tor. Though not peculiar to huniaa life un. 
der its developed form, the presence of this 
factor is still, in the highest degree, charac- 
teristic of it. Thougu there are inferior 
species displaying consid. rabie degrees o* 
sociality, and though the formulas for the:; 
complete lives would have to take accouf: 
of the relations arising from union, yet ou. 
own species is, on the whole, to be distin- 
guished as having a formula for complete 
life which specially recognizes the relations 
of each individual to others, in presence of 
Whom, and'in co-operation with whom, he 
has to live. 

This additional factor in the problem of 
complete living is, indeed, so important that 
the necessitated modifications of conduct 
have come to form a chief part of the code 
of conduct. Because the inherited desires 
which directly refer to the maintenance of 
individual life aie fairly adjusted tu the re- 
quirements, there has been no need to insist 
ou that conformity to them which furthers 
self-conservation. Conversely, because these 
desires prompt activities that often conflict 
with the activities of others, aud because 
the sentimeuts responding to others' claims 
are relatively weak, moral codes emphasize 
those restraints on conduct which the pres- 
ence of fellow-men entails. 

From the sociological point of view, then, 
ethics becomes nothing else than a derinite 
account of the forms of conduct that are tit- 
ted to the associated state, in such wise that 
the lives of each and all may be the greatest 
possible, alike in length ana breadth. 

§ 49. But here we are met by a fact which 
forbids us thus to put in the foreground the 
welfares of citizens, individually considered, 
and requires us to put in the foreground the 
welfare of the society as a whole. The life 
of the social organism must, as an end, rank 



518 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



above the lives of its units. These two ends 
are not harmouious at the outset, aud 
though the tendency is toward hamionizatiou 
of them, they are still partialty conflicting. 

As fast as the social slate establishes itself, 
the preservation of the society becomes a 
means of preserving its units. Living to- 
gether arose because, on the average, it 
proved more advantageous to each than liv- 
ing apart ; and this implies that maintenance 
of combination is maintenance of the con- 
ditions to more satisfactory living than the 
combined persons would otherwise have. 
Hence social self-preservation becomes a 
proximate aim, taking precedence of the ulti- 
mate aim, individual t.elf-preservaliou. 

This subordination of personal to social 
welfare is, however, contingent ; it depends 
on the presence of antagonistic societies. So 
long as the existence of a community is en- 
dangered by the actions of communities 
around, it must remain true that the interests 
of individuals must be sacrificed to the in- 
terests of the community, as far as is need- 
ful for the community's salvation. But if 
this is manifest, it is by implication mani- 
fest that when social antagonisms cease, this 
need for sacrifice of private claims to public 
claims ceases also ; or rather, there cease to 
be any public claims at variance with pri- 
vate claims.. All along, furtheiance of indi- 
vidual lives has been me ultimate end ; and 
it' this ultimate end has been postponed to 
the proximate end of preserving the com- 
munity's life, it has been so only because this 
proximate end was instrumental to the 
ultimate end. When the aggregate is no 
longer in danger, the final object of pursuit, 
the welfare of the units, no longer needing 
to be postponed, becomes the immediate ob- 
ject of pursuit. 

Consequently, unlike sets of conclusions 
respecting human conduct emerge, accord- 
ing as we are concerned with a state of 
habitual or occasional war, or are concerned 
with a state of permanent and general peace. 
Let us glance at these alternative states and 
the alternative implications. 

§ 50. At present the individual man has to 
carry on his life with due regard to the lives 
of others belonging to the same society, 
while he is sometimes called on to be regard- 
less of the lives of those belonging to other 
societies. The same mental constitution hav- 
ing to fulfil both these requirements is neces- 
sarily incongruous ; and the correlative con- 
duct, adjusted first to the one need aud then 
io the other, cannot be brought within any 
consistent ethical system. 

Hate and destroy your fellow-man, is now 
the command ; and then the command is, 
love and aid your fellow-mau. Use every 
means to deceive, says the one code of con- 
duct ; while the other code says, be truthful 
in word and deed. Seize what property you 
can and burn all you cannot, take away, are 
injunctions which the religion of enmity 
countenances: while by the leligiou of amity 
theft and arson are condemned as crimes. 
And as conduct has to be made up of Darts 



thus at variance with one another, the theory 
of conduct remains confused. Thei e coexists 
a kindred irreconcilability between the senti- 
ments answering to the forms of co-operation 
required for militancy and industrialism re- 
spectively. While social antagonisms are 
habitual, and while, for efficient action 
against other societies, there needs gieut sub. 
ordination to men who command, the virtue 
of loyally and the duty of implicit obedience 
have to be insisted on — disregard of the 
ruler's will is punished with death. But 
when war ceases to be chronic, and growing 
industrialism habituates men to maintaining 
their own claims while respecting the claims 
of others, loyalty becomes less piofound, the 
authority of the ruler, isqueslioned or denied 
in respect of various private actions and be- 
liefs. State-dictation is in many directions 
successfully defied, and the political inde- 
pendence of the citizen comes to be regarded 
as a claim which it is vmuous to maintain 
and vicious to yield up. Necessarily during 
the transition these opposite sentiments aie 
incongruously mingled. So is it, too, with 
domestic institutions under the two regimes. 
While the first is dominant, ownership of a 
slave is honorable, and in the slave submis 
sion is praiseworthy ; but as the last grows 
dominant, slave-owning becomes a crime, 
and servile obedience excites contempt. Nor 
is it otherwise in the family. Tiie subjection 
of women to men, complete while war is 
habitual but qualified as fast as peaceful oc- 
cupations replace it, comes eventually to be 
thought wrong, aud equality before the law 
is asserted. At the same time the opinion 
concerning paternal power changes. The 
once unquestioned light of the father to lake 
his children's lives is denied, and the duty 
of absolute submission to him, long insisted 
on, is clianged into the duty of obedience 
within reasonable limns. 

Were the ratio between the life of antag- 
onism with alien societies, and the life of 
peaceful co opeialiou within each soc;ety, a 
constant ratio, some peimauenl compromise 
between the conflicting rules of conduct ap- 
pioptiate to the two lives might be reached. 
But since this ratio is a variable one, the 
compromise can never be more than tempo- 
rary. Ever the tendency is toward congruily 
between beliefs and requirements. Either the 
social arrangements aie gradually changed 
untd they come into harmony with pievaiiing 
ideas and sentiments, or, if surrounding 
conditions pieveut change in the social ar- 
rangements, the necessitated habits of life 
modify the pie vailing ideas and sentiments 
to the requisite extent. Hence, for each kind 
and degree of social evolution determined by 
external conflict aud internal friendship, 
there is an appropriate compromise between 
the moral code of enmity and the moral code 
of amity — not, indeed, a definable, consis- 
tent compromise, but a compromise fairly 
well understood. 

This compromise, vague, ambiguous, illog- 
ical though it may be, is nevertheless tor the 
time being authoritative. For if, as above 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



519 



shown, the welfare of the society must take 
precedence of the welfares of its component 
individuals, during tho^e stages in which the 
individuals have to preserve themselves by 
preserving their society, then such tempo- 
lary compromise between the two codes of 
conduct as duly regards external defence, 
while favoring internal co-operation to the 
greatest extent practicable, subserves the 
maintenance of li.e in the highest degree, 
und tlius gaias the ultimate sanction. So 
Ihut the perplexed and inconsistent moralities 
of which each society and each age shows us 
a more or less different one, are severally jus- 
tified as being approximately the best undei 
the circumstances. 

But such moralities are by their definitions 
eliown to belong to incomplete conduct, 
not to conduct that is fully evolved. We 
saw that the adjustments of acts to ends 
which, while constituting the external man- 
ifestations of life, conduce to the continuance 
of life, have been risiug to a certaiu ideal 
form now approached by the civilized man. 
But this form is not reached so long as there 
continue aggressions of one society upon an- 
other. Whether the hinderances to complete 
living result from the trespasses of fellow- 
citizens or from the trespasses of aliens mat- 
ters not ; if they occur there does not yet 
exist the stat'i defined. The limit to the evo- 
lution of conduct is arrived at by the mem- 
bers of each society only when, being arrived 
at by members of other societies also, the 
causes of international antagonism end si- 
multaneously with the causes of antagonism 
between individuals. 

And now having from the sociological 
point of view recognized the need for and 
authority of these changing systems of eth- 
ics, proper to changing raiios between war- 
like activities and peaceful activities, we 
have, from the same point of view, to con- 
sider the system of ethics proper to the state 
in which peaceful activities are undisturbed. 

8 51. If, excluding all thought of dangers 
or hinderauces from causes external to a so- 
ciety, we set ourselves to specify those con- 
ditions under which the life of each person, 
and therefore of the aggregate, may be the 
greatest possible, we come upon certain sim- 
ple ones which, as here stated, assume the 
form of truisms. 

For, as we have seen, the definition of that 
highest life accompanying completely evolved 
conduct, itself excludes all acts of aggression 
— not only murder, assault, robbery, and the 
major offences generally, but minor offences, 
such as libel, injury to property, and so forth. 
While directly deducting from individual 
life, these indirectly cause perturbations of 
social life. Trespasses against others rouse 
antagonisms in them, and if these are nu- 
merous the group loses coherence. Hence, 
whether the integrity of the group itself is 
considered as the end, or whether the end 
uonsidered is the benefit ultimately secured 
t» its units by maintaining its integrity, or 
whether the immediate benefit of its units 
t aken separately is considered the end, the 



implication is the same : such acts are at va- 
riance with achievement of the end. That 
these inferences are self-evident and trite (as 
indeed the first inferences drawn from the 
data of every science that reaches the deduc- 
tive slage naturally are) must not make us 
pass lijrhtly over the all-important fact that, 
from the sociological point of view, the lead- 
ing moral laws are seen to follow as corol- 
laries from the definition of complete life 
carried on under social conditions. 

Respect for these primary moral laws is 
not enough, however. Associated men pur- 
suing their several lives without injuring one 
another, but without helping one another, 
reap no advantages from association beyond 
those of companionship. If while there is 
no co-operalion for defensive purposes 
(which is here excluded by the hypothesis) 
there is also no co-cperation for satisfying 
wants, the social state loses its raison d'etre 
— almost, if not entirely. There are, indeed, 
people who live in a condition little removed 
from this ; as the Esquimaux. But though 
these, exhibiting none of the co-operation 
necessitated by war, which is unknown to 
them, lead lives such that each family is 
substantially independent of others, occa- 
sional co-operation occurs. And, indeed, 
that families should live in company without 
ever yielding mutual aid is scarcely conceiv- 
able. 

Nevertheless, whether actually existing or 
only approached, we must here recognize as 
hypothetically possible a state in which these 
primary moral laws alone are conformed 
to, for the purpose of observing, in their 
uncomplicated forms, what are the nega- 
tive conditions to harmonious social life. 
Whether the members of a social group do 
or do not co-operate, certain limitations to 
their individual activities are necessitated by 
their association ; and after recognizing the.se 
as arising in the absence of co-operation, we 
shall be the better prepared to understand 
how conformity to them is effected when co- 
operation begins. 

§ 52. For whether men live together in 
quite independent ways, careful only to avoid 
aggressing, or whether, advancing from pas- 
sive association to active association, they 
co-operate, their conduct must be such that 
the achievement of ends by each shall at least 
not be hindered. And it becomes obvious 
that when they co-operate, there must not 
only be no resulting hinderance, but there 
must be facilitation, since in the absence of 
facilitation there can be no motive to co- 
operate. What shape, then, must the mutual 
restraints take when co-operation begins 5 or 
rather, what, in addition to the primary 
mutual restraints already specified, are those 
secondary mutual restraints required to make 
co-operation possible V 

One who, living in an isolated way, ex- 
pends effort in pursuit of an end gets com- 
pensation for the effort by securing the eud, 
and so achieves satisfaction. If he expends 
the effort without achieving the end there 
results dissatisfaction. The satisfaction and 



520 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



the dissatisfaction are measures of success 
and failure in life-sustaining acts, since that 
which is achieved by effort is something 
which directly or indirectly furthers ljfe, and 
so pays for the cost of the effort, while if 
the effort fails there is nothing to pay for the 
cost of it, and so much life is wasted; What 
must result from this when men's efforts are 
joined ? The reply will be made clearer if 
we lake the successive forms of co-operation 
in the order of ascending complexity. We 
may distinguish as homogeneous co-opera- 
tion, (1), that in which like efforts are joined 
for like ends that are simultaneously enjoyed. 
As co-operation that is not completely homo- 
geneons, we may distinguish, (2), that in 
which like efforts are joined for like ends 
that are not simultaneously enjoyed. A co- 
operation of which the heterogeneity is more 
distinct is, (3), that in which unlike efforts 
are joined fur like ends. And lastly comes 
the decidedly heterogeneous co-operation, 
(4), that in which unlike efforts are joined 
for unlike ends. 

The simplest and earliest of these, in which 
men's powers, similar in kind and degree, 
are united in pursuit of a benefit which, 
when obtained, they all participate in, is 
most familiarly exemplified iu the catching 
of game by primitive men — thi3 simplest and 
earliest form of industrial co-operation being 
also that which is least differentiated from 
militant co-operation ; for the co-operators 
arc the same, and the processes, both destruc- 
tive of life, are carried on in analogous ways. 
The condition under which such co-opera- 
tion may be successfully carried on is that 
the co-operators shall share alike in the prod- 
uce. Each thus being enabled to repay 
himself in food for the expended effort, and 
being further enabled to achieve other such 
desired ends as maintenance of family, ob- 
tains satisfaction : there is no aggression of 
one on another, and the co-operation is har- 
monious. Of course the divided produce can 
be but roughly proportioned to the several 
efforts joined in obtaining it ; but there is 
actually among savages, as we see that for 
harmonious co-operation there must be, a rec- 
ognition of the principle that efforts when 
combined shall severally hring equivalent 
benefits, as they \vould do if they were sepa- 
rate. Moreover, beyond the taking equal 
shares iu return for labors that are approxi- 
mately equal, there is generally an attempt 
at proportioning benefit to achievement, by 
assigning something extra, in the shape ot 
the best part or the trophy, to the actual 
slayer of the game. And obviously, if there 
is a wide departure from this system of shar- 
ing benefits when there has been a sharing 
of efforts, the co-operation will cease. Indi- 
vidual hunters will piefer U> do the best they 
can for themselves separately. 

Passing from Ihis simplest case of co- 
operation to a case not quite so simple — a 
case in which the homogeneity is incomplete 
— let us ai-k how a member of the group may 
be led without dissatisfaction to expend 
effort in achieving a benefit which, when 



achieved, is enjoyed exclusively by another ? 
Clearly he may do this on condition that the 
other shall afterward exptDd a like effort, 
the beneficial result of which shall be simi- 
larly rendered up by him in return. This 
exchange of equivalents of effoi t is the form 
which social co-operation lakes while yet 
there is little or no division of labor save that 
between the sexes. For example, the Bodo 
and Dhimals " mutually assist each other for 
the nonce, as well in constructing their 
houses as in clearing their plots for cultiva- 
tion." And this piinciple — I will help you 
if you will help me — common in simple com- 
munities where the occupations are alike in 
kind, and occasionally acted upon in more 
advanced communities, is one under which 
the l elation between effort and benefit, no 
longer directly maintained, is maintained 
indirectly. For wheieas when men's activi- 
ties are carried on separately, or are joined in 
the way exemplified above,' effort is immedi- 
ately paid for by benefit, in this form of co- 
operation the benefit achieved by effort is ex- 
changed for a like benefit to be afterward re- 
ceived when asked for. And in this case, as 
in the preceding case, co-operation can be 
maintained only by fulfilment of the tacit 
agreements. For if they are habitually not 
fulfilled, there will commonly be refusal to 
give aid when asked, and each man will be 
left to do the best he can by himself. All 
those advantages to be gained by union of 
efforts in doing things that are beyond the 
powers of the single individual will be un- 
achievable. At the outset, then, fulfilment 
of contracts that are implied if not expiessed 
becomes a condition te> social co-operation, 
and therefore to social development. 

From these simple forms of co-operation, in 
which the labors men carry on are of like 
kinds, let us turn to the more complex forms, 
in which they carry on labors of uulike 
kinds. Where men mutually aid in building 
huts or felling trees, the number of days' 
work now given by one to another is readily 
balanced by an equal number of days' work 
afterward given by the other to him. And 
no estimation of the relative values of the 
labors being recjuired, a definite understand- 
ing is little needed. But when division of 
labor arises — when there come transactions 
between one who makes weapons and an- 
other who dresses skins for clothing, or be- 
tween a grower of roots and a catcher of 
fish — neither the relative amounts nor the 
relative qualities of their labors admit of easy 
measure ; and with the multiplication of 
businesses, implying numerous kinds of skill 
and power, there ceases to be anything like 
manifest equivalence between either the bod- 
ily and mental efforts set against one another 
or between their products. Hence the ar- 
rangement cannot now be taken for granted, 
as while the things exchanged are like in 
kind : it has to be stated. If A allows B to 
appropriate a product of his special skill, on 
condition that he is allowed to appropriate a 
different product of B's special skill, it re- 
sults that &3 equivalence of the two products 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



521 



caneot be determined by direct comparison 
of their quantities and qualities, there must 
be a distinct understanding as to bow much 
of the one may be taken in consideration of 
so much of the other. 

Only under voluntary agreement, then, no 
longer tacit aud vague but overt and definite, 
can co-operation be harmoniously carried on 
when division of labor becomes established. 
And as in the simplest co-operation, where 
like efforts are joined to secure a common 
good, the dissatisfaction caused in those who, 
having expended their labors, do net get their 
shares of the good, prompts them to cease 
co-operating ; as in the mure advanced co- 
operation, achieved by exchanging equal la- 
bors of like kind expended at different times, 
aversion to co-operate is generated if the ex- 
pected equivalent of labor is nut rendered ; 
so in this developed cr-operalion the failure 
of either to surrender tot lie other that which 
was avowedly recognized as of like value 
with the labor or product given, tends to 
prevent co-operation by exciting discontent 
with its results. And evidently, while an- 
tagonisms thus caused impede the lives of 
the units, the life of the aggregate is endan- 
gered by diminished cohesion. 

§ 53. Beyond these comparatively direct 
mischiefs, special and general, there have to 
bs noted indirect mischiefs. As already im- 
plied by the reasoning in the last paragraph, 
not only social integration but also social 
differentiation is hindered by breach of con- 
tract. 

In Part II. of the "Principles of Sociol- 
ogy," it was shown that the fundamental 
principles of organization are the sanie for 
an individual organism and for a social or- 
gauism, because both consist of mutually 
dependent parts. In the one case as in the 
other, the assumption of uulike activities by 
the component members is possible only on 
Condition that they severally benefit in due 
degrees by one another's activities. That 
we may the better see what are the implica- 
tions in respect of social stiuctuies, let us 
first note the implications in respect of indi- 
vidual strictures. 

The welfare of a living body implies an 
approximate equilibrium between waste and 
repair. If the activities involve an expendi- 
ture not made good by nutrition, dwindling 
follows. If the tissues are enabled to take 
up from the blood enriched by food fit sub- 
stances enough to replace those used up in 
efforts made, the weight may be maintained. 
And if the gain exceeds the loss, growth re- 
sults. That which is true of the whole iu its 
relations to the external world, is no less true 
of the parts in their relations to one another. 
Each organ, like the entire organism, is 
wasted by performing its function, and has 
to restore itself from the materials brought 
to it. If the quantity of materials furnished 
by the joint agency of the other organs is de- 
ficient, the particular organ dwindles. If 
they are sufficient, it can maintain its integ- 
rity. If they are in excess, it is enabled to 
increase. To say that this arrangement con- 



stitutes the physiological contract is to usa 
a metaphor which, Though not tiue in as- 
pect is true in essence. Fur t lie relations of 
structures are actually such that, by the help 
of a central regulative system, each organ is 
supplied with blood ia propoittou to the 
work it does. As was pointed out (" Prin- 
ciples of Sociology," § 254), well-developed 
animals are so constituted that each muscle 
or viscus, when called iuto action, sends to 
the vaso-motor ceutres, through certain 
nerve-fibres, au impulse caused by its action, 
whereupon, through other nerve-fibres, there 
comes an impulse causing dilatation of its 
blood-vessels. That is to say, all other parts 
of the organism when they jointly require it 
to labor forthwith begin to pay it in blood. 
During the ordinary state of physiological 
equilibrium, the loss and the gain balance, 
and the organ does not sensibly change, if 
the amount of its function is increased wiUi- 
in such mode; ate limits that the local blood- 
vessels can bring adequately increased sup- 
plies, the organ grows : beyond replacing 
its losses by its gains, it makes a profit ou 
its extra transactions, so being enabled by 
extra structures to meet extra demands. 
But if the demands made on it become so 
great that the supply of materials cannot 
keep pace with the expenditure, either 1 be- 
cause the local blood-vessels are not large 
enough or for any other reason, then the 
organ begius to decrease from excess of 
waste over repair : there sets in what is 
known as atrophy. Now since each of the 
organs has thus to be paid in nutriment for 
its services by the rest, it follows that the 
due balancing of their respective claims aud 
payments is requisite directly for the wel- 
fare of each organ, and indirectly for the 
welfare of the organism. For in a whole 
formed of mutually dependent parts, any- 
thing which presents due performance of its 
duty by one part reacts injuriously on all 
the parts. 

With change of terms these statements 
and inferences hold of a society. That social 
division of labor which parallels in so many 
other respects the physiological division of 
labor parallels it in this respect also. As 
was shown at large in the "Principles of 
Sociology," Part II., each order ot i'une- 
tionarieVaud each group of producers, sever- 
ally performing some action or making 
some article not for direct satisfaction of 
their own needs but for satisfaction of tho 
needs of fellow-citizens in general, otherwise 
occupied, can coutinue to do this only so long 
as the expenditures of effort aud t blunts of 
profit are approximately equivalent. Social 
organs, like individual organs, remain station- 
ary if there cornc to them normal proportions 
of the commi dities produced by the society 
as a whole. If because the demands made 
on an industry or profession are unusually 
great, those engaged iu it make excessive 
profits, more citizens flock to it, and the so- 
cial structure constituted by its members 
grows, while decrease of the demands, aud 
therefore of the profits, cither leads its mem- 



522 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



bers to choose other careers or stops the ac- 
cessious needful to replace those "who die, 
and the structure dwindles. Thus is main- 
tained that proportion among the powers of 
the component parts which is most con- 
ducive to the welfare of the whole. 

And now mark that the primary condition 
to achievement of this result is fulfilment of 
contract. If from the members of any part 
payment is frequently withheld, or falls 
short of the promised amount, then, through 
ruin of some and abandonment of the occu- 
pation by others, live part diminishes ; and 
if it was before not more than competent to 
its duly, it now becomes incompetent, and 
the society suffers. Or if social needs throw 
on some part great increase of function, and 
the members of it aie enabled to get for their 
services unusually high prices, fulfilment 
of the agreements to give them these high 
prices is the only way of drawing to the 
part such additional number of members as 
will make it equal to the augmented demands. 
For citizens will nut come to it if they find 
the high prices agreed upon are not paid. 

Briefly, then, the universal basis of co- 
operation is the proportioning of benefits re- 
ceived to services rendered. Without this 
there can be no physiological division of la- 
bor ; without this there can be no sociologi- 
cal division of labor. And since division of 
labor, physiological or sociological, profits 
the whole and each part, it results that on 
maintenance of the arrangements necessary 
to it depend both special and general wel- 
fare. In a society such arrangements are 
maintained only if bargains, overt or tacit, 
are carried out. So that beyond the primary 
requirement to harmonious co-existence in a 
society, that its units shall not directly ag- 
gress on one another, there comes this sec- 
ondary requirement, that they shall not in- 
directly aggress by breaking agreements. 

§ 54. But now we have to recognize the 
fact that complete fulfilment of these con- 
ditions, original and derived, is not enough. 
Social co-operation may be such that no one 
is impeded in the obtainment of the normal 
return for effort, but contrariwise is aided by 
equitable exchange of services, and yet, 
much may remain to be achieved. There is 
a theoretically possible form of society, 
purely industrial in its activities, which, 
though approaching nearer to the moral 
ideal in its code of conduct than any society 
not purely industrial, docs not fully reach it. 
For while industrialism requires the life of 
each cHizen to be such that it may be carried 
on without direct or indirect aggression on 
other cilizens, it does not require his life t 
be such that it shall directly further the liv< 
of other citizens. It is not a necessary in 
plication of industrialism, as thus far d< 
fined, that each, beyond the benefits given 
and received by exchange of services, shall 
give and receive other benefits. A society is 
conceivable formed of men leading perfectly 
inoffensive lives, scrupulously fulfilling their 
contracts, and efficiently rearing their off- 
spring, who yet, yielding to one another no 



advantages beyond those agreed upon, fall 
short of that highest degree of life which the 
gratuitous rendering of services makes pos- 
sible. Daily experiences prove that every 
oue would suffer many evils and lose many 
goods, did none give him unpaid assistance. 
The life of each would be more or less dam- 
aged had he to meet all contingencies single- 
handed. Further, if no one aid for his fel- 
lows anything more than was required by 
strict performance of contract, private inter- 
ests would suffer from the absence of atten- 
tion to public interests. The limit of evolu- 
tion of conduct is consequently not reached 
until, beyond avoidance of direct and indi- 
rect injuries to others, there are spontaneous 
efforts to further the welfare of others. 

It may be shown that the form of nature 
which thus to justice adds beneficence is 
one which adaptation to the social state pro- 
duces. The social mau has not reached that 
harmonization of constitution with conditions 
forming the limit of evolution, so long as 
there remains space for the growth of facul- 
ties which, by their exercise, biing positive 
benefit to others and satisfaction to self. If 
the presence of fellow-men, while putting 
certain limits to each man's sphere of activ- 
ity, opens certain other spheres of activity in 
Which feelings, while achieving their gratifi- 
cations, do not diminish, but add to the grati- 
fications of others, then such spheres will in- 
evitably be occupied. Recognition of this 
truth does not, however, call on us to qualify 
greatly that conception of the industrial state 
above set forth, since sympathy is the root 
of both justice and beneficence. 

§ 55. Thus the sociologicsd view of ethics 
supplements the physical, the biological, and 
the psychological views, by disclosing those 
conditions under which only associated ac- 
tivities can be so carried on that the com- 
plete living of each consists with and con- 
duces to the complete living of all. 

At first the welfare of social groups, habit* 
ually in antagonism with other such groups, 
takes precedence of individual welfare, and 
the rules of conduct which are authoritative 
for the time being involve incompleteness 
of individual life that the general life may 
be maintained. At the same time the rules 
have to enforce the claims of individual life 
as far as may be, since on the welfare of the 
units the welfare of the aggregate largely de- 
pends. 

. In proportion as societies endanger one an- 
other less, the need for subordinating indi- 
vidual lives to the geneial life decreases; 
and with approach to a peaceful slate, the 
general life, having from the beginning had 
furtherance of individual lives as its ultimate 
purpose, comes to have this as its proximate 
purpose. 

During tha transitional stages there aro 
necessitated successive compromises between 
the moral code which asserts the claims of 
the society versus thoseof the individual, and 
the moral code which asserts the claims o. 
the individual versus those of the society 
And evidently esich such compromise, thoug" 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



523 



for the time being authoritative, admits of 
no consistent or definite expression. 

But gradually as war declines — gradually 
as the' compulsory co-operation needful in 
dealing with external enemies becomes un- 
necessary, and leaves behind the voluntary 
co-operation which effectually achieves in- 
ternal sustentation, there grows increasingly 
clear the code of conduct which voluntary 
co-operation implies. And this final perma- 
nent code alone admits of being definitely 
formulated, and so constituting ethics as a 
science in contrast with empirical ethics. 

The leading traits of a code under which 
complete living through voluntary co-opera- 
tion is secured may be simply stated. The 
fundamental requirement is that the life-sus- 
taining actions of each shall severally bring 
him the amounts and kinds of advantage 
naturally achieved by them ; and this im- 
plies, firstly, that he shall suffer no direct ag- 
gressions on his person or property, and, sec- 
ondly, that he shall suffer no indirect aggres- 
sions by breach of contract. Observance of 
these negative conditions to voluntary co- 
operation having facilitated life to the great- 
est extent by exchange of services under 
agreement, life is to be further facilitated by 
exchange of services beyond agreement : the 
highest life being reached only when, besides 
helping to complete one another's lives by 
specified reciprocities of aid, men otherwise 
help to complete one another's lives. 

CHAPTER IX. 

CRITICISMS AND EXPLANATIONS. 

§ 56. Comparisons of the foregoing chap- 
ters with one another suggest sundry ques- 
tions which must be answered partially, if 
not completely, before anything can be done 
toward reducing ethical principles from ab- 
stract forms to concrete forms. 

We have seen that to admit the desirable- 
ness of conscious existence is to admit that 
conduct should be such as will produce a 
consciousness which is desirable — a con- 
sciousness which is as much pleasurable and 
as little painful as may be. We have also 
seen that this necessary implication corre- 
sponds with the d priori inference that the 
evolution of life has been made possible only 
by the establishment of connections between 
pleasures and beneficial actions, and between 
pains and detrimental actions. But the gen- 
eral conclusion reached in both of these 
ways, though it covers the area within which 
our special conclusions must fall, does not 
help us to reach those special conclusions. 

Were pleasures all of one kind, differing 
only in degree, were pains all of one kind, 
differing only in degree, and could pleasures 
he measured against pains with definite re- 
sults, the problems of conduct would be 
greatly simplified. Were the pleasures and 
pains serving as incentives and deterrents 
simultaneously present to consciousness with 
like vividness, or were they all immediately 
impending, or were they all equidistant in 
time, the problems would be further sim- 
plified. And they would be still further 



simplified if the pleasures and pains were 
exclusively those of the actor. But both the 
desirable and the undesirable feelings are of 
various kinds, making quantitative compari- 
sons difficult : some are present and some 
are future, increasing the difficulty of quan- 
titative comparison ; some are entailed ou 
self and some are entailed on others, again 
increasing the difficulty. So that the guid- 
ance yielded by the primary principle 
reached is of little service unless supple- 
mented by the guidance of secondary princi- 
ples. 

Already, in recognizing the needful subor- 
dination of presentative feelings to repre- 
sentative feelings, and the implied postpone- 
ment of present to future throughout a wide 
range of cases, some approach toward a sec- 
ondary principle of guidance has been made. 
Already, too, in recognizing the limitations 
which men's associated state puts to their ac- 
tions, with the implied need for restraining 
feelings of some kinds by feelings of other 
kinds, we have come in sight of another sec- 
ondary principle of guidance. Still, there 
remains much to be decided respecting the 
relative claims of these guiding principles, . 
general and special. 

Some elucidation of the questions involved 
will be obtained by here discussing certain, 
views and arguments set forth by past audi 
present moralists. 

§ 57. Using the name hedonism for that 
ethical theory which makes happiness the 
end of action, and distinguishing hedonism 
into the two kinds, egoistic and universalis- 
tic, according as the happiness sought is that 
of the actor himself or is that of all, Mr. 
Sidgwick alleges its implied belief to be that 
pleasures and pains are commensurable. In 
his criticism on (empiric^) egoistic hedonism 
he says : 

" The fundamental assumption of hedonism, clearly- 
stated, is that all feelings considered merely as feel- 
ings can be arranged in a certain scale of desirability,, 
so that the desirability or pleasantness of each bears- 
a definite ratio to that of all the others."—" Methods, 
of Ethics," 2d ed., p. 115. 

And asserting this to be its assumption, he- 
proceeds to point out difficulties in the way 
of the hedonistic calculation, apparently for 
the purpose of implying that these difficulties 
tell against the hedonistic theory. 

Now though it may be shown that by 
naming the intensit}', the duration, the cer- 
tainty, and the proximity of a pleasure or a 
pain, as traits entering into the estimation of 
its relative value, Bentham has committed 
himself to the specified assumption, and 
though it is perhaps reasonably taken for 
granted that hedonism as represented by him 
is identical with hedonism at large, yet it 
seems to me that the hedonist, empirical or 
other, is not necessarily committed to this: 
assumption. That the greatest surplus of 
pleasures over pains ought to be the end of 
action, is a belief which he may still consis- 
tently hold after admitting that the valuations 
of pleasures and pains are commonly vague 
and often erroneous. He may sax that! 



524 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



though indefinite things do not admit of defi- 
nite measurements, yet approximately true 
estimates of their relative values may be 
made when they differ considerably ; and he 
may further say that even when their rela- 
tive values are not determinable, it remains 
true that the most valuable should be chosen. 
Let us listen to him : 

"A debtor who cannot pay me offers to 
compound for his debt by making over one 
of sundry things he possesses — a diamond or- 
nament, a silver vase, a picture, a carriage. 
Other questions being set aside, I assert it to 
be my pecuniary interest to choose the most 
valuable of these ; but I cannot say which is 
the most valuable. Does the proposition that 
it is my pecuniary interest to choose the most 
valuable therefore become doubtful ? Must 
I not choose as well as I can ; and if I choose 
wrongly must I give up my ground of 
choice ? Must I infer that in matters of busi- 
ness I may not act on the principle that, 
other things equal, the more profitable trans- 
action is to be preferred, because in many 
cases I caunot say which is the more profit- 
able, and have often chosen the less profit- 
able ? Because I believe that of many dan- 
gerous courses I ought to take the least dan 
gerous, do I make ' the fundamental assump- 
tion ' that courses can be arranged according 
to a scale of dangerousness, and must I 
abandon my belief if I cannot so arrange 
them ? If I am not by consistency bound to 
do tins, then I am no more by consistency 
bound to give up the principle that the great- 
est surplus of pleasures over pains should be 
the end of action, because the ' commensu- 
rability of pleasures and pains ' cannot be 
asserted. ' ' 

At the close of his chapters on empirical 
hedonism, Mr. Sidgwick himself says he 
does " not think that the common experience 
of mankind, impartially examined, really 
sustains the view that egoistic hedonism is 
necessarily suicidal ;" adding, however, that 
the " uncertainty of hedonistic calculation 
cannot be denied to have great weight." 
Bui, here the fundamental assumption of 
hedonism, that happiness is the end of ac- 
tion, is still supposed to involve the assump- 
tion that ' ' feelings can be arranged in a cer- 
tain scale of desirability." This we have 
seen it does not : its fundamental assumption 
is in no degree invalidated by proof that such 
arrangement of them is impracticable. 

To Mr. Sidgwick's argument there is the 
further objection, no less serious, that to 
whatever degree it tells against egoistic hed- 
onism, it tells in a greater degree against 
universalistic hedonism, or utilitarianism. 
He admits that it tells as much ; saying 
" whatever weight is to be attached to the 
objections brought against this assumption 
[the commensurability of pleasures and 
pains] must of course tell against the pres- 
ent method." Not only does it tell, but it 
tells in a double way. I do not mean merely 
that, as he points out, the assumption becomes 
greatly complicated if we take all sentient 
beings iuto account, and if we include pos- 



terity along with existing individuals. I 
mean that, taking as the end to be achieved 
the greatest happiness of the existing indi- 
viduals forming a single community, the set 
of difficulties standing in the way of egoistic 
hedonism is compounded with another set 
of difficulties no less great, when' we pass 
from it to universalistic hedonism. For if the 
dictates of universalistic hedonism are to be 
fulfilled, it must be under the guidance of 
individual judgments, or of corporate judg- 
ments, or of both. Now any one of such 
judgments issuing from a single mind, or 
from any aggregate of minds, necessarily 
embodies conclusions respecting the happi- 
nesses of other persons ; few of them known, 
and the great mass never seen. AH these 
persons have natures differing in countless 
waj r s and degrees from the natures of those 
who form the judgments, and the happi- 
nesses of which they are severally capable 
differ from one another, and differ from the 
happinesses of those who form the judg- 
ments. Consequently, if against the method 
of egoistic hedonism there is the objection 
that a man's own pleasures and pains, un- 
like in their kinds, intensities, and times 
of occurrence, are incommensurable, then 
against the method of universalistic hedon- 
ism it may be urged that to the incommen- 
surability of each judge's own pleasures and 
pains (which he must use as standards) has 
now to be added the much more decided in- 
commensurability of the pleasures and pains 
which he conceives to be experienced by in- 
numerable other persons, all differently con- 
stituted from himself and from one another. 

Nay more — there is a triple set of difficul- 
ties in the way of universalistic hedonism. 
To the double indeterminateuess of the end 
has to be added the indeterminateness of 
the means. If hedonism, egoistic or univer- 
salistic, is to pass from dead theory into liv- 
ing practice, acts of one or other kind must 
be decided on to achieve proposed objects ; 
and in estimating the two methods we have 
to consider how far the fitness of the acts 
respectively required can be judged. If, 
in pursuing his own ends, the individual is 
liable to be led by erroneous opinions to ad- 
just his acts wrongly, much more liable is 
he to be led by erroneous opinions to adjust 
wrongly more complex acts to the more 
complex ends constituted by other men's 
welfares. It is so if he operates singly to 
benefit a few others ; and it is still more so 
if he co-operates with many to benefit all. 
Making general happiness the immediate ob- 
ject of pursuit implies numerous and com- 
plicated instrumentalities officered by thou- 
sands of unseen and unlike persons, aDd 
working on millions of other persons unseen 
and unlike. Even the few factors in this im- 
mense aggregate of appliances and processes 
which are known are very imperfectly 
known, and the great mass of them are un- 
known. So that even supposing valuation 
of pleasures and pains for the community at 
large is more practicable than, or even as 
practicable as, valuation of his own pleasures 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



525 



and pains by the individual, yet tlie ruling 
of conduct with a view to the one end is far 
more difficult than the ruling of it with a 
view to the other. Hence, if the method of 
egoistic hedonism is unsatisfactory, far more 
unsatisfactory for the same and kindred rea- 
sons is the method of universalistic hedon- 
ism or utilitarianism. 

And here we come in sight of the conclu- 
sion which it has been the purpose of the 
foregoing criticism to'bring into view. The 
objection made to the hedonistic method con- 
tains a truth, but includes with it an un- 
truth. For while the proposition that hap- 
piness, whether individual or general, is the 
end of action, is not invalidated by proof 
that it cannot under either form be estimated 
by measurement of its components, yet it 
may be admitted that guidance in the pur- 
suit of happiness by a mere balancing of 
pleasures and pains is, if partially practi- 
cable throughout a certain range of conduct, 
futile throughout a much wider range. It 
is quite consistent to assert that happiness is 
the ultimate aim of action, and at the same 
time to deny that it can be reached by mak- 
ing it the immediate aim. I go with Mr. 
Sidgwick as far as the conclusion that " we 
must at least admit the desirability of con- 
firming or correcting the results of such com- 
parisons [of pleasures and pains] by any 
other method upon which we may find reason 
'to rely ;" and I then go further, and say 
that throughout a large part of conduct guid- 
ance by such comparisons is to be entirely 
set aside and replaced by other guidance. 

§ 58. The antithesis here insisted upon be- 
tween the hedonistic end considered in the 
abstract, and the method which current 
hedonism, whether egoistic or universalistic, 
associates with that end, and the joining 
acceptance of the one with rejection of the 
other, commits us to an overt discussion of 
these two cardinal elements of ethical theory. 
I may conveniently initiate this discussion by 
criticising another of Mr. Sidgwick 's criti- 
cisms on the method of hedonism. 

Though we can give no account of those 
simple pleasures which the senses yield, be- 
cause they are undecomposabie, yet we dis- 
tinctly know their characters as states of con- 
sciousness. Conversely, the complex pleas- 
ures formed by compounding and recom- 
pounding the ideas of simple pleasures, 
though theoretically resolvable into their 
components, are not easy to resolve, and in 
proportion as they are heterogeneous in com- 
position, the difficulty of framing intelligible 
conceptions of them increases. This is es- 
pecially the case with the pleasures which 
accompany our sports. Treating of these, 
along with the pleasures of pursuit in gen- 
eral, for the purpose of showing that " in or- 
der to get them one must forget them," Mr. 
Sidgwick remarks : 

"A man who maintains throughout an epicurean 
mood, fixing his aim on his own pleasure, does not 
catch the full spirit of the chase ; his eagerness never 
gets just the sharpness of edge which imparts to the 
pleasure its highest zest and flavor. Here comes into 
■view what we may call the fundamental paradox of 



hedonism, that the mpulse toward pleasure, if too 
predominant, defeats its own aim. This effect is not 
visible, or at any rate is scarcely visible, in the case 
of passive sensual pleasures. But of ouractive enjoy- 
ments generally, whether the activities on which they 
attend are classed as ' bodily' or as ' intellectual ' (as 
well as of many emotional pleasures), it may certainly 
be said that we cannot attain them, at least in their 
best form, so long as we concentrate our aim on them." 
—"Methods of Ethics," x.'d ed., p. 41. 

Now I think we shall not regard this truth 
as paradoxical after we have duly analyzed 
the pleasure of pursuit. The chief compo- 
nents of this pleasure are : first, a renewed 
consciousness of personal efficiency (made 
vivid by actual success and partially excited 
by impending success) which consciousness 
of personal efficiency, connected in experi- 
ence with achieved ends of every kind, 
arouses a vague but massive consciousness of 
resulting gratifications ; and, second, a rep- 
resentation of the applause which recognition 
of this efficiency by others has before brought 
and will again bring. Games of skill show 
us this clearly. Considered as an end in it- 
self, the good cannon which a billiard-player 
makes yields no pleasure. "Whence then 
does the pleasure of making it arise ? Partly 
from the fresh proof of capability which the 
player gives to himself, and partly from the 
imagined admiration of those who witness 
the proof of his capability : the last being 
the chief, since he soon tires of making can- 
nons in the absence of witnesses. When 
from games which, yielding the pleasures of 
success, yield no pleasure derived from the 
end considered intrinsically, we pass to 
sports in which the end has intrinsic value 
as a source of pleasure, we see substantially 
the same thing. Though the bird which the 
sportsman brings down is useful as food, 
yet his satisfaction arises mainly from hav- 
ing made a good shot, and from having add- 
ed to the bag which will presently brina; 
praise of his skill. The gratification of stlf- 
esteem he immediately experiences, and the 
gratification of receiving applause he experi- 
ences, if not immediately and in full degree, 
yet by representation ; for the ideal pleasure 
is nothing else than a faint revival of the real 
pleasure. These two kinds of agreeable ex 
citement, present in the sportsman during the 
chase, constitute the mass of the desires 
stimulating him to continue it ; for all desires 
are nascent forms of the feelings to be ob- 
tained by the efforts they prompt. And 
though while st eking more birds these repre- 
sentative feelings are not so vividly excited as 
by success just achieved, yet they are excited 
by imaginations of further successes, and so 
make enjoyable the activities constituting the 
pursuit. Recognizing, then, the truth that 
the pleasures of pursuit are much more those 
derived from the efficient use of means than 
those derived from the end itself, we see that 
"the fundamental paradox of hedonism" 
disappears. 

These remaps concerning end and means, 
and the pleasure accompanying use of the 
means as added to the pleasure derived from 
the end, I have made for the purpose of 
drawing attention to a fact of profound sig- 



52(5 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



nificanee. During evolution there has been 
a superposing of new and more complex sets 
of means upon older and simpler sets of 
means, and a superposing of the pleasures 
accompanying the uses of these successive 
sets of means, with the result that each of 
these pleasures has itself eventually become 
an end. We begin with a simple animal 
which, without ancillary appliances, swal- 
lows such food as accident brings in its way, 
and so, as we may assume, stills some kind 
of craving. Here we have the primary end 
of nutrition, with its accompanying satisfac- 
tion, in their simple forms. We pass to 
higher types having jaws for seizing and 
biting — jaws which thus, by their actions, 
facilitate achievement of the primary end. 
On observing animals furnished with these 
organs, we get evidence that the use of them 
becomes in itself pleasurable irrespective of 
tbe end : instance a squirrel, which, apart 
from food to be so obtained, delights in nib- 
bling everything it gets hold of. Turning 
from jaws to limbs, we see that these, serving 
some creatures for pursuit and others for es- 
cape, similarly yield gratification by their ex- 
ercise ; as in lambs which skip and horses 
which prance. How the combined use of 
limbs and jaws, originally subserving the sat- 
isfaction of appetite, grows to be in itself 
pleasurable, is daily illustrated in the playing 
of dogs. For that throwing down and worry- 
ing which, when prey is caught, precedes 
eating, is, in their mimic fights, carried by 
each as far as he dares. Coming to means 
still more remote from the end, namely, 
those- by which creatures chased are caught, 
we are again shown by dogs that when no 
creature is caught there is still a gratification 
in the act of catching. The eagerness witii 
which a dog runs after stones, or dances and 
barks in anticipation of jumping into the 
water after a stick, proves that apart from 
the satisfaction of appetite, and apart even 
from the satisfaction of killing prey, there is 
a satisfaction in the successful pursuit of a 
moving object. Throughout, then, we see 
that the pleasure attendant on the use of 
means to achieve an end itself becomes an 
end. 

Now if we contemplate these as phe- 
nomena of conduct in general, some facts 
worthy of note may be discerned — facts 
which, if we appreciate their significance, 
will aid us in developing our ethical concep- 
tions. One of them is that among the suc- 
cessive sets of means, the later are the more 
remote from the primary end — are, as co- 
ordinating earlier and simpler means, the 
more complex, and are accompanied by 
feelings which are more representative. An- 
other fact is that each set of means, with its 
accompanying satisfactions, eventually be- 
comes in its turn dependent on one originat- 
ing later than itself. Before the gullet swal- 
lows, the jaws must lay hold ; before the 
jaws tear out aud bring within the grasp of 
the gullet a piece fit for swallowing, there 
must be that co-operation of limbs and senses 
required for killing the prey ; before this co- 



operation can take place, there needs the 
much longer co-operation constituting the: 
chase ; and even before this there must be 
persistent activities of limbs, eyes, and nose, 
in seeking prey. The pleasure attending 
each set of acts, while making possible the 
pleasure attending the set of acts which fol- 
lows, is joined with a representation of this 
subsequent set of acts and its pleasure, and 
of the others which succeed in order ; so 
that along with the feelings accompanying 
the search for prey are partially aroused the 
feelings accompanying the actual chase, the 
actual destruction, the actual devouring, and 
the eventual satisfaction of appetite. A third 
fact is that the use of each set of means in 
due order constitutes an obligation. Main- 
tenance of its life being regarded as the end. 
of its conduct, the creature is obliged to use 
in succession the means of finding prey, the 
means of catching prey, the means of killing 
prey, the means of devouring prey. Lastly, 
it follows that though the assuaging of hun- 
ger, directly associated with sustentation, re- 
mains to the last the ultimate end, yet the 
successful use of each set of means in its 
turn is the proximate end — the end which 
takes temporary precedence in authoritative- 
ness. 

§ 59. The relations between means and 
ends thus traced throughout the earlier 
stages of evolving conduct are traceable 
throughout later stages, and hold true of 
human conduct, up even to its highest 
forms. As fast as, for the better mainten- 
ance of life, the simpler sets of means and 
the pleasures accompanying the uses of them 
come to be supplemented by the more com- 
plex sets of means and their pleasures,, these 
begin to take precedence in time and in im- 
perativeness. To use effectually each more 
complex set of means becomes the proximate 
end, and the accompanying feeling becomes 
the immediate gratification sought, though 
there may be, and habitually is, an associated 
consciousness of the remoter ends and remoter 
gratifications to be obtained. An example' 
will make clear the parallelism. 

Absorbed in his business the trader, if 
asked what is his main end, will say — mak- 
ing money. He readily grants that achieve- 
ment of this end is desired by him in further- 
ance of ends beyond it. He knows that in 
directly seeking money he is indirectly seek- 
ing food, clothes, house-room, and the com- 
forts of life for self and family. But while ad- 
mitting that money is but a means to these 
ends, he urges that the money-getting actions 
precede, in order of time and obligation, the 
various actions and concomitant pleasures 
subserved by them, and he testifies to the 
fact that making money has become itself an 
end, and success in it a source of satisfac- 
tion, apart from these more distant ends. 
Again, on observing more closely the trader's 
proceedings, we find that though to the end 
of living comfortably he gets money, and 
though to the end of getting money he buys 
and sells at a profit, which so becomes a 
means more immediately pursued, yet he is 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



527 



ehiefiy occupied with means still more re- 
mote from ultimate ends, and in relation to 
•which even the selling at a profit becomes an 
«nd. For leaving to subordinates the actual 
measuring out of goods and receiving of 
proceeds, he busies himself mainly with his 
general affairs— inquiries concerning mar- 
kets, judgments of future prices, calculations, 
negotiations, correspondence — the anxiety 
from hour to hour being to do well each one 
of these things indirectly conducive to the 
making of profits. And these ends precede 
in time and obligation the effecting of profit- 
able sales, just as the effecting of profitable 
sales precedes the end of money-making, and 
just as the end of money-making precedes 
the end of satisfactory living. His book- 
keeping best exemplifies the principle at 
large. Entries to the debtor or creditor sides 
are being made all through the day ; the 
items are classified and arranged in such way 
that at a moment's notice the state of each 
account may be ascertained ; and then, from 
time to time, the books are balanced, and it 
is required that the result shall come right to 
a penny— satisfaction following proved cor- 
rectness, and annoyance being caused by 
error. If you ask why all this elaborate pro- 
cess, so remote from the actual getting of 
money, and still more remote from the enjoy- 
ments of life, the answer is that keeping ac- 
counts correctly is fulfilling a condition to 
the end of money-making, and becomes in 
itself a proximate end— a duty to be dis- 
charged, that there may be discharged the 
duty of getting an income, that there may be 
discharged the duty of maintaining self, 
wife, and children. 

Approaching as we here do to moral obli- 
gation, are we not shown its relations to 
-conduct at large ? Is it not clear that observ- 
ance of moral principles is fulfilment of cer- 
tain general conditions to the successful car- 
rying on of special activities ? That the 
trader may prosper, he must not only keep 
his books correctly, but must pay those he 
employs according to agreement, and must 
meet his engagements with creditors. May 
we not say, then, that conformity to the sec- 
ond and third of these requirements is, like 
conformity to the first, an indirect means to 
effectual use of the more direct means of 
achieving welfare? May we not say, too, 
that as the use of each more indirect means 
an due order becomes itself an end and a 
source of gratification, so, eventually, be- 
comes the use of this most indirect means ? 
And may we not infer that though conform- 
ity to moral requirements precedes in imper- 
ativeness conformity to other requirements, 
yet that this imperativeness arises from the 
fact that fulfilment of the other requirements, 
by self or others or both, is thus furthered ? 

§ 60. This question brings us round to 
another side of the issue before raised. 
When alleging that empirical utilitarianism 
is but introductory to rational utilitarianism, 
I pointed out that the last does not take wel- 
fare for its immediate object of pursuit, but 
takes for its immediate object of pursuit con- 



formity to certain principles which, in the 
nature of things, causally determine welfare. 
And now we see that this amounts to rec- 
ognition of that law, traceable throughout 
the evolution of conduct in general, that each 
later and higher order of means takes pre- 
cedence in time and authoritativeness of each 
earlier and lower order of means. The con- 
trast between the ethical methods thus dis- 
tinguished, made tolerably clear by the 
above illustrations, will be made still clearer 
by contemplating the two as put in oppo- 
sition by the leading exponent of empirical 
utilitarianism. Treating of legislating aims, 
Bentham writes : 

"But justice, what is it that we are to understand 
by justice, and why not happiness but justice ? What 
happiness is every man knows, because what pleas- 
ure is every man knows, and what pain is every man 
knows. But what justice is — this is what on every 
occasion is the subject-matter of dispute. Be the 
meaning of the word justice what it will, what re- 
gard is it entitled to otherwise than as a means of 
happiness." 

Let us first consider the assertion here 
made respecting the relative intelligibilities 
of these two ends, and let us afterward 
consider what is implied by the choice of 
happiness instead of justice. 

Bentham's positive assertion that "what 
happiness is every man knows, because 
what pleasure is, every man knows," is 
met by counter-assertions equally positive. 
" Who can tell," says Plato, " what pleasure 
really is, or know it in its essence, except the 
philosopher, who alone is conversant with 
realities?" Aristotle, too, after commenting 
on the different opinions held by the vulgar, 
by the political, by the contemplative, says 
of happiness that " to some it seems to be 
virtue, to others prudence, and to others a 
kind of wisdom : to some again, these, or 
some one of these, with pleasure, or at least 
not without pleasure ; others again include 
external prosperity." And Aristotle, like 
Plato, comes to the remarkable conclusion 
that the pleasures of the intellect, reached by 
the contemplative life, constitute the highest 
happiness ! How disagreements concerning 
the nature of happiness and the relative 
values of pleasures, thus exhibited in ancient 
.times, continue down to modern times, is 
shown in Mr. Sidgwick's discussion of ego- 
istic hedonism, above commented upon. 
Further, as was pointed out before, the in- 
definiteness attending the estimations of 
pleasures and pains, which stands in the 
way of egoistic hedonism as ordinarily con- 
ceived, is immensely increased on passing to 
universalistic hedonism as ordinarily con- 
ceived, since its theory implies that the im- 
agined pleasures and pains of others are to 
be estimated by the help of these pleasures 
and pains of self, already so difficult to esti- 
mate. And that any one after observing the 
various pursuits into which some eagerly en- 
ter but which others shun, and after listen- 
ing to the different opinions concerning the 
likeableness of this or that occupation or 
amusement, expressed at every table, should 
assert that the nature of happiness can be 



528 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



fully agreed upon, so as to render it a fit enu 
for direct legislative action, is surprising. 

The accompanying proposition that jus- 
tice is unintelligible as an end is no less sur- 
prising. Though primitive men have no 
words for either happiness or justice, yet 
even among them an approach to' the concep- 
tion of justice is traceable. The law of re- 
taliation, requiring that a death inflicted by 
one tribe on another shall be balanced by 
the death either of the murderer or some 
member of his tribe, shows us in a vague 
shape that notion of equalness of treatment 
which forms an essential element in it. 
W hen we come to early races who have given 
their thoughts and feelings literary form, 
we find this conception of justice, as involv- 
ing equalness of action, becoming distinct. 
Among the Jews, David expressed in words 
this association of ideas when, praying to 
God to " hear the right," he said, " Let my 
seD fence come forth from thy presence ; let 
thine eyes behold the things that are equal ;" 
as also, among early Christians, did Paul 
when to the Colossians he wrote. " Masters, 
give unto your servants that which is just 
and equal." Commenting on the different 
meanings of justice, Aristotle concludes 
that " the just will therefore be the lawful 
and the equal ; and the unjust the unlawful 
and the unequal. But since the unjust man 
is also one who takes more than his share," 
etc. And that justice was similarly con- 
ceived by the Romans they proved by in- 
cluding under it such meanings as exact, 
proportionate, impartial, severally implying 
fairness of division, and still better by iden- 
tification of it with equity, which is a deriv- 
ative of cequus — the word cequus itself hav- 
ing for one of its meanings just or impartial. 
This coincidence of view among ancient 
peoples respecting the nature of justice has 
extended 1o modern peoples, who, by a gen- 
eral agreement in certain cardinal principles 
which their systems of law embody, forbid- 
ding direct aggressions, which are forms of 
unequal actions, and forbidding indirect ag- 
gressions by breaches of contract, which are 
other forms of unequal actions, one and all 
show us the identification of justice with 
equalness. Bentham, then, is wrong when 
he says, " But what justice is— this is what 
on every occasion is the subject-matter of 
dispute." He is more wrong, indeed, than 
has thus far appeared. For, in the first 
place, he misrepresents utterly by ignoring the 
fact that in ninety-nine out of every hundred 
daily transactions between men, no dispute 
about justice arises, but the business done 
is recognized on both sides as justly done. 
And in the second place if, with respect to 
the hundredth transaction there is a dispute, 
the subject-matter of it is not " what justice 
is," for it is admitted to be equity or equal- 
ness ; but the subject-matter of dispute 
always is, what, under these particular cir- 
cumstances, constitutes equalness ? — a widely 
different question. 

It is not then self-evident, as Bentham 
alleges, that happiness is an intelligible end 



while justice is not ; but, contrariwise, ex- 
amination makes evident the greater intelligi- 
bility cf justice as an end. And analysis 
shows why it is the more intelligible. For 
justice, or equity, or equalness is concerned 
exclusively wi'.h quantity under stated con- 
ditions ; whereas happiness is concerned with 
both quantity and quality under conditions not 
stated. "When, as in case of theft, a benefit 
is taken while no equivalent benefit is 
yielded — when, as in case of adulterated 
goods bought or base coin paid, that which 
is agreed to be given in exchange as of equal 
value is not given, but something of less 
value —when, as in case of broken contract, 
the obligation on one side has been dis- 
charged, while there has been no discharge, 
or incomplete discharge, of the obligation on 
the other, we see that, the circumstances being 
specified, the injustice complained of refers 
to the relative amounts of actions, or prod- 
ucts, or benefits, the natures of which are 
recognized only so far as is needful for say- 
ing whether as much has been given, or 
done, or allowed, by each concerned, as was 
implied by tacit or overt understanding to be 
an equivalent. But when the end proposed 
is happiness, the circumstances remaining 
unspecified, the problem is that of estimating 
both quantities and qualities, unhelped by 
any such definite measures as acts of ex- 
change imply, or as contracts imply, or as 
are implied by the differences between the 
doings of one aggressing and one aggressed 
upon. The mere fact that Bentham himself 
includes as elements in the estimation of each 
pleasure or pain, its intensity, duration, cer- 
tainty, and proximity, suffices to show how 
difficult is this problem. And when it is re- 
membered that all pleasures and pains, not 
felt in particular cases only but in the aggre- 
gate of cases, and severally regarded under 
these four aspects, have to be compared with 
one another and their relative values deter- 
mined, simply by introspection, it will be 
manifest both that the problem is complicated 
by the addition of indefinite judgments of 
qualities to indefinite measures of quantities, 
and that it is further complicated by the 
multitudinousness of these vague estimations 
to be gone through and summed up. 

But now passing over this assertion of 
Bentham that happiness is a more intelligible 
end than justice, which we find to be the 
reverse of truth, let us note the several im- 
plications of the doctrine that the supreme 
legislative body ought to make the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number its imme- 
diate aim. 

It implies, in the first place, that happi- 
ness may be compassed by methods framed 
directly for the purpose, without any previ- 
ous inquiry respecting the conditions that 
must be fulfilled, and this presupposes a be- 
lief that there are no such conditions. For 
if there are any conditions without fulfilment 
of which happiness cannot be compassed, 
then the first step must be to ascertain these 
conditions with a view to fulfilling them ; 
and to admit this is to admit that not happi- 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



529 



ness itself must be the immediate end, but 
fulfilment of the conditions to its attainment 
must be the immediate end. The alterna- 
tives are simple : either the achievement of 
happiness is not conditional, in which case 
one mode of action is as good as another, or 
it is conditional, in which case the required 
mode of action must be the direct aim and 
not the happiness to be achieved by it. 

Assuming it conceded, as it will be, that 
there exist conditions which must be fulfilled 
before happiness can be attained, let us next 
ask what is implied by proposing modes of 
so controlling conduct as to further happi- 
ness, without previously inquiring whether 
any such modes are already known ? The 
implication is that human intelligence 
throughout the past, operating on experi- 
ences, has failed to discover any such modes, 
whereas present human intelligence may be 
expected forthwith to discover them. Un- 
less this be asserted, it must be admitted 
that certain conditioD3 to the achievement of 
happiness have already been partially, if not 
wholly, ascertained ; and if so, our first busi- 
ness should be to look for them. Having 
found them, our rational course is to bring 
existing intelligence to bear on these prod- 
ucts of past intelligence, with the expecta- 
tion that it wiil verify the substance of them 
while possibly correcting the form. But to 
suppose that no regulative principles for the 
conduct of associated human beings have 
thus far been established, and that they are 
now to be established de novo, is to suppose 
that man as he is differs from man as he was 
in an incredible degree. 

Beyond ignoring the probability, or rather 
the certainty, that past experience general- 
ized by past intelligence must by this time 
have disclosed partially, if not wholly, some 
of the essential conditions to the achievement 
of happiness, Bentham's proposition ignores 
the formulated knowledge of them actually 
existing. For whence come the concep- 
tion of justice and the answering sentiment. 
He will scarcely say that thc-y are meaning- 
less, although his proposition implies as 
much ; and if he admits that they have mean- 
ings, he must choose between two alterna- 
tives, either of which is fatal to his hypothe- 
sis. Are they supernaturally caused modes 
of thinking and feeling, tending to make 
men fulfil the conditions to happiness ? If 
so their authority is peremptory. Are they 
modes of thinking and feeling naturally 
caused in men by experience of these con- 
ditions ? ^f so, their authority is no less 
peremptory. Not only, then, does Bentham 
fail to infer that certain principles of guid- 
ance must by this time have been ascertained, 
but he refuses to recognize these principles 
as actually reached and present to him. 

And then, after all, he tacitly admits that 
which he overtly denies, by saying that 
"Be the meaning of the word justice what 
it will, what regard is it entitled to other- 
wise than as a means to happiness ?" For if 
justice is a means having happiness as its 
end, then justice must take precedence of 



happiness, as every other means takes prece- 
dence of every other end. Bentham's own 
elaborate polity is a means having happiness 
as its end, as justice is, by his own admission, 
a means having happiness as an end. If, 
then, we may properly skip justice, and g:> 
directly to the end happiness, we may prop- 
erly skip Bentham's polity, and go directly 
to the end happiness. In short, we are led 
to the remarkable conclusion that in all cases 
we must contemplate exclusively the end and 
must disregard the means. 

§ 61. This relation of ends to means, un- 
derlying all ethical speculation, will be fur- 
ther elucidated if we join with some of the 
above conclusions certain conclusions drawn 
in the last chapter. We shall see that while 
greatest happiness may vary widely in soci- 
eties which, though ideally constituted, are 
subject to unlike physical circumstances, cer- 
tain fundamental conditions to the achieve- 
ment of this greatest happiness are common 
to all such societies. 

Given a people inhabiting a tract which 
makes nomadic habits necessary, and the 
happiness of each individual will be greatest 
when his nature is so moulded to the require- 
ments of his life that all his faculties find 
their due activities in daily driving and tend- 
ing cattle, milking, migrating, and so forth. 
The members of a community otherwise sim- 
ilar, which is permanently settled, will sever- 
ally achieve their greatest happiness when 
their natures have become such that a fixed 
habitat, and the occupations necessitated by 
it, supply the spheres in which each instinct 
and emotion is exercised and brings the con- 
comitant pleasure. The citizens of a larjre 
nation industrially organized have reached 
their possible ideal of happiness when the 
producing, distributing, and other activities 
are such in their kinds and amounts that 
each citizen finds in them a place for all his 
energies and aptitudes, while he obtains the 
means of satisfying all his desires. Once 
more we may recognize as not only possible 
but probable the eventual existence of a 
community, also industrial, the members of 
which, having natures similarly responding 
to these requirements, are also characterized 
by dominant aesthetic faculties, and achieve 
complete happiness only when a large part 
of life is filled with aesthetic activities. Evi- 
dently these different types of men, with 
their different standards of happiness, each 
finding the possibility of that happiness in 
his own society, would not find it if trans- 
ferred to any of the other societies. Evi- 
dently though they might have in common 
such kinds of happiness as accompany the 
satisfaction of vital needs, they would not 
have in common sundry other kinds of hap- 
piness. 

But now mark that while, to achieve great- 
est happiness in each of such societies, the 
special conditions to be fulfilled must differ 
from those to be fulfilled in the other socie- 
ties, certain general conditions must be ful- 
filled in all the societies. Harmonious co- 
operation, by which alone in any of them. 



530 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



the greatest happiness can be attained, is, as 
we saw, made possible only by respect for 
one another's claims : there must be neither 
those direct aggressions which we class as 
crimes against person and property, nor 
must there be those indirect aggressions con- 
stituted by breaches of contracts. So that 
maintenance of equitable relations between 
men is the condition to attainment of great- 
est happiness in all societies, however much 
tiie gceatest happiness attainable in each may 
differ in nature, or amount, or both. 

And here a physical analogy may fitly be 
used to give the greatest definiteness to this 
cardinal truth. A. mass of matter of what- 
ever kind maintains its state of internal 
equilibrium so long as its component par- 
ticles severally stand toward their neighbors 
in equidistant positions. Accepting the con- 
clusions of modern physicists, which im- 
ply that each molecule moves rhythmically, 
then a balanced state implies that each per- 
forms its movements within a space bounded 
by the like spaces required for the move- 
ments of those around. If the molecules 
have been so aggregated that the oscillations 
of some are mote restrained than the oscilla- 
tions of others, there is a proportionate in- 
stability. If the number of them thus un- 
duly restrained is considerable, the instability 
is sucb that the cohesion in some part is 
liable to fail, and a crack results. If the ex- 
cesses of restraint are great and multitudi- 
nous, a trifling disturbance causes the mass 
to break up into small fragments. To which 
add that the recognized remedy for this un- 
stable state is an exposure to such physical 
condition (ordinarily high temperature) as 
enables the molecules so to change their rela- 
tive positions that their mutual restraints 
become equal on all sides. And now ob- 
serve that this holds whatever be the natures 
of the molecules. They may be simple ; 
they may be compound ; they may be com- 
posed of this or that matter in this or that 
way. In other words, the special activities 
of each molecule, constituted by the relative 
movements of its units, may be various in 
their kinds and degrees, and yet, be they 
what they may, it remains true that to pre- 
serve internal equilibrium throughout the 
mass of molecules the mutual limitations of 
their activities must be everywhere alike. 

And this is the above described prerequisite 
to social equilibrium, whatever the special 
natures of the associated persons. Assum- 
ing that within each society such persons are 
of the same type, needing for the fulfilment 
of their several lives kindred activities, and 
though these activities may be of one kind 
in one society and of another kind in an- 
other, so admitting of indefinite variation, 
this condition to social equilibrium does not 
admit of variation. It must be fulfilled be- 
fore complete life, that is greatest happiness, 
can be attained in any society, be the par- 
ticular quality of that life or that happiness 
what it may? . 

§ 62. After thus observing how means and 
ends in conduct stand to one another, and 



how there emerge certain conclusions re- 
specting their relative claims, we may see a 
way to reconcile sundry conflicting ethical 
theories. These severally embody portions 
of the truth, and simply require combining 
in proper order to embody the whole truth. 

The theological theory contains a part. If 
for the Divine will, supposed to be supernat- 
uraliy revealed, we substitute the naturally 
revealed end toward which the Power mani- 
fested throughout evolution works, then, 
since evolution has been, and is still, work- 
ing toward the highest life, it follows that 
conforming to those principles by which the 
highest life is achieved is furthering that 
end. The doctrine that perfection or excel- 
lence of nature should be the object of pur- 
suit, is in one sense true, for it tacitly rec- 
ognizes that ideal form of being which the 
highest life implies, and to which evolution 
tends. There is a truth, also, in the doc- 
trine that virtue must be the aim, for this is 
another form of the doctrine that the aim 
must be to fulfil the conditions to achieve- 
ment of the highest life. That the intuitions 
of a moral faculty should guide our conduct 
is a proposition in which a truth is contained, 
for these intuitions are the slowly organized 
results of experiences received by the race 
while living in presence of these conditions. 
And that happiness is the supreme end is be- 
yond question true, for this is the concom- 
itant of that highest life which every theory 
of moral guidance has distinctly or vaguely 
in view. 

So understanding their relative positions, 
those ethical systems which make virtue, 
right, obligation, the cardinal aims are seen 
to be complementary to those ethical sys- 
tems which make welfare, pleasure, happi- 
ness the cardinal aims. Though the moral 
sentiments generated in civilized men by 
daily contact with social conditions and grad- 
ual adaptation to them are indispensable as 
incentives and deterrents ; and though the 
intuitions corresponding to these sentiments 
have, in virtue of their origin, a general 
authority to be reverently recognized, yet 
the sympathies and antipathies hence origi- 
nating, together with the intellectual expres- 
sions of them, are, in their primitive forms, 
necessarily vague. To make guidance by 
them adequate to all requirements, their dic- 
tates have to be interpreted and made definite 
by science ; to which end there must be 
analysis of those conditions to complete liv- 
ing which they respond to, and from con- 
verse with which they have arisen. And 
such analysis necessitates the recognition of 
happiness for each and all, as the end to be 
achieved by fulfilment of these condemns. 

Hence, recognizing in due degrees all the 
various ethical theories, conduct in its high- 
ist form will take as guides innate percep- 
tions of right duly enlightened and made 
precise by an analytic intelligence, while 
conscious that these guides are proximately 
supreme solely because they lead to the ulti- 
mately supreme end, happiness special and 
general. 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



531 



CHAPTER X. 

ST3B RELATIVITY OF FAINS AND PLEASURES. 

§ Q'd. A truth of cardinal importance as 
i datum of ethics, which was incidentally 
referred to in the last chapter, must here be 
;set forth at full length. I mean the truth 
that not only men of different races, but also 
different men of the same race, and even the 
same men at different periods of life, have 
different standards of happiness. Though 
there is some recognition of this by moralists, 
the recognition is inadequate, and the far- 
reaching conclusions to be drawn when the 
relativity of happiness is fully recognized 
are scarcely suspected. 

It is a belief universal in early life — a be- 
lief which in most people is but partially 
corrected in later life, and in very few 
wholly dissipated — that there is something 
intrinsic in the pleasantness of certain things, 
while other things are intrinsically un- 
pleasant. The error is analogous to and 
closely allied with the error crude realism, 
makes. Just as to the uncultured mind it 
-appears self-evident that the sweetness of 
sugar is inherent in sugar, that sound as we 
perceive it is sound as it exists in the external 
world, and that the warmth from a fire is in 
itself what it seems, so does it appear self- 
evident that the sweetness of sugar is neces- 
sarily grateful, that there is in a beautiful 
sound something that must be beautiful to 
all creatures, and that the agreeable feeling 
produced by warmth is a feeling which every 
other consciousness must find agreeable. 

But as criticism proves the one set of con- 
clusions to be wrong, so does it prove to be 
wrong the other set. Not only are the 
qualities of external things as intellectually 
apprehended by us relative to our own 
organisms, but the pleasurableness or pain- 
fulness of the feelings which we associate 
with such qualities are also relative to our 
own organisms. They are so in a double 
sense — they are relative to its structures, and 
they are relative to the states of its struc- 
tures. 

That we may not rest in a mere nominal 
acceptance of these general truths, but may 
so appreciate them as to see their full bear- 
ings on ethical theory, we must here glance 
at them as exemplified by animate creatures 
at large. For after contemplating the wide 
divergences of sentiency accompanying the 
wide divergences of organization which 
evolution in general has brought about, we 
shall be enabled the better to see the diver- 
gences of sentiency to be expected from the 
further evolution of humanity. 

§ 64. Because they can be most quickly 
disposed of, let us first deal with pains — a 
further reason for first dealing with pains 
being that we may thus forthwith recognize, 
and then leave out of consideration, those 
sentient states the qualities of which may be 
regarded as absolute rather than relative. 

The painfulness of the feelings produced 
by forces which tend to destroy organic 
structures, wholly or in part, is of course 



common to all creatures capable of feeling. 
We saw it to be inevitable that during evolu- 
tion there must everywhere be established 
such connections betvveeu external uctiou3 
and the modes of consciousness they cause, 
that the injurious ones are accompanied by 
disagreeable feelings and the beneficial ones 
by agreeable feelings. Consequently, pres- 
sures or strains which tear or bruise, and 
heats which burn or scald, being in all cases 
partially or wholly destructive, are in all 
cases painful. But even here the relativity 
of the feelings may in one sense be asserted. 
For the effect of a force of given quantity or 
intensity varies partly with the size and 
partly with the structure of the creature ex- 
posed to it. The weight which is scarcely 
felt by a large animal crushes a small one ; 
the blow which breaks the limbs of a mouse 
produces little effect on a horse ; the weapon 
which lacerates a horse leaves a rhinoceros 
uninjured. And with these differences of 
injuriousness doubtless go differences of feel- 
ing. Merely glancing at the illustrations of 
this truth furnished by sentient beings in 
general, let us consider the illustrations man- 
kind furnish. 

Comparisons of robust laboring men with 
women or children show us that degrees of 
mechanical stress which the first bear with 
impunity produce on the others injuries and 
accompanying pains. The blistering of a 
tender skin by an amount of friction which 
does not even redden a coarse one, or the 
bursting of superficial blood-vessels, and con- 
sequent discoloration, caused in a person of 
lax tissues by a blow which leaves in well- 
toned tissues no trace, will sufficiently ex- 
emplify this contrast. Not only, however, are 
the pains due to violent incident forces, rela- 
tive to the characters or constitutional 
qualities of the parts directly affected, but 
they are relative in equally marked ways, or 
even in more marked ways, to the characters 
of the nervous structures. The common as- 
sumption is that equal bodily injuries excite 
equal pains. But this is a mistake. Pulling 
out a tooth or cutting off a limb gives to 
^different persons widely different amounts 
of suffering — not the endurance only but 
the feeling to be endured varies greatly, 
and the variation largely depends on the de- 
gree of nervous development. This is well 
shown by the great insensibility of idiots — 
blows, cuts, and extremes of heat and cold 
being borne by them with indifference. The 
relation thus shown in the most marked 
manner where the development of the 
central nervous system is abnormally low, is 
shown in. a less marked manner where the 
development of the central nervous system is 
normally low — namely, among inferior races 
of men. Many travellers have commented 
on the strange callousness shown by savages 
Who have been mangled in battle or by 
accident ; and surgeons in India say that 
wounds and operations are better borne by 
natives than by Europeans. Further, there 
comes the converse fact that among the 
higher types of men, larger-brained and mora 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



sensitive to pain than the lower, the most 
sensitive are those whose nervous develop- 
ments, as shown by their mental powers, are 
the highest — part of the evidence being the 
relative intolerance of disagreeable sensations 
common among men of genius, and the 
general irritability characteristic of them. 

That pain is relative not to structures 
only, but to their states as well, is also 
manifest. — more manifest indeed. The sensi- 
bility of an external part depends on its tem- 
perature. Cool it below a certain point and 
it becomes, as we say, numb ; and if by 
ether-spray it is made very cold, it may be 
cut without tiny feeling being produced. 
Conversely, heat the part so that its blood- 
vessels dilate, and the pain which any injury 
or irritation causes is greater than usual. 
How largely the production of pain depends 
on the condition of the part affected, we see 
in the extreme tenderness of an inflamed 
surface — a tenderness such that a slight 
touch causes shrinking, and such that rays 
from the fire which ordinarily would be in- 
different become intolerable. Similarly 
with the special senses. A light which eyes 
that are in good order bear without disagree- 
able feeling cannot be borne by inflamed 
eyes. And beyond the local state, the state 
of the system as a whole and the state of 
the nervous centres are both factors. Those 
enfeebled by illness are distressed by noises 
which those in health bear with equanimity ; 
and men with overwrought brains are irri- 
tated in unusual degrees by annoyances, 
both physical and moral. Further, the tem- 
porary condition known as exhaustion enters 
into the relation. Limbs overworn by pro- 
longed exertion cannot without aching per- 
form acts which would at other times cause 
no appreciable feeling. After reading con- 
tinuously for very many hours, even strong 
eyes begin to smart. And noises that can be 
listened to for a short time with indifference 
become, if there is no cessation, causes of 
suffering. 

So that though there is absoluteness in the 
relation between positive pains and actions 
that are positively injurious, in so far that 
wherever there is sentiency it exists, yet 
even here partial relativity may be asserted. 
For there is no fixed relation between the act- 
ing force and the produced feeling. The 
amount of feeling varies with the size of the 
organism, with the character of its outer 
structures, with the character of its nervous 
system, and also with the temporary states 
of the part affected, of the body at large, and 
of the nervous centres. 

§ 65. The relativity of pleasures is far 
more conspicuous, and the illustrations of it 
furnished by the sentient world at large are 
innumerable. 

It needs but a glance round at the various 
things which different creatures are prompt- 
ed by their desires to eat and are gratified in 
eating — flesh for predaceous animals, grass 
for the herbivora, worms for the mole, flies 
for the swallow, seeds for the finch, honey 
for the bee, a decaying carcase for the mag- 



got — to be reminded that the tastes for food 
are relative to the structures of the creatures. 
And this truth, made conspicuous by a sur- 
vey of animals in general, is forced on our 
attention even by a survey of different races 
of men. Here human flesh is abhorred, and 
there regarded as the greatest delicacy ; in 
this country roots are allowed to putrefy be- 
fore they are eaten, and in that the taint of 
decay produces disgust ; the whale's blubber 
which one race devours with avidity, will in 
another by its very odor produce nausea. 
Nay, without looking abroad, we may, in the 
common saying that " one man's meat is 
another man's poison," see the general ad- 
mission that members of the same society so 
far differ that a taste which is to these 
pleasurable is to those displeasurable. So is 
it with the other senses. Assafcetida, which 
by us is singled out as typical of the disgust- 
ing in odor, ranks among the Esthonians as 
a favorite perfume ; and even those around 
us vary so far in their likings that the scents 
of flowers grateful to some are repugnant to 
others. Analogous differences in the pref- 
erences for colors we daily hear expressed. 
And in a greater or less degree the like holds 
with all sensations, down even to those of 
touch — the feeling yielded by velvet, which 
is to most agreeable, setting the teeth on 
edge in some. 

It needs but to name appetite and satiety 
to suggest multitudinous facts showing that 
pleasures are relative not only to the organic 
Structures but also to their states. The food 
which yields keen gratification when there is 
great hunger ceases to be grateful when 
hunger is satisfied, and if then forced on the 
eater is rejected with aversion. So, too, a- 
particular kind of food, seeming when first 
tasted so delicious that daily repetition would 
be a source of endless enjoyment, becomes, 
in a few days, not only unenjoyable but re- 
pugnant. Brilliant colors which, falling on 
unaccustomed eyes, give delight, pall on the 
sense if long looked at, and there is relief in 
getting away from the impressions they 
yield. Sounds sweet in themselves and 
sweet in their combinations, which yield to 
unfatigued ears intense pleasure, become, at 
the end of a long concert, not only weari- 
some, but, if there is no escape from them, 
causes of irritation. The like holds down 
even to such simple sensations as those of 
heat and cold. The fire so delightful on a 
winter's day is, in hot weather, oppressive, 
and pleasure is then taken in the cold water 
from which, in winter, there would be 
shrinking. Indeed, experiences lasting over 
but a few moments suffice to show how 
relative to the states of the structures are 
pleasurable sensations of these kinds ; for it 
is observable that on dipping the cold hand 
into hot water the agreeable feeling gradu- 
ally diminishes as the hand warms. 

These few instances will carry home the 
truth, manifest enough to all who observe, 
that the receipt of each agreeable sensation 
depends primarily on the existence of a 
structure which is called into play, and, 



I 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



533. 



secondarily, ou the condition of that struc- 
ture, as fitting it or unfitting it for activity. 

§ 66. The truth that emotional pleasures 
are made possible, partly by the existence 
of correlative structures and partly by the 
states of those structures, is equally undeni- 
able. 

Observe the animal which, leading a life 
demanding solitary habits, has an adapted 
organization, and it gives no sign of need 
for the presence of its kind. Observe, con- 
versely, a gregarious animal separated from 
the herd, and you see marks of unhappiness 
while the separation continues, and equally 
distinct marks of joy on joining its com- 
panions. In the one case there is no nervous 
structure which finds its sphere of action in 
the gregarious state, and in the other case 
such a structure exists. As was implied by 
instances cited in the last chapter for another 
purpose, animals leading lives involving 
particular kinds of activities have become 
so constituted that pursuance of those 
activities, exercising the correlative struc- 
tures, yields the associated pleasures. Beasts 
of prey confined in dens show us by their 
pacings from side to side the endeavor to 
obtain, as well as they can, the satisfactions 
that accompany roaming about in their 
natural habitats ; and that gratification in 
the expenditure of their locomotive energies 
shown us by porpoises playing round a 
vessel is shown us by the similarly unceas- 
ing excursions from end to end of its cell 
which a captured porpoise makes. The 
perpetual hoppings of the canary from bar 
to bar of its cage, and the ceaseless use of 
claws and bill iu climbing about its perch 
by the parrot, are other activities which, 
severally related to the needs of the species, 
have severally themselves become sources of 
agreeable feelings. Still more clearly are 
we shown by the efforts which a caged 
beaver makes to build with such sticks and 
pieces of wood as are at hand, how domi- 
nant ia its nature has become the building 
instinct, and how, apart from any advan- 
tage gained, it gets gratification by repeat- 
ing, as well as it can, the processes of con- 
struction it is organized to carry on. The 
cat which, lacking something to tear with 
her claws, pulls at the mat with them, the 
confined giraffe which, in default of branches 
to lay hold of wears out the upper angles of 
the doors to its house by continually grasp- 
ing them with its prehensile tongue, the 
rhinoceros which, having no enemy to fight, 
ploughs up the ground with his horn, all 
yield us analogous evidence. Clearly, these 
various actions performed by these various 
creatures are uot intrinsically pleasurable, 
for they differ more or less in each species 
and are often utterly unlike. The pleasur- 
ableness is simply in the exercise of nervo- 
muscular structures adapted to the perform- 
ance of the actions. 

Though races of men are contrasted with 
one another so much less than genera and 
orders of animals are, yet, as we saw in the 
last chapter, along with visible differences 



there go invisible differences with accompany- 
ing likings for different modes of life. 
Among some, as the Mantras, the love of un- 
restrained action and the disregard of com- 
panionship are such that they separate if 
they quarrel, and hence live scattered ; while 
among others, as the Damaras, there is little 
tendency to resist, but instead an admiration 
for any one who assumes power over them. 
Already when exemplifying the indefinite- 
ness of happiness as an end of action, I have 
referred to the unlike ideals of life pursued 
by the nomadic and the settled, the warlike 
and the peaceful — unlike ideals which imply 
unlikenesses of nervous structures caused 
by the inherited effects of unlike habits 
accumulating through generations. These 
contrasts, various in their kinds and degrees 
among the various types of mankind, every 
one can supplement by analogous contrasts 
observable among those around. The occu- 
pations some delight in are to those other- 
wise constituted intolerable ; and men's 
hobbies, severally appearing to themselves 
quite natural, often appear to their friends 
ludicrous and almost insane — facts which 
alone might make us see that the pleasurable- 
ness of actions of this or that kind is due 
not to an3"thing in the natures of the actions 
but to the existence of faculties which find 
exercise in them. 

It must be added that each pleasurable 
emotion, like each pleasurable sensation, is^ 
relative not only to a certain structure but 
also to the state of that structure. The parts 
called into action must have had proper rest 
— must be in a condition fit for action, not 
in the condition which prolonged action 
produces. Be the order of emotion what it 
may, an unbroken continuity in the receipt 
of it eventually brings satiety. The pleasur- 
able consciousness becomes less and less- 
vivid, and there arises the need for a tem- 
porary cessation, during which the parts that 
have been active may recover their fitness 
for activity, and during which also the 
activities of other parts and receipt of the 
accompanying emotions may find due place. 

§ 67. I have insisted on these general truths . 
with perhaps needless iteration, to prepare 
the .reader for more fully recognizing a. 
corollary that is practically ignored. Abun- 
dant and clear as is the evidence, and forced 
though it is daily on every one's attention, 
the conclusions respecting life and conduct 
which should be drawn are not drawn ; and. 
so much at variance are these conclusions 
with current beliefs that enunciation of them, 
causes a stare of incredulity. Pervaded as- 
all past thinking has been, and as most pres- 
ent thinking is, by the assumption that the 
nature of every creature has been specially 
created for it, and that human nature, also, 
specially created, is, like other natures, fixed 
— pervaded too as this thinking has been,, 
and is, by the allied assumption that the 
agreeableness of certain actions depends on 
their essential qualities, while other actions 
are by their essential qualities made disa- 
greeable, it is difficult to obtain a hearing 



534 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



for_ the doctrine that the kinds of action 
"which are now pleasurable will, under con- 
ditions requiring the change, cease to be 
pleasurable, while other kinds of action will 
become pleasurable. Even those who accept 
the doctrine of evolution mostly hear with 
scepticism, or at best with nominal faith, the 
inferences to be drawn from it respecting 
the humanity of the future. 

And yet as shown in myriads of instances 
indicated by the few above given, those 
natural processes which have produced 
multitudinous forms of structure adapted to 
multitudinous forms of activity have simul- 
taneously made these forms of activity 
pleasurable. And the inevitable implication 
is that within the limits imposed by physical 
laws there will be evolved, in adaptation to 
any new sets of conditions that may be es- 
tablished, appropriate structures of which 
the functions will yield their respective 
gratifications. 

When we have got rid of the tendency to 
think that certain modes of activity are nec- 
essarily pleasurable because they give us 
pleasure, and that other modes which do not 
please us are necessarily unpleasing, we 
.shall see that the remoulding of human 
nature into fitness for the requirements of 
social life must eventually make all needful 
activities pleasurable, while it makes dis- 
. pleasurable all activities at variance with 
these requirements. When we have com« 
fully to recognize the truth that there is noth- 
ing intrinsically more gratifying in the ef- 
forts by which wild animals are caught 
than in the efforts expended in rearing 
plants, and that the combined actions of 
muscles and senses in rowing a boat are not 
by their essential natures more productive of 
agreeable feeling than those gone through in 
reaping corn, but that everything depends on 
the co-operating emotions, which at present 
■are more in accordance with the one than 
with the other, we shall infer that along 
■with decrease of those emotions for which 
the social state affords little or no scope, and 
increase of those which it persistently exer- 
■cises, the things now done with dislike from 
a sense of obligation will be done with im- 
mediate liking, and the things desisted from 
.as a matter of duty will be desisted from 
•because they are repugnant. 

This conclusion, alien to popular beliefs 
■and in ethical speculation habitually ignored, 
or at most recognized but partially and 
occasionally, will be thought by the majority 
so improbable that I must give further justi- 
fication of it, enforcing the d prion argu- 
ment by an d posteriori one. Small as is the 
attention given to the fact, yet is the fact 
conspicuous that the corollary above drawn 
from the doctrine of evolution at large 
coincides with the corollary which past and 
present changes in human nature force on 
us. The leading contrasts of character be- 
tween savage and civilized are just those 
contrasts to be expected from the process of 
^adaptation. 

The life of the primitive man is passed 



mainly in the pursuit of beasts, birds, and 
fish, which yields him a gratifying excite- 
ment ; but though to the civilized man the 
chase gives gratification, this is neither so 
persistent nor so general. There are among 
us keen sportsmen, but there are many to 
whom shooting and fishing soon become 
wearisome, and there are not a few to 
whom they are altogether indifferent or even 
distasteful. Conversely, the power of con- 
tinued application which in the primitive 
man is very small has among ourselves be- 
come considerable. It is true that most are 
coerced into industry by necessity ; but there 
are sprinkled throughout society men to 
whom active occupation is a need — men who 
are restless when away from business and 
miserable when they eventually give it up ; 
men to whom this or that line of investiga- 
tion is so attractive that they devote them- 
selves to it day after day, year after year ; 
men who are so deeply interested in public 
affairs that they pass lives of labor in achiev- 
ing political ends they think advantageous, 
hardly giving themselves the rest necessary 
for health. Yet again, and still more strik- 
ingly, does the change become manifest when 
We compare undeveloped with developed 
humanity in respect of the conduct prompted 
by fellow-feeling. Cruelty rather than kind 
ness is characteristic of the savage, and is in 
many cases a source of marked gratification 
to him ; but though among the civilized are 
some in whom this trait of the savage 
survives, yet a love of inflicting pain is not 
general, and besides numbers who show be- 
nevolence, there are those who devote their 
whole time and much of their money to 
philanthropic ends, without thought of re- 
ward either here or hereafter. Clearly these 
major, along with many minor, changes of 
nature conform to the law set forth. Activ- 
ities appropriate to their needs which give 
pleasures to savages have ceased to be 
pleasurable to many of the civilized, while 
the civilized have acquired capacities for 
other appropriate activities and accompany- 
ing pleasures which savages had no capaci- 
ties for. 

Now, not only is it rational to infer that 
changes like those which have been going on 
during civilization will continue to go on, 
but it is irrational to do otherwise. Not he 
who believes that adaptation will increase is 
absurd, but he who doubts that it will in- 
crease is absurd. Lack of faith in such 
further evolution of humanity as shall har- 
monize its nature with its conditions adds 
but another to the countless illustrations of 
inadequate consciousness of causation. One 
who, leaving behind both primitive dogmas 
and primitive ways of looking at things, has, 
while accepting scientific conclusions, acquir- 
ed those habits of thought which science 
generates will regard the conclusion above 
drawn as inevitable. He will find it impos- 
sible to believe that the processes which have 
heretofore so moulded all beings to the re- 
quirements of their lives that they get satis- 
factions in fulfilling them will not hereafter 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



535. 



continue so moulding them. He will infer 
that the type of nature to which the highest 
social life affords a sphere such that every 
faculty has its due amount, and no more 
than the due amount, of function and accom- 
panying gratification, is the type of nature 
toward which progress cannot cease till it is 
leached. Pleasure being producible by the 
exercise of any structure which is adjusted 
to its special end, he will see the necessary 
implication to be that, supposing it consis- 
tent with maintenance of life, there is no 
kind of activity which will not become a 
source of pleasure if continued ; and that 
therefore pleasure will eventually accom- 
pany every mode of action demanded by 
social conditions. 

This corollary I here emphasize because it 
will presentl3 r play an important part in the 
argument. 

CHAPTER XL 
egoism versus altruism. 
§ 68. If insistence on them tends to un- 
settle established systems of belief, self- 
evident truths are by most people silently 
passed over, or else there is a tacit refusal 
to draw from them the most obvious in- 
ferences. 

Of self-evident truths so dealt with, the 
one which here concerns us is that a crea- 
ture must live before it can act. From this it 
is a corollary that the acts by which each 
maintains his own life must, speaking gener- 
ally, precede in imperativeness all other acts 
of which he is capable. For if it be asserted 
that these other acts must precede in im- 
perativeness the acts which maintain life, 
and if this, accepted as a general law of con- 
duct, is conformed to by all, then by post- 
poning the acts which maintain life to the 
other acts which life makes possible, all must 
lose their lives. That is to say, ethics has to 
recognize the truth, recognized in un- 
ethical thought, that egoism comes before 
altruism. The acts required for continued 
self-preservation, including the enjoyment of 
benefits achieved by such acts, are the first 
requisites to universal welfare. Unless each 
duly cares for himself, his care for all others 
is ended by death ; aud if each thus dies, 
there remain no others to be cared for. 

This permanent supremacy of egoism over 
altruism, made manifest by contemplating 
existing life, is further made manifest by 
contemplating life in course of evolution, 

§ 69. Those who have followed with 
assent the recent course of thought do not 
need telling that throughout past eras, the 
life, vast in amount and varied in kind, 
which has overspread the earth has pro- 
gressed in subordination to the law that 
every individual shall gain by whatever 
aptitude it has for fulfilling the conditions to 
its existence. The uniform principle has 
been that better adaptation shall bring 
greater benefit, which greater benefit, 
whi\o increasing the prosperity of the better 
adapted, shall increase also its ability to 
leave offspring inheriting more or less its 



better adaptation. And, by implication, the 
uniform principle has been that the ill- 
adapted, disadvantaged in the struggle for 
existence shall bear the consequent evils, 
either disappearing when its imperfections 
are extreme, or else rearing fewer offspring, 
which, inheriting its imperfections, tend to 
dwindle away in posterity. 

It has been thus with innate superiorities ; 
it has been thus also with acquired ones. 
All along the law has been that increased 
function brings increased power, and that 
therefore such extra activities as aid welfare 
in any member of a race produce in its. 
structures greater ability to carry on such 
extra activities — the derived advantages be- 
ing enjoyed by it to the heightening and 
lengthening of its life. Conversely, as 
lessened function ends in lessened structure, 
the dwindling of unused faculties has ever 
entailed loss of power to achieve the correla- 
tive ends — the result of inadequate fulfil- 
ment of the ends being diminished ability to' 
maintain life. And by inheritance, such 
functionally produced modifications have 
respectively furthered or hindered survival in 
posterity. 

As already said, the law that each creature 
shall take the benefits and the evils of its- 
own nature, be they those derived from 
ancestry or those due to self-produced modi- 
fications, has been the la7/ under which life 
has evolved thus far, and it must continue 
to be the law, however much further life 
may evolve. Whatever qualifications this 
natural course of action may now or here- 
after undergo are qualifications that cannot, 
without fatal results, essentially change it. 
Any arrangements which in a considerable 
degree prevent superiority from profiting by 
the rewards of superiority, or shield in- 
feriority from the evils it entails — any ar- 
rangements which tend to make it as well to 
be inferior as to be superior, are arrange- 
ments diametrically opposed to the progress 
of organization and the reaching of a higher 
life. 

But to say that each individual shall reap (he 
benefits brought to him by his own powers, 
inherited and acquired, is to enunciate egoism 
as an ultimate principle of conduct. It is to 
say that egoistic claims must take precedence 
of altruistic claims. 

§ 70. Under its biological aspect this prop- 
osition cannot be contested by those who 
agree in the doctrine of evolution ; but prob- 
ably they will not at once allow that admis- 
sion of it under its ethical aspect is equally 
unavoidable. While, as respects develop- 
ment of life, the well-working of the uni- 
versal principle described is sufficiently mani- 
fest, the well-working of it as respects 
increase of happiness may not be seen at 
once. But the two cannot be disjoined. 

Incapacity of every kind and of whatever 
degree causes unhappiness directly and in- 
directly — directly by the pain consequent on 
the overtaxing of inadequate faculty, and 
indirectly by the non-fulfilment, or imper- 
fect fulfilment, of certain conditions to wel- 



336 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



fare. Conversely, capacity of every kind 
sufficient for the requirement conduces to 
happiness immediately and remotely — im- 
mediately by the pleasure accompanying the 
normal exercise of each power that is up to 
its work, and remotely by the pleasures 
which are furthered by the ends achieved. 
A creature that is weak or slow of foot, and 
so gets food only by exhausting efforts or 
escapes enemies with difficulty, suffers the 
pains of overstrained powers, of unsatisfied 
appetites, of distressed emotions ; while the 
strong and swift creature of the same species 
delights in its efficient activities, gains more 
fully the satisfactions yielded by food as well 
as the renewed vivacity this gives, and has 
to bear fewer and smaller pains in defending 
itself against foes or escaping from them. 
Similarly with duller and keener senses, or 
higher and lower degrees of sagacity. The 
mentally inferior individual of any race 
suffers negative and positive miseries, while 
the mentally superior individual receives 
negative and positive gratifications. Inevi- 
tably, then, this law, in conformity with 
which each member of a species takes the 
consequences of its own nature, and in 
virtue of which the progeny of each mem- 
ber, participating in its nature, also takes 
such consequences, is one that tends ever to 
raise the aggregate happiness of the species, 
by farthering the multiplication of the 
happier and hindering that of the less happy. 

All this is true of human beings as of other 
beings. The conclusion forced on us is that 
the pursuit of individual happiness within 
those limits prescribed by social conditions 
is the first requisite to the attainment of the 
greatest general happiness. To see this it 
needs but to contrast one whose self-regard 
has maintained bodily well-being with one 
whose regardlessness of self has brought its 
natural results, and then to ask what must 
be the contrast between two societies formed 
<of two such kinds of individuals. 

Bounding out of bed after an unbroken 
sleep, singing or whistling as he dresses, 
coming down with beaming face ready to 
laugh on the smallest provocation, the 
healthy man of high powers, conscious of 
past successes, and by his energy, quickness, 
resource, made confident of the future, enters 
on the day's business not with repugnance 
but with gladness ; and from hour to hour 
experiencing satisfactions from work ef- 
fectually done, comes home with an abun- 
dant surplus of energy remaining for hours of 
relaxation. Far otherwise is it with one whf 
is enfeebled by great neglect of self. 
Already deficient, his energies are made more 
deficient by constant endeavors to execute 
tasks that prove beyond his strength, and by 
the resultiug discouragement. Besides the 
depressing consciousness of the immediate 
future, there is the depressing consciousness 
of the remoter future, with its probability of 
accumulated difficulties and diminished 
ability to meet them. Hours of leisure 
which, rightly passed, bring pleasures that 
raise the tide of life and renew the powers 



of work, cannot be utilized— there is not 
vigor enough for enjoyments involving 
action, and lack of spirits prevents passive 
enjoyments from being entered upon with 
zest. In brief, life becomes a burden. Now 
if, as must be admitted, in a community 
composed of individuals like the first the 
happiness will be relatively great, while in 
one composed of individuals like the last 
there will be relatively little happiness, or 
rather much miseiy, it must be admitted 
that conduct causing the one result is good 
and conduct causing the other is bad. 

But diminutions of general happiness are 
produced by inadequate egoism in several 
other ways. These we will successively 
glance at. 

§ 71. If there were no proofs of heredity 
— if it were the rule that the strong are 
usually begotten by the weak, while the 
weak usually descend from the strong, that 
vivacious children form the families of mel- 
ancholy parents, while fathers and mothers 
with overflowing spirits mostly have dull 
progeny, that from stolid peasants there ordi- 
narily come sons of high intelligence, while 
the sons of the cultured are commonly fit for 
nothing but following the plough — if there 
were no transmission of gout, scrofula, in- 
sanity, and did the diseased habitually give 
birth to the healthy and the healthy to the 
diseased, writers on ethics might be justified 
in ignoring those effects of conduct which 
are felt by posterity through the natures they 
inherit. 

As it is, however, the current ideas con- 
cerning the relative claims of egoism aud 
altruism are vitiated by the omission of this 
all-important factor. For if health, strength, 
and capacity are usually transmitted, and 
if disease, feebleness, stupidity, generally 
reappear in descendants, then a rational 
altruism requires insistance on that egoism 
which is shown by receipt of the satisfac- 
tions accompanying preservation of body and 
mind in the best state. The necessary im- 
plication is that blessings are provided for 
offspring by due self-regard, while disregard 
of self carried too far provides curses. 
When, indeed, we remember how commonly 
it is remarked that high health and overflow- 
ing spirits render any lot in life tolerable, 
while chronic ailments make gloomy a life 
most favorably circumstanced, it becomes 
amazing that both the world at large and 
writers who make conduct their study 
should ignore the terrible evils which disre- 
gard of personal well-being inflicts on the 
unborn, and the incalculable good laid up 
for the unborn by attention to personal well- 
being. Of all bequests of parents to children 
the most valuable is a sound constitution. 
Though a man's body is not a property that 
can be inherited, yet his constitution may 
fitly be compared to an entailed estate ; and 
if he rightly understands his duty to pos- 
terity, he will see that he is bound to pass on 
that estate uninjured if not improved. To 
say this is to say that he must be egoistic to 
the extent of satisfying all those desires as- 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



537 



sociated with the due performance of func- 
tions. Nay, it is to say more. It is to say 
that he must seek in due amounts the various 
pleasures which life offers. For beyond the 
effect these have in raising the tide of life 
and maintaining constitutional vigor, there 
is the effect they have in preserving and in- 
creasing a capacity for receiving enjoyment. 
Endowed with abundant energies and 
various tastes, some can get gratifications of 
anany kinds on opportunities hourly oc- 
curring, while others are so inert, and so 
uninterested in things around, that they 
cannot even take the trouble to amuse them- 
selves. And unless heredity be denied, the 
inference must be that due acceptance of the 
miscellaneous pleasures life offers conduces 
to the capacity for enjoyment in posterity, 
and that persistence in dull, monotonous 
lives by parents diminishes the ability of 
their descendants to make the best of what 
gratifications fall to them. 

§ 72. Beyond the decrease of general 
happiness which results in this indirect way 
if egoism is unduly subordinated, there is a 
decrease of general happiness which results 
in a direct way. He who carries self-regard 
far enough to keep himself in good health 
and high spirits, in the first place thereby 
becomes an immediate source of happiness to 
those around, and in the second place main- 
tains the ability to increase their happiness 
by altruistic actions. But one whose bodily 
vigor and mental health are undermined by 
self-sacrifice carried too far, in the first place 
becomes to those around a cause of depres- 
sion, and in the second place renders himself 
incapable, or less capable, of actively fur- 
thering their welfare. 

In estimating conduct we must remember- 
that there are those who by their joyousness 
bpget joy in others, and that there are those 
who by their melancholy cast a gloom on 
•every circle they enter. And we must re- 
member that by display of overflowing 
happiness a man of the one kind may add 
to the happiness of others more than by 
positive efforts to benefit them, and that a 
man of the other kind may decrease their 
happiness more by his presence tnan he in- 
creases it by his actions. Full of vivacity, 
the one is ever welcome. For his wife he 
has smiles and jocose speeches ; for his 
children stores of fun and play ; for his 
friends pleasant talk interspersed with the 
sallies of wit that come from buoyancy. 
Contrariwise, the other is shunned. The 
irritability resulting now from ailments, now 
from failures caused by feebleness, his 
family has daily to bear. Lacking adequate 
energy for joining in them, he has at best 
but a tepid interest in the amusements of his 
children, aud he is called a wet blanket by 
his friends. Little account as our ethical 
reasonings take note of it, yet is the fact 
obvious that since happiness and misery are 
infectious, such regard for self as conduces 
to health and high spirits is a benefaction to 
others, and such disregard of self as brings 
■•on suffering, bodily or mental, is a malefac- 



tion to others. The duty of making one's 
self agreeable by seeming to be pleased is, 
indeed, often urged, and thus to gratify 
friends is applauded so long as self-sacrificing 
effort is implied. But though display of 
real happiness gratifies friends far more 
than display of sham happiness, and has no 
drawback in the shape either of hypocrisy or 
strain, yet it is not thought a duty to fulfil 
the conditions which favor the display of 
real happiness. Nevertheless, if quantity of 
happiness produced is to be the measure, the 
last is more imperative than the first. 

And then, as above indicated, beyond this 
primary series of effects produced on others 
there is a secondary series of effects. The 
adequately egoistic individual retains those 
powers which make altruistic activities 
possible. The individual who is inadequately 
egoistic loses more or less of his ability to 
be altruistic. The truth of the one proposi- 
tion is self-evident, and the truth of the 
other is daily forced on us by examples. 
Note a few of them. Here is a mother 
who, brought up in the insane fashion usual 
among the cultivated, has a physique not 
strong enough for suckling her infant, but 
who, knowing that its natural food is the 
best, and anxious for its welfare, continues 
to give it milk for a longer time than her 
system will bear. Eventually the accumu- 
lating reaction tells. There comes exhaustion, 
running, it may be, into illness caused by 
depletion ; occasionally ending in death, and 
often entailing chronic weakness. She be- 
comes, perhaps for a time, perhaps per- 
manently, incapable of carrying on household 
affairs ; her other children suffer from the 
loss of maternal attention ; and where the 
income is small, payments for nurse and 
doctor tell injuriously on the whole family. 
Instance, again, what not unfrequently 
happens with the father. Similarly prompt- 
ed by a high sense of obligation, and misled 
by current moral theories into the notion that 
self-denial may rightly be carried to any 
extent, he daily continues his office-work for 
long hours regardless of hot head and cold 
feet, and debars himself from social 
pleasures, for which he thinks he can afford 
neither time nor money. What comes of 
this entirely unegoistic course Y Eventually 
a sudden collapse, sleeplessness, inability to 
work. That rest which he would not give 
himself when his sensations prompted he 
has now to take in long measure. The extra 
earnings laid by for the benefit of his family 
are quickly swept away by costly journeys 
in aid of recovery, and by the many expenses 
which illness entails. Instead of increased 
ability to do his duty by his offspring, there 
comes now inability. Lifelong evils on 
them replace hoped-for goods. And so is it, 
too, with the social effects of inadequate 
egoism. All grades furnish examples of the 
mischiefs, positive and negative, inflicted on 
society by excessive neglect of self. Now the 
case is that of a laborer who, conscientiously 
continuing his work under a broiling sun, 
spite of violent protest from his feelings, 



538 



THE DATA OF JETHICS. 



dies of sunstroke, and leaves his family a 
burden to the parish. Now the case is that 
of a clerk whose eyes permanently fail from 
overstraining, or who, daily writing for 
hours after his fingers are painfully cramped, 
is attacked with " scrivener's palsy," and, 
unable to write at all, sinks with aged 
parents into poverty which friends are called 
on to mitigate. And now the case is that 
of a man devoted to public ends who, shat- 
tering his health by ceaseless application, 
fails to achieve all he might have achieved 
by a more reasonable apportionment of his 
time between labor on behalf of others and 
ministration to his own needs. 

§ 73. In one further way is the undue 
subordination of egoism to altruism injurious. 
Both directly and indirectly unselfishness 
pushed to excess generates selfishness. 

Consider first the immediate effects. That 
one man may yield up to another a gratifica- 
tion, it is needful that the other shall accept 
it ; and where the gratification is of a kind 
to which their respective claims are equal, or 
which is no more required by the one than 
by the other, acceptance implies a readiness 
to get gratification at another's cost. The cir- 
cumstances and needs of the two being alike, 
Jhe transaction involves as much culture of 
egoism in the last as it involves culture of 
altruism in the first. It is true that not un- 
frequently difference between their means or 
difference between their appetites for a pleas- 
ure which the one has had often and the 
other rarely, divests the • acceptance of this 
character ; and it is true that in other cases 
the benefactor manifestly takes so much 
pleasure in giving pleasure that the sacrifice 
is partial, and the reception of it not wholly 
selfish. But to see the effect above indicated 
we must exclude such inequalities, and con- 
sider what happens where wants are ap- 
proximately alike and where the sacrifices, 
not reciprocated at intervals, are perpetually 
on one side. So restricting the inquiry all 
can name instances verifying the alleged re- 
sult. Every one can remember circles in 
which the daily surrender of benefits by the 
generous to the greedy has caused increase 
of greediness, until there has been produced 
an unscrupulous egoism intolerable to all 
around. Thete are obvious social effects of 
kindred nature. Most thinking people now 
recognize the demoralization caused by in- 
discriminate charity. They see how in the 
mendicant there is, besides destruction of 
the normal relation between labor expended 
and benefit obtained, a genesis of the expec- 
tation that others shall minister to his needs, 
showing itself sometimes in the venting of 
curses on those who refuse. 

Next consider the remote results. "When 
the egoistic claims are so much subordinated 
to the altruistic as to produce physical mis- 
chief, the tendency is toward a relative de- 
crease in the number of the altruistic, and 
therefore an increased predominance of the 
egoistic. Pushed to extremes, sacrifice of 
self for the benefit of others leads occasion- 
ally to death before the ordinary period of 



marriage ; leads sometimes to'abstention f roc 
marriage, as in sisters of charity ; leada 
sometimes to an ill-health or a loss of attrac- 
tiveness which prevents marriage ; leads 
sometimes to non-acquirement of the pecu- 
niary means needed for marriage ; and in all 
these cases, therefore, the unusually altruis- 
tic leave no descendants. Where the post- 
ponement of personal welfare to the welfare 
of others has not been carried so far as to pre- 
vent marriage, it yet not un frequently occurs 
that the physical degradation resulting from 
years of self-neglect causes infertility, so 
that again the most altruistioally-uaturei 
leave no like-natured posterity. And then 
in less marked and more numerous cases the 
resulting enfeeblement shows itself by the 
production of relatively weak offspring, of 
whom some die early, while the rest are less 
likely than usual to transmit the parental 
type to future generations. Inevitably, then, 
by this dying out of the especially unegoistic, 
there is prevented that desirable mitigation 
of egoism in the average nature which would 
else have taken place. Such disregard of 
self as brings down bodily vigor below the 
normal level eventually produces in the so- 
ciety a counterbalancing excess of regard for 
self. 

§ 74. That egoism precedes altruism in or- 
der of imperativeness is thus clearly shown. 
The acts which make continual life possible 
must, on the average, be more peremptory 
than all those other acts which life makes 
possible, including the acts which benefit 
others. Turning from life as existing to life 
as evolving, we are equally shown this. 
Sentient beings have progressed from low to 
high types, under the law that the superior 
shall profit by their superiority and the in- 
ferior shall suffer from their inferiority. 
Conformity to this law has been, and is still, 
needful, not only for the continuance of life 
but for the increase of happiness, since the 
superior are those having faculties better ad- 
justed to the requirements — faculties, there- 
fore, which bring in their exercise greater 
pleasure and less pain. 

More special considerations join these more 
general ones in showing us this truth. Such 
egoism as preserves a vivacious mind in a 
vigorous body furthers the happiness of de- 
scendants, whose inherited constitutions make 
the labors of life easy and its pleasures keen - r 
while, conversely, unhappiness is entailed on 
posterity by those who bequeath them con- 
stitutions injured by self-neglect. Again, 
the individual whose well-conserved life 
shows itself in overflowing spirits becomes, 
by his mere existence, a source of pleasure to 
all around, while the depression which com- 
monly accompanies ill-health diffuses itself 
through family and among friends. A fur- 
ther contrast is that whereas one who has 
been duly regardful of self retains the power 
of being helpful to others, there results from 
self-abnegation in excess not only an in- 
ability to help others but the infliction of pos- 
itive burdens on them. Lastly, we come 
upon the truth that undue altruism increasea 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



538 



egoism, both directly in contemporaries and 
indirectly in posterity. 

And now observe that though the general 
conclusion enforced by these special conclu- 
sions is at variance with nominally accepted 
beltefs, it is not at variance with actually 
accepted beliefs. While opposed to the doc- 
trine which men are taught should be acted 
upon, it is in harmony with the doctrine 
which they do act upon and dimly see must 
be acted upon. For omitting such abnormali- 
ties of conduct as are instanced above, every 
one, alike by deed and word, implies that in 
the business of life personal welfare is the 
primary consideration. The laborer looking 
for wages in return for work done, no less 
than the merchant who sells goods at a profit, 
the doctor who expects fees for advice, the 
priest who calls the scene of his ministra- 
tions " a living, " assumes as beyond ques- 
tion the truth that selfishness, carried to the 
extent of enforcing his claims and enjoying 
the returns his efforts bring, is not only legiti- 
mate but essential. Even persons who avow 
a contrary conviction prove by their acts 
that it is inoperative. Those who repeat with 
emphasis the maxim, "Love your neighbor as 
yourself," do not render up what they pos- 
sess so as to satisfy the desires of all as much 
as they satisfy their own desires. Nor do 
those whose extreme maxim is, ' ' Live for oth- 
ers, " differ appreciably from people around 
in their regards for personal welfare, or fail 
to appropriate their shares of life's pleasures. 
In short, that which is above set forth as the 
belief to which scientific ethics leads us is 
that which men do really believe, as distin- 
guished from that which they believe they 
believe. 

Finally, it may be remarked that a rational 
egoism, so far from implying a more egoistic 
human nature, is consistent with a human 
nature that is less egoistic. For excesses in 
one direction do not prevent excesses in the 
opposite direction, but rather extreme de- 
viations from the mean on one side lead to 
extreme deviations on the other side. A so- 
ciety in which the most exalted principles of 
self-sacrifice for the benefit of neighbors are 
enunciated may be a society in which un- 
scrupulous sacrifice of alien fellow-creatures 
is not only tolerated but applauded. Along 
with professed anxiety to spread these ex- 
alted principles among heathens there may 
go the deliberate fastening of a quarrel upon 
them with a view to annexing their territory. 
Men who every Sunday have listened approv- 
ingly to injunctions carrying the regard for 
other men to an impracticable extent may 
yet hire themselves out to slay, at the word 
of command, any people in any part of the 
world, utterly indifferent to the right or 
wrong of the matter fought about. And as 
in these cases transcendent altruism in theory 
co-exists with brutal egoism in practice, so, 
conversely, a more qualified altruism may 
have for its concomitant a greatly moderated 
egoism. For asserting the due claims of self 
is, by implication, drawing a limit beyond 
which the claims are undue, and is, by conse- 



quence, bringing into greater clearness the 
claims of others. 

CHAPTER XII. 

ALTHUISXI Versus EGOISM. 

§ 75. If we define altruism as being all ac- 
tion which, in the normal course of things, 
benefits others instead of benefiting self, then, 
from the dawn of life, altruism has been no 
less essential than egoism. Though primarily 
it is dependent on egoism, yet secondarily 
egoism is dependent on it. 

Under altruism in this comprehensive sense, 
I take in the acts by which offspring are 
preserved and the species maintained. More- 
over, among these acts must be included not 
such only as are accompanied by conscious- 
ness, but alsosuch as conduce to the welfare of 
offspring without mental representation of 
the welfare — acts of automatic altruism as we 
may call them. Nor must there be left out 
those lowest altruistic acts which subserve 
race-maintenance without implying even 
automatic nervous processes — acts not in the 
remotest sense psychical, but in a literal 
sense physical. Whatever action, uncon- 
scious or conscious, involves expenditure of 
individual life to the end of increasing life in 
other individuals, is unquestionably altruis- 
tic in a sense, if not in the usual sense ; and. 
it is here needful to understand it in this 
sense that we may see how conscious altruism 
grows out of unconscious altruism. 

The simplest beings habitually multiply by 
spontaneous fission. Physical altruism of 
the lowest kind, differentiating from physi- 
cal egoism, may in this case be considered as 
not yet independent of it. For since the two 
halves which before fission constitute the in 
dividual do not on dividing disappear, we 
must say that though the individuality of 
the parent infusorium or other protozoon is 
lost in ceasing to be single, yet the old in- 
dividual continues to exist in each of the. 
new individuals. When, however, as hap- 
pens generally with these smallest animals > 
an interval of quiescence ends in the break- 
ing up of the whole body into minute parts,, 
each of which is the germ of a young one,, 
we see the parent entirely sacrificed in form- 
ing progeny. 

Here might be described how among crea- 
tures of higher grades, by fission or gemma- 
tion, parents bequeath parts of their bodies, 
more or less organized, to form offspring at. 
the cost of their own individualities. Numer- 
ous examples might also be given of the 
ways in which the development of ova is car- 
ried to the extent of making the parental 
body little more than a receptacle for them — 
the implication being that the accumulations 
of nutriment which parental activities have 
laid up are disposed of for the benefit of 
posterity. And then might be dwelt on the 
multitudinous cases where, as generally 
throughout the insect world, maturity having 
been reached and a new generation provided 
for, life ends — death follows the sacrifices 
made for progeny. 

But leaving these lower types in which th« 



540 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



altruism is physical only, or in which it iw 

S)hysical and automatically psychical only 
et us ascend to those in which it is also, to 
a considerable degree, conscious. Though 
in birds and mammals such parental activi- 
ties as are guided by instinct are accompa- 
nied by either no representations or but 
vague representations of the benefits which 
the young receive, yet there are also in 
them actions which we may class as altruis- 
tic in the higher sense. The agitation which 
creatures of these classes show when their 
young are in danger, joined often with efforts 
on their behalf , as well as the grief displayed 
after loss of their young, make it manifest 
that in them parental altruism has a con- 
comitant of emotion. 

Those who understand by altruism only 
the conscious sacrifice of self to others among 
human beings will think it strange, or even 
absurd, to extend its meaning so widely. 
But the justification for doing this is greater 
than has thus far appeared. I do not mean 
merely that in the course of evolution there 
has been a progress through infinitesimal 
gradations from purely physical and uncon- 
scious sacrifices of the individual for the 
welfare of the species, up to sacrifices con- 
sciously made. I mean that from first to last 
the sacrifices are, when reduced to their low- 
est terms, of the same essential nature ; to 
the last, as at first, there is involved a loss 
of bodily substance. When a part of the 
parental body is detached in the shape of 
gemmule, or egg, or foetus, the material sac- 
rifice is conspicuous ; and when the mother 
yields milk by absorbing which the young 
grows, it cannot be questioned that there is 
also a material sacrifice. But though a ma- 
terial sacrifice is not manifest when the 
young are benefited by activities on their be- 
half, yet as no effort can be made without 
an equivalent waste of tissue, and as the 
bodily loss is proportionate to the expend- 
iture that takes place without reimburse- 
ment iu food consumed, it follows that 
efforts made in fostering offspring do really 
represent a part of the parental substance, 
which is now given indirectly instead of 
directly. 

Self-sacrifice, then, is no less primordial 
than self-preservation. Being in its simple 
physical form absolutely necessary for the 
continuance of life from the beginning, and 
being extended under its automatic form, as 
indispensable to maintenance of race in types 
considerably advanced, and being developed 
to its semi-conscious forms, along with the 
continued and complicated attendance by 
which the offspring of superior creatures are 
brought to maturity, altruism has been 
evolving (simultaneously with egoism. As 
was pointed out in an early chapter, the 
same superiorities which have enabled the in- 
dividual to preserve itself better have en- 
abled it better to preserve the individuals de- 
rived from it ; and each higher species, using 
its improved faculties primarily for egoistic 
benefit, has spread in proportion as it has 
used them secondarily for altruistic benefit. 



The imperativeness of altruism as thus un- 
derstood is, indeed, no less than the imper- 
ativeness of egoism was shown to be in the 
last chapter. For while, on the one hand, a 
falling short of normal egoistic acts entails 
enfeeblement or loss of life, and therefore 
loss of ability to perform altruistic acta, on 
the other hand such defect of altruistic acts 
as causes death of offspring or inadequate 
development of them involves disappearance 
from future generations of the nature that is 
not altruistic enough — so decreasing the 
average egoism. In short, every species is 
continually purifying itself from the unduly 
egoistic individuals, while there are being 
lost to it the unduly altruistic individuals. 

§ 76. As there has been an advance by de- 
grees from unconscious parental altruism to 
conscious parental altruism of the highest 
kind, so has there been an advance by de- 
grees from the altruism of the family to so- 
cial altruism. 

A fact to be first noted is that only where 
altruistic relations in the domestic group 
have reached highly developed forms do 
there arise conditions making possible full 
development of altruistic relations in the po- 
litical group. Tribes in which promiscuity 
prevails or in which the marital relations 
are transitory, and tribes in which polyandry 
entails in another way indefinite relationships, 
are incapable of much organization. Nor do 
peoples who are habitually polygamous 
show themselves able to take on those high 
forms of social co-operation which demand 
due subordination of self to others. Only 
where monogamic marriage has become gen- 
eral and eventually universal — only where 
there have consequently been established 
the closest ties of blood — only where family 
altruism has been most fostered, has social 
altruism become conspicuous. It needs but 
to recall the compound forms of the Aryan 
family as described by Sir Henry Maine and 
others, to see that family feeling, first ex- 
tending itself to the gens and the tribe, and 
afterward to the society formed of related 
tribes, prepared the way for fellow-feeling 
among citizens not of the same stock. 

Recognizing this natural transition, we are 
here chiefly concerned to observe that 
throughout the latter stages of the progress, 
as throughout the former, increase of egois- 
tic satisfactions has depended ua growth of 
regard for the satisfactions of others. On 
contemplating a line of successive parents 
and offspring, we see that each, enabled 
while young to live by the sacrifices prede- 
cessors make for it, itself makes, when adult, 
equivalent sacrifices for successors ; and that 
in default of this general balancing of bene- 
fits received by benefits giveu, tiie lims dies 
out. Similarly, it is manifest that in society 
each generation of members, indebted for 
such benefits as social organization yields 
them to preceding generations, who have by 
their sacrifices elaborated this organ izutic:., 
are called on to make for succeeding genera- 
tions such kindred sacrifices as shall at least 
maintain this organization, if they do not 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



541 



Improve it — the alternative being decay and 
eventual dissolution of the society, implying 
gradual decrease in the egoistic satisfactions 
of its members. 

And now we are prepared to consider the 
several ways in which, under social con- 
ditions, personal welfare depends on due re- 
gard for the welfare of others. Already the 
conclusions to be drawn have been fore- 
shadowed. As in the chapter on the biolog- 
ical view were implied the inferences defi- 
nitely set forth in the last chapter, so in the 
chapter on the sociological view were implied 
the inferences to be definitely set forth here. 
Sundry of these are trite enough, but they 
must nevertheless be specified, since the 
statement would be incomplete without 
them. 

§ 77. First to be dealt with comes that 
negative altruism implied by such curbing 
of the egoistic impulses as prevents direct 
aggression. 

As before shown, if men instead of living 
separately are to unite for defence or for 
other purposes, they must severally reap 
more good than evil from the union. On 
the average, each must lose less from the an- 
tagonisms of those with whom he is asso- 
ciated than he gains by the association. At 
the outset, therefore, that increase of egoistic 
satisfactions which the social state brings 
■can be purchased only by altruism sufficient 
to cause some recognition of others' claims — 
if not a voluntary recognition, still a com- 
pulsory recognition. 

While the recognition is but of that lowest 
kind due to dread of retaliation or of pre- 
scribed punishment, the egoistic gain from 
association is small, and it becomes con- 
siderable only as the recognition becomes 
-voluntary — that is, more altruistic. Where, 
as among some of the wild Australians, there 
exists no limit to the right of the strongest, 
and the men fight to get possession of 
women while the wives of one man fight 
among themselves about him, the pursuit of 
egoistic satisfactions is greatly impeded. Be- 
sides the bodily pain occasionally given to 
each by conflict, and the more or less of sub- 
sequent inability to achieve personal ends, 
there is the waste of energy entailed in main- 
taining readiness for self-defence, and there 
is the accompanying occupation of conscious- 
ness by emotions that are on the average of 
cases disagreeable. Moreover, the primary 
end of safety in presence of external foes is 
ill-attained in proportion as there are inter- 
nal animosities ; such furtherance of satisfac- 
tions as industrial co-operation brings cannot 
be had ; and there is little motive to labor 
for extra benefits when the products of labor 
are insecure. And from this early stage to 
comparatively late stages we may trace in 
the wearing of arms, in the carrying on of 
family feuds, and in the taking of daily pre- 
cautions for safety, the ways in which the 
egoistic satisfactions of each are diminished 
by deficiency of that altruism which checks 
overt injury of others. 

The private interests of the individual are 



on the average better subserved, not only 
in proportion as he himself refrains from di- 
rect aggression, but also, on the average, in 
proportion as he succeeds in diminishing the 
aggressions of his fellows on one another. 
The prevalence of antagonisms among those 
around impedes the activities carried on by 
each in pursuit of satisfactions, and by 
causing disorder makes the beneficial results 
of activities more doubtful. Hence, each 
profits egoistically from the growth of an 
altruism which leads each to aid in prevent- 
ing or diminishing others' violence. 

The like holds when we pass to that altru- 
ism which restrains the undue egoism dis- 
played in breaches of contract. General 
acceptance of the maxim that honesty is the 
best policy implies general experience that 
gratification of the self-regarding feelings is 
eventually furthered by such checking of 
them as maintains equitable dealings. And 
here, as before, each is personally interested 
in securing good treatment of his fellows by 
one another. , For in countless ways evils are 
entailed on each by the prevalence of fraud- 
ulent transactions. As every one knows, the 
larger the number of a shopkeeper's bills left 
unpaid by some customers, the higher must 
be the prices which other customers pay. 
The more manufacturers lose by defective 
raw materials or by carelessness of workmen, 
the more must they charge for their fabrics 
to buyers. The less trustworthy people are, 
the higher rises the rate of interest, the larger 
becomes the amount of capital hoarded, the 
greater are the impediments to industry. The 
further traders and people in general go be- 
yond their means, and hypothecate the prop- 
erty of others in speculation, the more seri- 
ous are those commercial panics which bring 
disasters on multitudes and injuriously affect 
all. 

This introduces us to yet a third way in 
which such personal welfare as results from 
the proportioning of benefits gained to labors 
given depends on the making of certain sac- 
rifices for social welfare. The man who, 
expending his energies wholly on private 
affairs, refuses to take trouble about public 
affairs, pluming himself on his wisdom in 
minding his own business, is blind to the 
fact that his own business is made possible 
only by maintenance of a healthy social state, 
and that he loses all round by defective gov- 
ernmental arrangements. Where there are 
many like-minded with himself — where, as a 
consequence, offices come to be filled by polit- 
ical adventurers and opinion is swayed by 
demagogues — where bribery vitiates the ad- 
ministration of the law and makes fraudulent 
state transactions habitual, heavy penalties 
fall on the community at large, and, among 
others, on those who have thus done every- 
thing for self and nothing for society. 
Their investments are insecure, recovery 
of their debts is difficult, and even their 
lives are less safe than they would otherwise 
have been. 

So that on such altruistic actions as are 
implied, firstly in being just, secondly in, 



542 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



seeing- justice done between others, and 
thirdly in upholding and improving the 
agencies by which justice is administered, 
depend, in large measure, the egoistic satis- 
factions of each. 

§ 78. But the identification of personal ad- 
vantage with the advantage of fellow-citi- 
zens is much wider than this. In various 
other ways the well-being of each rises and 
falls with the well-being of all. 

A weak man left to provide for his own 
wants suffers by getting smaller amounts of 
food and other necessaries than he might get 
were he stronger. In a community formed 
of weak men, who divide their labors and 
exchange .the products, all suffer evils from 
the weakness of their fellows. The quantity 
of each kind of product is made deficient by 
the deficiency of laboring power, and the 
share each gets for such share of his own 
product as he can afford to give is relatively 
small. Just as the maintenance of paupers, 
hospital patients, inmates of asylums, and 
others who consume but do not produce, 
leaves to be divided among producers a 
smaller stock of commodities than would ex- 
ist were there no incapables, so must there 
be left a smaller stock of commodities to be 
divided, the greater the number of inefficient 
producers, or the greater the average de- 
ficiency of producing power. Hence, what- 
ever decreases the strength of men in general 
restricts the gratifications of each by making 
the means to them dearer. 

More directly and more obviously does 
the bodily well-being of his fellows concern 
him, for their bodily ill-being, when it takes 
certain shapes, is apt to bring similar bodily 
ill-being on him. If he is not himself at- 
tacked by cholera, or small-pox, or typhus, 
when it invades his neighborhood, he often 
suffers a penalty through his belongings. 
Under conditions spreading it, his wife 
catches diphtheria, or his servant is laid up 
with scarlet fever, or his children take now 
this and now that infectious disorder. Add 
together the immediate and remote evils 
brought on him year after year by epidemics, 
and it becomes manifest that his egoistic sat- 
isfactions are greatly furthered by such altru- 
istic activities as render disease less prevalent. 

With the mental as well as with the bod- 
ily states of fellow-citizens, his enjoyments 
are in multitudinous ways bound up. Stu- 
pidity like weakness raises the cost of com- 
modities. Where farming is unimproved, 
the prices of food are higher than they 
would else be ; where antiquated routine 
maintains itself in trade, the needless expense 
of distribution weighs on all ; where there is 
no inventiveness, every one loses the benefits 
■which improved appliances diffuse. Other 
than economic evils come from the average 
unintelligence — periodically through the ma- 
nias and panics that arise because traders 
rush in herds all to buy or all to sell ; and 
habitually through the maladministration of 
justice, which people and rulers alike disre- 
gard while pursuing this or that legislative 
will-o'-the-wisp. Closer and clearer is the 



dependence of his personal satisfactions oa 
others' mental states which each experiences 
in his household. Unpunctuality and want 
of system are perpetual sources of annoy- 
ance. The unskilfulness of the cook causes 
frequent vexation and occasional indigestion. 
Lack of forethought in the housemaid leads 
to a fall over a bucket in a dark passage. 
And inattention to a message or forgetfulness 
in delivering it entails failure in an impor- 
tant engagement. Each, therefore, benefits 
egoistically by such altruism as aids in rais- 
ing the average intelligence. I do not mean 
such altruism as taxes ratepayers that chil- 
dren's minds may be filled with dates, and 
names, and gossip about kings, and narra- 
tives of battles, and other useless information 
no amount of which will make them capable 
workers or good citizens ; but I mean such 
altruism as helps to spread a knowledge of 
the nature of things and to cultivate the 
power of applying that knowledge. 

Yet again, each has a private interest in 
public morals, and profits by improving 
them. Not in large ways only, by aggres- 
sions and breaches of contract, by adultera- 
tions and short measures, does each suffer 
from the general unconscientiousness, but 
in more numerous small ways. Now it is 
through the untruthfulness of one whe gives 
a good character to a bad servant ; now it is 
by the recklessness of a laundress who, using; 
bleaching agents to save trouble in washing, 
destroys his linen ; now it is by the acted 
falsehood of railway passengers who, by 
dispersed coats, make him believe that all the 
seats in a compartment are taken when they 
are not. Yesterday the illness of his child, 
due to foul gases, led to the discovery of a 
drain that had become choked because it 
was ill-made by a dishonest builder under 
supervision of a careless or bribed surveyor. 
To-day workmen employed to rectify it 
bring on him cost and inconvenience by 
dawdling ; and their low standard of work, 
determined by the unionist principle that the 
better workers must not discredit the worse 
by exceeding them in efficiency, he may 
trace to the immortal belief that the unworthy 
should fare as well as the worthy. To- 
morrow it turns out that business for the 
plumber has been provided by damage which 
the bricklayers have done. 

Thus the improvement of others, physi- 
cally, intellectually, and morally, personally 
concerns each, since their imperfections tell 
in raising the cost of all the commodities he 
buys, in increasing the taxes and rates he 
pays, and in the losses of time, trouble, and 
money, daily brought on him by others' 
carelessness, stupidity, or unconscientious- 
ness. 

§ 79. Very obvious are certain more im- 
mediate connections between personal wel- 
fare and ministration to the welfare of those 
around. The evils suffered by those whose 
behavior is unsympathetic, and the benefits 
to self which unselfish conduct brings, show 
these. 

That any one should have formulated his 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



543 



experience by saying that the conditions to 
success are a hard heart and a sound diges- 
tion is marvellous, considering the many 
proofs that success, even of a material kind, 
greatly depending as it does on the good 
offices of others, 13 furthered by whatever 
creates good- will in others. The contrast be- 
tween the prosperity of those who to but 
moderate abilities join natures which beget 
friendships by their kindliness, and the ad- 
versity of those who, though possessed of 
superior faculties and greater acquirements, 
arouse dislikes by their hardness or indiffer- 
ence, should force upon all the truth that 
egoistic enjoyments are aided by altruistic 
actions. 

This increase of personal benefit achieved 
by benefiting others is but partially achieved 
■where a selfish motive prompts the seemingly 
uuselfish act : it is fully achieved only where 
the act is really unselfish. Though services 
rendered with the view of some time profit- 
ing by reciprocated services answer to a 
certain extent, yet, ordinarily, they answer 
only to the extent of bringing equivalents of 
reciprocated services. Those which bring 
more than equivalents are those not 
prompted by any thoughts of equivalents. 
For obviously it is the spontaneous outflow 
of good nature, not in the larger acts of life 
only but in all its details, which generates in 
those around the attachments prompting un- 
stinted benevolence. 

Besides furthering prosperity, other-regard- 
ing actions conduce to self-regarding gratifi- 
cations by generating a genial environment. 
With the sympathetic being every one feels 
more sympathy than with others. All con- 
duct themselves with more than usual amia- 
bility to a person who hourly discloses a lov- 
able nature. Such a one is practically sur- 
rounded by a world of better people than one 
who is less attractive. If we contrast the 
state of a man possessing all the material 
means to happiness, but isolated by his abso- 
lute egoism, with the state of an altruistic 
man relatively poor in means but rich in 
friends, we may see that various gratifica- 
tions not to be purchased by money come 
in abundance to the last and are inaccessible 
to the first. 

While, then, there is one kind of other-re- 
garding action, furthering the prosperity of 
fellow-citizens at large, which admits of be- 
ing deliberately pursued from motives that 
are remotely self-regard ing — the conviction 
being that personal well-being depends in 
large measure on the well-being of society — 
there is an additional kind of other-regarding 
action having in it no element of conscious 
self-regard, which nevertheless conduces 
greatly to egoistic satisfactions. 

§ 80. Tet other modes exist in which 
egoism unqualified by altruism habitually 
fails. It diminishes the totality of egoistic 
pleasure by diminishing in several directions 
the capacity for pleasure. 

Self-gratifications, considered separately or 
in the aggregate, lose their intensities by that 
too great persistence in them which results 



if they are made the exclusive objects of pur- 
suit. The law that function entails waste, 
and that faculties yielding pleasure by their 
action cannot act incessantly without ex- 
haustion and accompanying satiety, has the 
implication that intervals during which altru- 
istic activities absorb the energies are inter- 
vals during which the capacity for egoistic 
pleasure is recovering its full degree. The 
sensitiveness to purely personal enjoyments 
is maintained at a higher pitch by those who 
minister to the enjoyments of others than it 
is by those who devote themselves wholly to 
personal enjoyments. 

^This which is manifest even while the tide 
of life is high becomes still more manifest 
as life ebbs. It is iu maturity and old age 
that we especially see how, as egoistic pleas- 
ures grow faint, altruistic actions come in to 
revive them in new forms. The contrast 
between the child's delight in the novelties 
daily revealed and the indifference which 
comes as the world around grows familiar, 
until in adult life there remain comparatively 
few things that are greatly enjoyed, draws 
from all the reflection that as years go by 
pleasures pall. And to those who think, it 
becomes clear that only through sympathy 
can pleasures be indirectly gained from 
things that have ceased to yield pleasures di- 
rectly. In the gratifications derived by 
parents from the gratifications of their off- 
spring this is conspicuously shown. Trite 
as is the remark that men live afresh in their 
children, it is needful here to set it down as 
reminding us of the way in which, as the 
egoistic satisfactions in life fade, altruism 
renews them while it transfigures them. 

We are thus introduced to a more general 
consideration — the egoistic aspect of altruis- 
tic pleasure. Not, indeed, that this is the 
place for discussing the question whether the 
egoistic element can be excluded from altru- 
ism, nor is it the place for distinguishing 
between the altruism which is pursued with 
a foresight of the pleasurable feeling to be 
achieved through it, and the altruism which, 
though it achieves this pleasurable feeling, 
does not make pursuit of it a motive. Here 
we are concerned with the fact that, whether 
knowingly or unknowingly gained, the state 
of mind accompanying altruistic action, be- 
ing a pleasurable state, is to be counted in 
the sum of pleasures which the individual 
can receive, and in this sense cannot be 
other than egoistic. That we must so re- 
gard it is proved on observing that this pleas- 
ure, like pleasures in general, conduces to 
the physical prosperity of the ego. As every 
other agreeable emotion raises the tide of life, 
so does the agreeable emotion which accom- 
panies a benevolent deed. As it cannot be 
denied that the pain caused by the sight of 
suff ering.depresses the vital functions —some- 
times even to the extent of arresting the 
heart's action, as in one who faints on seeing 
a surgical operation, so neither can it be de- 
nied that the joy felt in witnessing others' 
joy exalts the vital functions. Hence, how- 
ever much we may he sitate to class altruistic 



544 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



pleasure as a higher kind of egoistic pleas- 
ure, we are obliged to recognize the fact that 
its immediate effects in augmenting life, and 
so furthering personal well-being, are like 
those of pleasures that are directly egoistic. 
And the corollary drawn must be that pure 
egoism is, even in its immediate results, less 
buccessfully egoistic than is the egoism duly 
qualified by altruism, which, besides achiev- 
ing additional pleasures, achieves also, 
through raised vitality, a greater capacity for 
pleasures in general. 

That the range of aesthetic gratifications is 
wider for the altruistic nature than for the 
egoistic nature is also a truth not to be over- 
looked. The joys and sorrows of human be- 
ings form a chief element in the subject-mat- 
ter of art, and evidently the pleasures which 
art gives increase as the fellow-feeling with 
these joys and sorrows strengthens. If we 
contrast early poetry occupied mainly with 
war and gratifying the savage instincts by 
descriptions of bloody victories, with the po- 
etry of modern times, in which the sangui- 
nary forms but a small part, while a large 
part, dealing with the gentler affections, en- 
lists the feelings of readers on behalf of the 
weak, we are shown that with the develop- 
ment of a more altruistic nature there has 
been opened a sphere of enjoyment inacces- 
sible to the callous egoism of barbarous times. 
So, too, between the fiction of the past and 
the fiction of the present there is the differ- 
ence that while the one was almost exclu- 
sively occupied with the doings of the ruling 
classes, and found its plots in their antago- 
nisms and deeds of violence, the otner, 
chiefly taking stories of peaceful life for its 
subjects, and to a considerable extent the life 
of the humbler classes, discloses a new 
world of interest in the every-day pleasures 
and pains of ordinary people. A like con- 
trast exists between early and late forms of 
plastic art. "When not representing acts of 
worship, the wall sculptures and wall paint- 
ings of the Assyrians and Egyptians, or the 
decorations of temples among the Greeks, 
represented deeds of conquest ; whereas in 
modern times, while the works which glorify 
destructive activities are less numerous, there 
are an increasing number of works gratify- 
ing to the kindlier sentiments of spectators. 
To see that those who care nothing about 
the feelings of other beings are, by implica- 
tion, shut out from a wide range of aesthetic 
pleasures, it needs but to ask whether men 
who delight in dog-fights may be expected 
to appreciate Beethoven's " Adelaida," or 
whether Tennyson's " InMemoriam" would 
greatly move a gang of convicts. 

§ 81. From the dawn of life, then, egoism 
has been dependent upon altruism as altruism 
has been dependent upon egoism ; and in 
the course of evolution the reciprocal ser- 
vices of the two have been increasing. 

The physical and unconscious self-sacrifice 
of parents to form offspring, which the low 
est living things display from hour to hour, 
3I10W3 us in its primitive form the altruism 
which makes possible the egoism of individ- 



ual life and growlk. 

As we ascend to higher grades of ores 
tures, this parental altruism becomes a direct! 
yielding up of only part of the body, joined 
with an increasing contribution from the re- 
mainder in the shape of tissue wasted in 
efforts made on behalf of progeny. This 
indirect sacrifice of substance, replacing more 
and more the direct sacrifice as parental 
altruism becomes higher, continues to the 
last to represent also altruism which is other 
than parental, since this, too, implies loss 
of substance in making efforts that do not 
bring their return in personal aggrandizement. 

After noting how among man kind parental 
altruism and family altruism pass into social 
altruism, we observed that a society, like a 
species, survives only on condition that each 
generation of its members shall yield to the 
next benefits equivalent to those it has re- 
ceived from the last. And this implies that 
care for the family must be supplemented by 
care for the society. 

Fulness of egoistic satisfactions in the as- 
sociated state, depending primarily on main- 
tenance of the normal relation between 
efforts expended and benefits obtained, which 
underlies all life, implies an altruism which 
both prompts equitable conduct and prompts 
the enforcing of equity. The well-being of 
each is involved with the well-being of all 
in sundry other ways. Whatever conduces 
to their vigor concerns him, for it dimin- 
ishes the cost of everything he buys. What- 
ever conduces to their freedom from disease 
concerns him, for it diminishes his own lia- 
bility to disease. Whatever raises their in- 
telligence concerns him, for inconveniences 
are daily entailed on him by others' ignorance 
or folly. Whatever raises their moral char- 
acters concerns him, for at every turn he 
suffers from the average unconscientiousness. 

Much more directly do his egoistic satisfac- 
tions depend on those altruistic activities 
which enlist the sympathies of others. By 
alienating those around, selfishness loses the 
unbought aid they can render, shuts out_ a 
wide range of social enjoyments, and fails 
to receive those exaltations of pleasure and 
mitigations of pain, which come from men's 
fellow-feeling with those they like. 

Lastly, undue egoism defeats itself by 
bringing on an incapacity for happiness. 
Purely egoistic gratifications are rendered 
less keen by satiety, even in the earlier part 
of life, and almost disappear in the later ; 
the less satiating gratifications of altruism 
are missed throughout life, and especially in 
that latter part when they largely replace 
egoistic gratifications, and there is a lack of 
susceptibility to aesthetic pleasures of the 
higher orders. 

An indication must be added of the truth, 
scarcely at all recognized, that this depend- 
ence of egoism upon altruism ranges beyond 
the limits of each society, and tends ever 
toward universality. That within each so- 
ciety it becomes greater as social evolution, 
implying increase of mutual dependence, 
progresses, needs not. be shown ; and it is a 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



545 



corollary that as fast as the dependence of 
societies on one another is increased by com- 
mercial intercourse, the internal welfare of 
each becomes a matter of concern to the 
others. That the impoverishment of any 
country, diminishing both its producing and 
consuming powers, tells detrimentally on the 
people of countries trading with it, is a com- 
monplace of political economy. Moreover, 
we have had of late years abundant experi- 
ence of the industrial derangements through 
which distress is brought on nations not im- 
mediately concerned, by wars between other 
nations. And if each community has the 
egoistic satisfaction of its members dimin- 
ished by aggressions of neighboring commu- 
nities on one another, still more does it have 
them diminished by its own aggressions. 
One who marks how, in various parts of the 
world, the unscrupulous greed of conquest, 
cloaked by pretences of spreading the bless- 
ings of British rule and Biitish religion, is 
now reacting to the immense detriment of 
the industrial classes at home, alike by in- 
creasing expenditure and paralyzing trade, 
may see that these industrial classes, absorbed 
in questions about capital and labor, and 
thinking themselves unconcerned in our do- 
ings abroad, are suffering from lack of that 
wide-reaching altruism which should insist 
on just dealings with other peoples, civilized 
or savage. And he may also see that beyond 
these immediate evils they will for a genera- 
tion to come suffer the evils that must flow 
from resuscitating the type of social organi- 
zation which aggressive activities produce, 
and from the lowered moral tone which iff its 
accompaniment. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

"RIAL AND COMPROMISE. 

§ 82. In the foregoing two chapters the 
case on behalf of egoism and the case on be- 
half of altruism have been stated. The two 
conflict, and we have now to consider what 
verdict ought to be given. 

If the opposed statements are severally 
valid, or even if each of them is valid in part, 
the inference must be that pure egoism and 
pure altruism are both illegitimate. If the 
maxim, "Live for self," is wrong, so also is 
the maxim, "Live for others." Hence a 
compromise is the only possibility. 

This conclusion, though already seeming 
unavoidable, I do not here set down as 
proved. The purpose of this chapter is to 
justify it in full; and I enunciate it at the 
outset because the arguments used will be 
better understood if the conclusion to which 
they converge is in the reader's view. 

How shall we so conduct the discussion as 
most clearly to bring out this necessity for a 
compromise ? Perhaps the best way will be 
that of stating one of the two claims in its 
extreme form, and observing the implied ab- 
surdities. To deal thus with the principle 
of pure selfishness would be to waste space. 
Every one sees that an unchecked satisfac- 
tion of personal desires from moment to mo- 



ment, in absolute disregard of all othe. be- 
ings, would cause universal conflict and so- 
cial dissolution. The principle of pure un- 
selfishness, less obviously mischievous, may 
therefore better be chosen. 

There are two aspects under which the 
doctrine that others' happiness is the true 
ethical aim presents itself. The "others" 
may be conceived personally, as individuals 
with whom we stand in direct relations; or 
they may be conceived impersonally, as con- 
stituting the comniunity. In so far as the 
self-abnegation implied by pure altruism is 
concerned, it matters not in which sense 
"others" is used. But criticism will be 
facilitated by distinguishing between these 
two forms of it. We will take the last form 
first. 

§ 83. This commits us to an examination 
of "the greatest-happiness principle," as 
enunciated by Bentham and his followers. 
The doctrine "that the general happiness" 
ought to be the object of pursuit is not, in- 
deed, overtly identified with pure altruism. 
But as, if general happiness is the proper end 
of action, the individual actor must regard 
his own share of it simply as a unit in the 
aggregate, no more to be valued by him than 
any other unit, it results that since this unit is 
almost infinitesimal in comparison with the 
aggregate, his action, if directed conclusively 
to achievement of general happiness, is, if 
not absolutely altruistic, as nearly so as may 
be. Hence the theory which makes general 
happiness the immediate object of pursuit 
may rightly be taken as one form of the pure 
altruism to be here criticised. 

Both as justifying this interpretation and 
as furnishing a definite proposition with 
which to deal, let me set out by quoting a 
passage from Mr. Mill's " Utilitarianism." 

"The greatest-happiness principle," he says, "is 
a mere form of words without rational signification, 
unless one person's happiness, supposed equal in de- 
gree (with the proper allowance made for kind), is 
counted for exactly as much as another's. Those 
conditions being supplied, Bentham's dictum, * every- 
body to count for one, nobody for more than one,' 
might be written under the principle of utility as an 
explanatory commentary" (p. 91). 

Now though the meaning of "greatest 
happiness " as an end is here to a certain de- 
gree defined, the need for further definition 
is felt the moment we attempt to decide on 
ways of regulating conduct so as to attain the 
end. The first question which arises is. 
Must we regard this "greatest-happiness 
principle" as a principle of guidance for the 
community in its corporate capacity, or as a 
principle of guidance for its members sepa- 
rately considered, or both ? If the reply is 
that the principle must be taken as a guide 
for governmental action rather than for indi- 
vidual action, we are at once met by the in- 
quiry, What is to be the guide for individual 
action ? If individual action is not to be reg- 
ulated solely for the purpose of achieving 
" the greatest happiness of the greatest num- 
ber," some other principle of regulation for 
individual action is required; and "the 
greatest-happiness principle " fails to furnish. 



548 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



the needful ethical standard. Should it be 
rejoined that the individual, in his capacity of 
political unit, is to take furtherance of gen- 
eral happiness as his end, giving his vote or 
otherwise acting on the legislature with a 
view to this end, and that in so far guidance 
is supplied to him, there comes the further 
inquiry, Whence is to come guidance for the 
remainder of individual conduct, constituting 
by far the greater part of it ? If this private 
part of individual conduct is not to have gen- 
eral happiness as its direct aim, then an ethi- 
cal standard other than that offered has still 
to be found. 

Hence, unless pure altruism as thus formu- 
lated confesses its inadequacy, it must jus- 
tify itself as a sufficient rule for all conduct, 
individual and social. We will first deal 
with it as the alleged right principle of pub- 
lic policy, and then as the alleged right 
principle of private action. 1 

§ 84. On trying to understand precisely the 
statement that when taking general happi- 
ness as an end the rule must be, "Every- 
body to count for one, nobody for more than 
one," there arises the idea of distribution. 
We can form no idea of distribution without 
thinking of something distributed and recipi- 
ents of this something. That we may clearly 
conceive the proposition we must clearly 
conceive both these elements of it. Let us 
take first the recipients. 

" Everybody to count for one, nobody for 
more than one." Does this mean that, in 
respect of whatever is poicioned out, each is 
to have the same share, whatever his charac- 
ter, whatever his conduct ? Shall he if pas- 
sive have as much as if active? Shall he if 
useless have as much as if useful ? Shall he 
if criminal have as much as if virtuous ? If 
the distribution is to be made without refer- 
ence to the natures and deeds of the recipi- 
ents, then it must be shown that a system 
which equalizes, as far as it can, the treat- 
ment of good and bad, will be beneficial. If 
the distribution is not to be indiscriminate, 
theu the formula disappears. The something 
distributed must be apportioned otherwise 
than by equal division. There must be ad- 
justment of amounts to deserts ; and we are 
left in the dark as to the mode of adjustment 
— we have to find other guidance. 

Let us next ask, what is the something to 
be distributed ? The first idea which occurs 
is that happiness itself must be divided out 
among all. Taken literally, the notions that 
the greatest happiness should be the end 
sought, and that in apportioning it everybody 
should count for one and nobody for more 
than one, imply that happiness is something 
that can be cut up into parts and handed 
round. This, however, is an impossible in- 
terpretation. But after recognizing the im- 
possibility of it, there returns the question, 
What is it in respect of which everybody is 
to count for one and nobody for more than 
one ? 

Shall the interpretation be that the con- 
crete means to happiness are to be equally di- 
vided ? Is it intended that there shall be dis- 



tributed to all in equal portions the necessa- 
ries of life, the appliances to comfort, the 
facilities for amusement ? As a oonception 
simply, this is more defensible. But passing 
over the question of policy — passing over the 
question whether greatest happiness would 
ultimately be secured by such a process 
(which it obviously would not), it turns out 
on examination that greatest happiness could 
not even proximately be so secured. Differ- 
ences of age, of growth, of constitutional 
need, differences of activity and consequent 
expenditure, differences of desires and tastes, 
would entail the inevitable result that the 
material aids to happiness which each re- 
ceived would be more or less unadapted to 
his requirements. Even if purchasing 
power were equally divided, tha greatest 
happiness would not be achieved if every- 
body counted for one and nobody for more 
than one, since, as the capacities for utilizing 
the purchased means to happiness would vary 
both with the constitution and the stage of 
life, the means which would approximately 
suffice to satisfy the wants of one would be 
extremely insufficient to satisfy the wants of 
another, and so the greatest total of happiness 
would not be obtained— means might be un- 
equally apportioned in a way that would pro- 
duce a greater total. 

But now if happiness itself cannot be cut 
up and distributed equally, and if equal di- 
vision of the material aids to happiness 
would not produce greatest happiness, what 
is the thing to be thus apportioned? what 
is it in respect of which everybody is to 
count for one and nobody for more than 
one ? There seems but a single possibility. 
There remain to be equally distributed noth- 
ing but the conditions under which each 
may pursue happiness. The limitations to 
action, the degrees of freedom and re- 
straint, shall be alike for all. Each shall 
have as much liberty to pursue his ends as 
consists with maintaining like liberties to 
pursue their ends by others, and one as 
much as another shall have the enjoyment 
of that which his efforts, carried on within 
these limits, obtain. But to say that in re- 
spect of these conditions everybody shall 
count for one and nobody for more than one, 
is simply to say that equity shall be enforced. 
Thus, considered as a principle of public 
policy, Bentham's principle, when analyzed, 
transforms itself into the principle he slights. 
Not general happiness becomes the ethical 
standard by which legislative action is to be 
guided, but universal justice. And so the 
altruistic theory under this form collapses. 

§ 85. From examining the doctrine that 
general happiness should be the end of pub- 
lic action we pass now to examine the doc- 
trine that it should be the end of private 
action. 

It is contended that from the standpoint of 
pure reason, the happiness of others has no 
less a claim as an object of pursuit for each 
than personal happiness. Considered as 
parts of a total, happiness felt by self and 
like happiness felt by another are of ey.ua! 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



547 



values, and hence it is inferred that, ration- 
ally estimated, the obligation to expend effort 
for others' benefit is as great as the obliga- 
tion to expend effort for one's own benefit. 
Holding that the utilitarian system of morals, 
rightly understood, harmonizes with the 
Christian maxim, "Love your neighbor as 
yourself," Mr. Mill says that "as between 
bis own happiness and that of others, utili- 
tarianism requires him to be as strictly im- 
partial as a disinterested and benevolent 
spectator" (p. 24). Let us consider the alter- 
native interpretations which may be given to 
this statement. 

Suppose, first, that a certain quantum of 
happiness has in some way become available 
without the special instrumentality of A, B, 

C, or D, constituting the group concerned. 
Then the proposition is that each shall be 
ready to have his quantum of happiness as 
much enjoyed by one or more of the others 
as by himself. The disinterested and benev- 
olent spectator would clearly, in such a case, 
rul that no one ought to have more of the 
happiness than another. But here, assum- 
ing as we do that the quantum of happiness 
has become available without the agency of 
any among the group, simple equity dictates 
as much. No one having in any way estab- 
lished a claim different from the claims of 
others, their claims are equal, and due re- 
gard for justice by each will not permit him 
to monopolize the happiness. 

Now suppose a different case. Suppose 
that the quantum of happiness has been 
made available by the efforts of one member 
of the group. Suppose that A has acquired 
by labor some material aid to happiness. 
He decides to act as the disinterested and 
benevolent spectator would direct. What 
will he decide ? what would the spectator 
direct ? Let us consider the possible sup- 
positions, taking first the least reasonable. 

The spectator may be conceived as decid- 
ing that the labor expended by A in acquir- 
ing this material aid to happiness originates 
no claim to special use of it, but that it 
ought to be given to B, C, and D, or that it 
ought to be divided equally among B, C, and 

D, or that it ought to be divided equally 
among all members of the group, including 
A who has labored for it. And if the specta- 
tor is conceived as deciding thus to-day, he 
must be conceived as deciding thus day after 
•day, with the result that one of the group 
-expends ail the effort, getting either none of 
the benefit or only his numerical share while 
•the others get their shares of the benefit with- 
out expending any efforts. That A might 
■conceive the disinterested and benevolent 
spectator to decide in this way, and might 
feel bound to act in conformity with the im- 
agined decision, is a strong supposition: and 
probably it will be admitted that such kind 
of impartiality, so far from being conducive 
to the general happiness, would quickly be 
fatal to every one. But this is not, all. Ac- 
tion in pursuance of such a decision would 
in reality be negatived by the very principle 
■enunciated. For not only A, but also B, C, 



and D have to act on this principle. Each 
of them must behave as he conceives an im- 
partial spectator would decide. Does B con- 
ceive the impartial spectator as awarding to 
him, B, that product of A's labor? Then 
the assumption is that B conceives the im- 
partial spectator as favoring himself, B, more 
than A conceives him as favoring himself, 
A, which is inconsistent with the hypothe- 
sis. Does B, in conceiving the impartial 
spectator, exclude his own interests as com- 
pletely as A does ? Then how can he decide 
so much to his own advantage, so partially 
as to allow him to take from A an equal 
share of the benefit gained by A's labor, 
toward which he and the rest have done 
nothing ? 

Passing from this conceivable, though not 
credible, decision of the spectator, here noted 
for the purpose of observing that habitual 
conformity to it would be impossible, there 
remains to be considered the decision which 
a spectator really impartial would give. He 
would say that the happiness, or material aid 
to happiness, which had been purchased by 
A's "labor, was to be taken by A. He would 
say that B, C, and D had no claims to it, but 
only to such happiness or aids to happiness 
as their respective labors had purchased. 
Consequently, A, acting as the imaginary 
impartial spectator would direct, is, by this 
test, justified in appropriating such happiness 
or aid to happiness as his own efforts have 
achieved. 

And so under its special form as under its 
general form, the principle is true only in so 
far as it embodies a disguised justice. 
Analysis again brings out the result that 
making ' ' general happiness " the end of ac- 
tion really means maintaining what we call 
equitable relations among individuals. De- 
cline to accept in its vague form "the great- 
est-happiness principle," and insist on know- 
ing what is the implied conduct, public or 
private, and it turns out that the principle is 
meaningless save as indirectly asserting that 
the claims of each should be duly regarded 
by all. The utilitarian altruism becomes a 
duly qualified egoism. 

§ 86. Another point of view from which to 
judge the altruistic theory may now be 
taken. If, assuming the proper object of 
pursuit to be general happiness, we proceed 
rationally, we may ask in what different 
ways the aggregate, general happiness, may 
be composed, and must then ask what com- 
position of it will yield the largest sum. 

Suppose that each citizen pursues his own 
happiness independently, not to the detriment 
of others but without active concern for 
others ; then their united happinesses consti- 
tute a certain sum — a certain general happi- 
ness. Now suppose that each, instead of 
making his own happiness the object of pur- 
suit, makes the happiness of others the ob- 
ject of pursuit; then, again, there results a 
certain sum of happiness. This sum must 
be less than, or equal to, or greater than, the 
first. If it is admitted that this sum is either 
less than the fiist or only equal to it, the 



543 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



altruistic course of action is confessedly 
either worse than, or no better . than, the 
egoistic. The assumption must be that the 
sum of happiness obtained is greater. Let 
us observe what is involved in this assump- 
tion. 

If each pursues exclusively the happiness 
of others, and if each is also a recipient of 
happiness (which he must be, for otheiwise 
no aggregate happiness can be formed out of 
their individual happinesses) ; then the im- 
plication is that each gains the happiness 
due to altruistic action exclusively, and that 
in each this is greater in amount than the 
egoistic happiness obtainable by him, if be 
devoted himself to pursuit of it. Leaving 
out of consideration for a moment these rela- 
tive amounts of the two, let us note the con- 
ditions to the receipt of altruistic happiness 
by each. The sympathetic nature gets pleas- 
ure by giving pleasure ; and the proposition 
is that if the general happiness is the object 
of pursuit, each will be made happy by wit- 
nessing others' happiness. But what in such 
case constitutes the happiness of others? 
These others are also, by the hypothesis, pur- 
suers and receivers of altruistic pleasure. 
The genesis of altruistic pleasure in each is 
to depend on the display of pleasures by 
others, which is again to depend on the dis- 
play of pleasures by others, and so on per- 
petually. Where, then, is the pleasure to 
begin ? Obviously there must be egoistic 
pleasure somewhere before there can be the 
altruistic pleasure caused by sympathy with 
it. Obviously, therefore, each must be 
egoistic in due amount, even if only with 
the view of giving others the possibility of 
being altruistic. So far from the sum of hap- 
piness being made greater if all make greatest 
happiness the exclusive end, the sum disap- 
pears entirely. 

How absurd is the supposition that the 
happiness of all can be achieved without 
each pursuing his own happiness, will be 
best shown by a physical simile. Suppose a 
cluster of bodies, each of which generates 
beat, and each of which is, therefore, while 
a radiator of heat to those around, also a re- 
ceiver of beat from them. Manifestly each 
will have a certain proper heat irrespective 
of that which it gains from the rest, and 
each will have a certain heat gained from the 
rest irrespective of its proper heat. What 
will happen ? So long as each of the bodies 
continues to be a generator of heat, each 
continues to maintain a temperature partly 
derived from itself and partly derived from 
others. But if each ceases to generate heat 
for itself and depends on the heat radiated to 
it by the rest, the entire cluster becomes 
cold. Well, the self -generated heat stands 
for egoistic pleasure, the heat radiated and 
received stands for sympathetic pleasure, 
and the disappearance of all heat if each 
ceases to be an originator of it corresponds 
to the disappearance of all pleasure if each 
ceases to originate it egoistically. 
_ A further conclusion may be dfawa. Be- 
sides the implication that before altruistic 



pleasure can exist, egoistic pleasure must ex- 
ist, and that if the rule of conduct is to be 
the same for all, each must be egoistic in due 
degree, there is the implication that to 
achieve the greatest sum of happiness, each 
must be more egoistic than altruistic. For 
speaking generally, sympathetic pleasures 
must ever continue less intense than the 
pleasures with which there is sympathy 
Other things equal, ideal feelings caunot be 
as vivid as real feelings. It is true that 
those having strong imaginations may 
especially m cases where the affections are 
engaged, feel the moral pain if not the physi- 
cal I pam of another as keenly as the actual 
sufferer of it, and may participate with like 
intensity in another's pleasure— sometimes 
even mentally representing the received 
pleasure as greater than it really is, and so 
getting reflex pleasure greater than the recipi- 
ents direct pleasure. Such cases, however 
and cases in which even, apart from exalta- 
tion of sympathy caused by attachment, there 
is a body of feeling sympathetically aroused 
equal in amount to the original feeling if 
not greater, are necessarily exceptional. For 
in such cases the total consciousness includes 
many other elements besides the mentally 
represented pleasure or pain — notably the 
luxury of pity and the luxury of goodness • 
and genesis of these can occur but occasion-' 
ally : they could not be habitual concomi- 
tants of sympathetic pleasures if all pursued 
these from moment to moment. In estimat- 
ing the possible totality of sympathetic pleas- 
ures, we must include nothing beyond the 
representations of the pleasures others expe- 
rience. And unless it be asserted that we 
can have other's states of consciousness per- 
petually reproduced in us more vividly than 
the kindred states of consciousness are aroused 
m ourselves by their proper personal causes, 
it must be admitted that the totality of altru- 
istic pleasures cannot become equal to the 
totality of egoistic pleasures. Hence, be- 
yond the truth that before there can be altru- 
istic pleasures there must be the egoistic 
pleasures from sympathy with which they 
arise, there is the truth that, to obtain the 
greatest sum of altruistic pleasures there 
must be a greater sum of egoistic pleas- 
ures. 

§ 87. That pure altruism is suicidal may 
be yet otherwise demonstrated. A perfectly 
moral law must be one which becomes per- 
fectly practicable as human nature becomes 
perfect. 

If its practicableness decreases as humaii 
nature improves, and if an ideal human na- 
ture necessitates its impracticability, it can. 
not be the moral law sought. 

Now opportunities for practising altruism 
are numerous and great in proportion as 
there is weakness, or incapacity, or imperfec- 
tion. If we pass beyond the limits of the 
family, in which a sphere for self-sacrificing 
activities must be preserved as long as off- 
spring have to be reared, and if we ask how 
there can continue a social sphere for self- 
sacrificing activities, it becomes obvious 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



549 



that the continued existence of serious evils, 
caused by prevalent defects of nature, is im- 
plied. As fast as men adapt themselves to 
the requirements of social life, so fast will 
the demands for efforts on their behalf di- 
minish. And with arrival at finished adap- 
tation, when all persons are at once com- 
pletely self-conserved and completely able to 
fulfil the obligations which society imposes 
on them, those occasions for postponement 
of self to others which pure altruism contem- 
plates disappear. • 

Such self-sacrifices become, indeed, doubly 
impracticable. Carrying on successfully 
their several lives, men not only cannot yield 
to those around the opportunities for giving 
aid, but aid cannot ordinarily be given them 
without interfering with their normal activi- 
ties, and so diminishing their pleasures. 
Like every inferior creature, led by its innate 
desires spontaneously to do all that its life 
requires, man, when completely molded to 
the social state, must have desires so adjusted 
to his needs that he fulfils the needs in grati- 
fying the desires. And if his desires are 
severally gratified by the performance of re- 
quired acts, none of these can be performed 
for him without balking his desires. Ac- 
ceptance from others of the results of their 
activities can take place only on condition of 
relinquishing the pleasures derived from his 
own activities. Diminution rather than in- 
crease of happiness would result, could 
altruistic action in such case be enforced. 

And here, indeed, we are introduced to 
another baseless assumption which the theory 
makes. 

§ 88. The postulate of utilitarianism as for- 
mulated in the statements above quoted, 
and of pure altruism as otherwise ex- 
pressed, involves the belief that it is pos- 
sible for happiness, or the means to hap- 
piness, or the conditions to happiness, to 
be transferred. Without any specified limit- 
ation, the proposition taken for grant- 
ed is that happiness in general admits 
of detachment from one and attachment to 
another — that surrender to any extent is pos- 
sible by one and appropriation to any extent 
is possible by another. But a moment's 
thought shows this to be far from the truth. 
On the one hand, surrender carried to a cer- 
tain point is extremely mischievous, and to 
a further point fatal ; and on the other hand, 
much of the happiness each enjoys is self- 
generated and can neither be given nor re- 
ceived. 

To assume that egoistic pleasures may be 
relinquished to any extent is to fall into one 
of those many errors of ethical speculation 
which result from ignoring the truths of bi- 
ology. When taking the biological view of 
ethics we saw that pleasures accompany nor- 
mal amounts of functions, while pains ac- 
company defects or excesses of functions ; 
further, that complete life depends on com- 
plete discharge of functions, and therefore on 
receipt of the correlative pleasures. Hence, 
to yield up normal pleasures is to yield up so 
much life ; and there arises the question to 



what extent may this be done ? If he is to 
continue living, the individual must take cer- 
tain amounts of those pleasures which go 
along with fulfilment of the bodily functions, 
and must avoid the pains which entire non- 
fulfilment of them entails. Complete abne- 
gation means death ; excessive abnegation 
means illness ; abnegation less excessive 
means physical degradation and consequent 
loss of power to fulfil obligations, personal 
and other. When, therefore, we attempt to 
specialize the proposal to live not for self- 
satisfaction but for the satisfaction of others, 
we meet with the difficulty that beyond a 
certain limit this cannot be done. And 
when we have decided what decrease of 
bodily welfare, caused by sacrifice of pleas- 
ures and acceptance of pains, it is proper for 
the individual to make, there is forced on us 
the fact that the portion of happiness or 
means of happiness which it is possible for 
him to yield up for redistribution is a 
limited portion. 

Even more rigorous on another side is the 
restriction put upon the transfer of happi- 
ness or the means to happiness. The pleas- 
ures gained by efficient action, by successful 
pursuit of ends, cannot by any process be 
parted with, and cannot in any way be ap- 
propriated by another. The habit of argu- 
ing about general happiness sometimes as 
though it were a concrete product to be por- 
tioned out, and sometimes as though it were 
coextensive with the use of those material 
aids to pleasure which may be given and re- 
ceived, has caused inattention to the truth 
that the pleasures of achievement are not 
transferable. Alike in the boy who has won 
a game of marbles, the athlete who has per- 
formed a feat, the statesman who has gained 
a party triumph, the inventor who has de- 
vised a new machine, the man of science who 
has discovered a truth, the novelist who has 
well delineated a character, the poet who has- 
finely rendered an immotion, we see pleasures 
which must, in the nature of things, be en- 
joyed exclusively by those to whom they come. 
And if we look at all such occupations as men 
are not impelled to by their necessities, if we 
contemplate the various ambitions which play 
so large a part in life, we are reminded that so 
long as the consciousness of efficiency remains a 
dominant pleasure, there will remain a dom- 
inant pleasure which cannot be pursued 
altruistically, but must be pursued egoisti- 
cally. 

Cutting off, then, at the one end, those 
pleasures which are inseparable from mainten- 
ance of the physique in an uninjured state, and 
cutting off at the other end the pleasures of 
successful action, the amount that remains is 
so greatly diminished as to make untenable the 
assumption that happiness at large admits of 
distribution after the manner which utilitarian- 
ism assumes. 

§ 89. In yet one more way may be shown 
the inconsistency of this transfigured util- 
itarianism which regards its doctrine as 
embodying the Christian maxim, "Love 
your neighbor as yourself," and of that aU 



550 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



truism which, going still further, enunciates 
the maxim, " Live for others." 

A right rule of conduct must be one which 
may with advantage be adopted by all. 
' ' Act according to that maxim only which 
you can wish at the same time to become a 
universal law," says Kant. And clearly, 
passing over needful qualifications of this 
maxim, we may accept it to the extent of ad- 
mitting that a mode of action which becomes 
impracticable as it approaches universality 
must be wrong. Hence, if the theory of 
pure altruism implying that effort should be 
expended for the benefit of others and not 
for personal benefit, is defensible, it must be 
shown that it will produce good results when 
acted upon by all. Mark the consequences if 
all are purely altruistic. 

First, an impossible combination of moral 
attributes is implied. Each is supposed by the 
hypothesis to regard self so little and others 
so much that he willingly sacrifices his 
own pleasures to give pleasures to them. 
But if_ this is a universal trait, and if 
action is universally congruous with it, we 
have to conceive each as being not only 
a sacrificer but also one who accept sac- 
rifices. While he is so unselfish as will- 
ingly to yield up the benefit for which he has 
labored, he is so selfish as willingly to let 
others yield up to him the benefits they have 
labored for. To make pure altruism possible 
for all, each must beat once extremely un- 
cgoistie and extremely egoistic. As a giver, 
he must have no thought for self ; as a re- 
ceiver, no thought for others. Evidently, 
this implies an inconceivable mental consti- 
tution. The sympathy which is so solicitous 
for others a3 willingly to injure self in bene- 
fiting them cannot at the same time be so 
regardless of others as to accept benefits 
which they injure themselves in giving. 

The incongruities that emerge if we assume 
pure altruism to be universally practised 
may be otherwise exhibited thus. Suppose 
that each, instead of enjoying such pleasures 
as come to him, or such consumable appli- 
ances to pleasure as he has worked for, or 
such occasions for pleasure as reward his 
efforts, relinquishes these to a single other, 
or adds them to a common stock from which 
others benefit ; what will result ? Different 
answers may be given according as we as- 
sume that there are or are not additional in- 
fluences brought into play. Suppose there 
are no additional influences. Then, if each 
transfers to another his happiness, or means 
to happiness, or occasions for happiness, 
while some one else does the like to him, the 
distribution of happiness is, on the average, 
unchanged ; or if each adds to a common 
stock his happiness, or means to happiness, 
or occasions for happiness, from which com- 
mon stock each appropriates his portion, the 
average state is still, as before, unchanged. 
The only obvious effect is that transactions 
must be gone through in the redistribution, 
and loss of time and labor must result. Xow 
suppose some additional influence which 
makes the process beneficial ; what must i* 



be ? The totality can be increased only if 
the acts of transfer increase the quantity of 
that which is transferred. The happiness 
or that which brings it must be greater to 
one who derives it from another's efforts 
than it would have been had his own efforts 
procured it ; or otherwise, supposing a fund 
of happiness, or of that which brings it, has 
been formed by contributions from each, 
then each, in appropriating his share, must 
find it larger than it would have been had no 
such aggregation and dispersion taken place. 
To justify belief in such increase two conceiv- 
able assumptions may be made. One is that 
though the sum of pleasures or of pleasure- 
yielding things remains the same, yet the 
kind of pleasure or of pleasure-yieMing 
things which each receives in exchange from 
another, or from the aggregate of others, is 
one which he appreciates more than that for 
which he labored. But to assume this is to 
assume that each labors directly for the thing 
which he enjoys less, rather than for the thing 
which he enjoys more, which is absurd. The 
other assumption is that while the exchanged 
or redistributed pleasure of the egoistic kind 
remains the same in amount for each, there 
is added to it the altruistic pleasure accom- 
panying the exchange. But this assumption 
is clearly inadmissible if, as is implied, the 
transaction is universal — is one through 
which each becomes giver and receiver to 
equal extents. For if the transfer of pleas- 
ures or of pleasure-yielding things from one 
to another or others is always accom- 
panied by the consciousness that there will 
be received from him or them an equivalent, 
there results merely a tacit exchange, either 
direct or roundabout. Each becomes altru- 
istic in no greater degree than is implied by 
being equitable, and each, having nothing to 
exalt his happiness, sympathetically or other- 
wise, cannot be a source of sympathetic 
happiness to others. 

§ 90. Thus, when the meanings of its 
words are inquired into, or when the neces- 
sary implications of its theory are examined, 
pure altruism, in whatever form expressed, 
commits its adherents to various absurdi- 
ties. 

If " the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number," or, in other words, "the general 
happiness," is the proper end of action, then 
not only for all public action but for all 
private action it must be the end, because, 
otherwise, the greater part of action remains 
, unguided. Consider its fitness for each. If 
corporate action is to be guided by the prin- 
ciple, with its interpreting comment, 
" everybody to count for one, nobody for 
more than one," there must bean ignoring 
of all differences of character and conduct, 
merits and demerits, among citizens, since 
no discrimination is provided for ; and, more- 
over, since that in respect of which all are to 
count alike cannot be happiness itself, which 
is indistnbutable, and since equal sharing of 
the concrete means to happiness, besides fail- 
ing ultimately would fail proximately to pro- 
duce the greatest happiness, it results that 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



551 



equal distribution of the conditions under 
which happiness may be pursued is the only 
tenable meaning : we discover in the prin- 
ciple nothing but a roundabout insistance on 
equity. If, taking happiness at large as the 
aim of private action, the individual is re- 
quired to judge between his own happiness 
and that of others as an impartial spectator 
would do, we see that no supposition con- 
cerning the spectator save one which suici- 
dally ascribes partiality to him can bring out 
any other result than that each shall enjoy 
such happiness, or appropriate such means to 
happiness, as his own efforts gain : equity is 
again the Sole content. When, adopting 
another method, we consider how the great- 
est sum of happiness may be composed, and, 
recognizing the fact that equitable egoism 
will produce a certain sum, ask how pure 
altruism is to produce a greater sum, we are 
shown that if all, exclusively pursuing altru- 
istic pleasures, are so to produce a greater 
sum of pleasures, the implication is that al- 
truistic pleasures, which arise from sym- 
pathy, can exist in the absence of egoistic 
pleasures with which there may be sympathy 
— an impossibility ; and another implication 
is that if, the necessity for egoistic pleasures 
being admitted, it is said that the greatest sum 
of happiness will be attained if all individu- 
als are more altruistic than egoistic, it is in- 
directly said that, as a general truth, repre- 
sentative feelings are stronger than presenta- 
tive feelings — another impossibility. Again, 
the doctrine of pure altruism assumes that 
happiness may be to any extent transferred or 
redistributed ; whereas the fact is that pleas- 
ures of one order cannot be transferred in 
large measure without results which are fatal 
or extremely injurious, and that pleasures 
of another order cannot be transferred in any 
degree. Further, pure altruism presents this 
fatal anomaly, that while a right principle 
of action must be more and more practised 
as men improve, the altruistic principle be- 
comes less and less practicable as men ap- 
proach an ideal form, because the sphere for 
practising it continually decreases. Finally, 
its self-destructiveness is made manifest on 
observing that for all to adopt it as a prin- 
ciple of action, which they must do if it is a 
sound principle, implies that all are at once 
extremely unegoistic and extremely egoistic 
— ready to injure self for others' benefit, and 
ready to accept benefit at the cost of injury 
to others : traits which cannot co-exist. 

The need for a compromise between egoism 
and altruism is thus made conspicuous. We 
are forced to recoguize the claims which his 
own well-being has on the attention of each 
by noting how in some directions we come 
to a deadlock, in others to contradictions, and 
in others to disastrous results, if they are 
ignored. Conversely, it is undeniable that 
disregard of others by each carried to a great 
extent is fatal to society, and carried to a still 
greater extent is fatal to the family, and 
eventually to the race. Egoism and altruism 
are therefore co-essential. 

§ 91. What form is the compromise be- 



tween egoism and altruism to assume ? how 
are their respective claims to be satisfied in 
due degrees '? 

It is a truth insisted on by moralists and 
recognized in common life, that the achieve- 
ment of individual happiness is not propor- 
tionate to the degree in which individual 
happiness is made the object of direct pur- 
suit ; but there has not yet become current 
the belief that, in like manner, the achieve- 
ment of general happiness is not proportion- 
ate to the degree in which general happiness 
is made the object of direct pursuit. Yet 
failure of direct pursuit in the last case is 
more reasonably to be expected than in the 
first. 

When discussing the relations of means 
and ends, we saw that as individual conduct 
evolves its principle becomes more and more 
that of making fulfilment of means the prox- 
imate end, and leaving the ultimate end, wel- 
fare or happiness, to come as a result. And 
we saw that when general welfare or happi- 
ness is the ultimate end, the same principle 
holds even more rigorously, since the ulti- 
ms te end under its impersonal form is less 
de- erminate than under its personal form, and 
the difficulties in the way of achieving it by 
direct pursuit still greater. Eecognizing, then, 
the fact that corporate happiness still more 
than individual happiness must be pursued 
not directly but indirectly, the first question 
for us is, What must be the general nature 
of the means through which it is to be 
achieved ? 

It is admitted that self -happiness is, in a 
measure, to be obtained by furthering the 
kappiness of others. May it not be true that, 
conversely, general happiness is to be ob- 
tained by furthering self -happiness 1 If the 
well-being of each unit is to be reached partly 
through his care for the well-being of the ag- 
gregate, is not the well-being of the aggregate 
to be reached partly through the care of each 
unit for himself ? Clearly, our conclusion 
must be that general happiness is to be 
achieved mainly through the adequate pur- 
suit of their own happinesses by individuals, 
while, reciprocally, the happinesses of indi- 
viduals are to be achieved in part by their 
pursuit of the general happiness. 

And this is the conclusion embodied in the 
progressing ideas and usages of mankind. 
This compromise between egoism and altru- 
ism has been slowly establishing itself ; and 
toward recognition of its propriety, men's 
actual beliefs, as distinguished from their 
nominal beliefs, have been gradually ap- 
proaching. Social evolution has been bring- 
ing about a state in which the claims of the 
individual to the proceeds of his activities, 
and to such satisfactions as they bring, are 
more and more positively asserted, at the 
same time that insistence on others' claims 
and habitual respect for them have been in- 
creasing. Among the rudest savages personal 
interests are very vaguely distinguished from 
the interests of others. In early stages of 
civilization, the proportioning of benefits to 
efforts is extremely rude : slaves and serfs 



552 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



get for work arbitrary amounts of food and 
shelter : exchange being infrequent, there is 
little to develop the idea of equivalence. But 
as civilization advances and status passes into 
contract, there comes daily experience of the 
relation between advantages enjoyed and 
labor given— the industrial system maintain- 
ing, through supply and demand, a due ad- 
justment of the one to the other. And this 
growth of voluntary co-operation — this ex- 
change of services under agreement has been 
necessarily accompanied by decrease of ag- 
gressions one upon another, and increase of 
sympathy, leading to exchange of services 
beyond agreement. That is to say, the more 
distinct assertions of individual claims and 
more rigorous apportioning of personal en- 
joyments to efforts expended have gone hand 
in hand with growth of that negative altruism 
sho wn in equitable conduct and that positive 
altruism shown in gratuitous aid. 

A higher phase of this double change has 
in our own times become conspicuous. If, 
on the one hand, we note the struggles for 
political freedom, the contests between labor 
and capital, the judicial reforms made to 
facilitate enforcement of rights, we see that 
the tendency still is toward complete appro- 
priation by each of whatever benefits are due 
to him, and consequent exclusion of his fel- 
lows from such benefits. On the other hand, 
if we consider what is meant by the surrender 
of power to the masses, the abolition of class- 
privileges, the efforts to diffuse knowledge, 
the agitations to spread temperance, the 
multitudinous philanthropic societies, it be- 
comes clear that regard for the 'well-being of 
others is increasing pari passu with the tak- 
ing of means to secure personal well-being. 

What holds of the relations within each 
society holds to some extent, if to a less ex- 
tent, of the relations between societies. 
Though to maintain national claims, real or 
imaginary, often of a trivial kind, the civil- 
ized still make war on one another, yet their 
several nationalities are more respected than 
in past age3. Though by victors portions of 
territory are taken and money compensations 
exacted, yet conquest is not now, as of old, 
habitually followed by entire appropriation 
of territories and enslavement of peoples. 
The individualities of societies are in a larger 
measure preserved. Meanwhile the altruistic 
intercourse is greater : aid is rendered on 
occasions of disaster by flood, by fire, by 
famine, or otherwise. And in international 
arbitration as lately exemplified, implying the 
recognition of claims by one nation upon 
another, we see a further progress in this 
wider altruism. Doubtless there is much to 
be said by way of set-oft' ; for in the dealings 
of the civilized with the uncivilized, little of 
this progress can be traced. It may be urged 
that the primitive rule, " Life for life," has 
been developed by us into the rule, " For 
one life many lives," as in the cases of Bishop 
Patteson and Mr. Birch ; but then there is 
the qualifying fact that we do not torture 
our prisoners or mutilate them. If it be 
said that as the Hebrews thought themselves 



warranted in seizing the lands God promised 
to them, and in some cases exterminating the 
inhabitants, so we, to fulfil the " manifest 
intention of Providence," dispossess inferior 
races whenever we want their territories, it 
may be replied that we do not kill many 
more than seems needful, and tolerate the 
existence of those who submit. And should 
any one point out that as Attila, while con- 
quering or destroying peoples and nations, 
regarded himself as " the scourge of God," 
punishing men for their sins, so we, as repre- 
sented by a High Commissioner and a priest 
he quotes, think ourselves called on to chas- 
tise with rifles and cannon heathens who 
practise polygamy, there is the rejoinder 
that not even the most ferocious disciple of 
the teacher of mercy would carry his ven- 
geance so far a3 to depopulate whole terri- 
tories and erase scores of cities. And when, 
on the other hand, we remember that there 
is an Aborigines Protection Society, that 
there are commissioners in certain colonies 
appointed to protect native inter ests, and that 
in some cases the lands of natives have been 
purchased in ways which, however unfair, 
have implied some recognition of their claims, 
we may say that little as the compromise be- 
tween egoism and altruism has progressed in 
international affairs, it has still progressed 
somewhat in the direction indicated. 

CHAPTER XIV. 

CONCILIATION. 

§ 92. As exhibited in the last chapter, tho 
compromise between the claims of self and 
the claims of others seems to imply perma- 
nent antagonism between the two. The pur- 
suit by each of his own happiness, while pay- 
ing due regard to the happiness, of his fel- 
lows, apparently necessitates the ever-recur- 
ring question, how far must the one end be 
sought and how far the other— suggesting, if 
not discord in the life of each, stiD an absence 
of complete harmony. This is not the inevi- 
table inference however. 

When, in the " Principles of Sociology," 
Part III., the phenomena of race-maintenance 
among living things at large were discussed, 
that the development of the domestic rela- 
tions might be the better understood, it was 
shown that duriug evolution there has been 
going on a conciliation between the interests 
of the species, the interests of the parents, 
and the interests of the offspring. Proof 
was given that as we ascend from the lowest 
forms of life to the highest, race-maintenance 
is achieved with a decreasing sacrifice of life, 
alike of young individuals and of adult in- 
dividuals, and also with a decreasing sacri- 
fice of parental lives to the lives of offspring. 
We saw that, with the progress of civiliza- 
tion, like changes go on among human 
beings, and that the highest domestic rela- 
tions are those in which the conciliation of 
welfares within the family becomes greatest, 
while the welfare of the society is best sub- 
served. Here it remains to be shown that a 
kindred conciliation has been, and is, taking 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



553 



place between the interests of each citizen 
and the interests of citizens at large, tending 
ever toward a state in which the two be- 
come merged in one, and in which the feel- 
ings answering to them respectively fall into 
complete concord. 

In the family group, even as we observe it 
among many inferior vertebrates,. we see that 
the parental sacrifice, now become so moder- 
ate in amount as to consist with long-con- 
tinued parental life, is not accompanied by 
consciousness of sacrifice, but, contrariwise, 
is made from a direct desire to make it : the 
altruistic labors on behalf of young are car- 
ried on in satisfaction of parental instincts. 
If we trace these relations up through the 
grades of mankind, and observe how largely 
love rather than obligation prompts the care 
of children, we see the conciliation of inter- 
ests to be such that achievement of parental 
happiness coincides with securing the happi- 
ness of offspring — the wish for children 
among the childless and the occasional adop- 
tion of children showing how needful for 
attainment of certain egoistic satisfactions are 
these altruistic activities. And further evo- 
lution, causing along with higher nature 
diminished fertility, and therefore smaller 
burdens on parents, may be expected to 
bring a state in which, far more than now, 
the pleasures of adult life will consist in rais- 
ing offspring to perfection while simultane- 
ously furthering the immediate happiness of 
offspring. 

Now though altruism of a social kind, 
lacking certain elements of parental al- 
truism, can never attain the same level, yet 
it may be expected to attain a level at which 
it will be like parental altruism in spontane- 
ity — a level such that ministration to others' 
happiness will become a daily need — a level 
such that the lower egoistic satisfactions will 
be continually subordinated to this higher 
egoistic satisfaction, not by any effort tosub 1 - 
ordinate them, but by the preference for this 
higher egoistic satisfaction whenever it can 
be obtained. 

Let us consider how the development of 
sympathy, which must advance as fast as 
conditions permit, will bring about this state. 

§ 93. "We have seen that during the evolu- 
tion of life, pleasures and pains have neces- 
sarily been the incentives to and deterrents 
from actions which the conditions of exist- 
ence demanded and negatived. An implied 
truth to be here noted is, that faculties which, 
under given conditions, yield partly pain 
and partly pleasure cannot develop beyond 
the limit at which they yield a surplus of 
pleasure ; if beyond that limit more pain 
than pleasure results from exercise of them, 
their growth must be arrested. 

Through sympathy both these forms of 
feeling are excited. Now a pleasurable con- 
sciousness is aroused on witnessing pleasure ; 
uow a painful consciousness is aroused on 
"witnessing pain. Hence, if beings around 
him habitually manifest pleasure and but 
rarely pain, sympathy yields to its possessor 
a surplus of pleasure ; while, contrariwise, if 



little pleasure is ordinarily witnessed and 
much pain, sympathy yields a surplus of 
pain to its possessor, The average develop- 
ment of sympathy must, therefore, be regu- 
lated by the average manifestations of pleas- 
ure and pain in others. If the life usually 
led under given social conditions is such that 
suffering is daily inflicted, or is daily dis- 
played by associates, sympathy cannot grow : 
to assume growth of it is to assume that the 
constitution will modify itself in such way 
as to increase its pains and therefore depress 
its energies, and is to ignore the truth that 
bearing any kind of pain gradually produces 
insensibility to that pain, or callousness. On 
the other hand, if the social state is such that 
manifestations of pleasure predominate, sym- 
pathy will increase, since sympathetic pleas- 
ures, adding to the totality of pleasures en- 
hancing vitality, conduce to the physical 
prosperity of the most sympathetic, and since 
the pleasures of sympathy exceeding its pains 
in all lead to an exercise of it which 
strengthens it. 

The first implication is one already more 
than once indicated. We have seen that 
along with habitual militancy and under the 
adapted type of social organization, sympathy 
cannot develop to any considerable height. 
The destructive activities carried on against 
external enemies sear it ; the state of feeling 
maintained causes within the society itself 
frequent acts of aggression or cruelty ; and 
further, the compulsory co-operation charac- 
terizing the militant regime necessarily re- 
presses sympathy — exists only on condition 
of an unsympathetic treatment of some by 
others. 

But even could the militant regime forthwith 
end, the hinderances to development of sym- 
pathy would still be great. Though cessation 
of war would imply increased adaptation of 
man to social life and decrease of sundry 
evils, yet there would remain much non- 
adaptation and much consequent unhappi- 
ness. In the first place, that form of nature 
which has generated and still generates wars, 
though by implication raised to a higher 
form, would not at once be raised to so high 
a form that there would cease all injustices 
and the pains they cause. For a considerable 
period after predatory activities had ended, 
the defects of the predatory nature would 
continue, entailing their slowly diminishing 
evils. In the second place, the ill-adjust- 
ment of the human constitution to the pur- 
suits of industrial life must long persist, and 
may be expected to survive in a measure the 
cessation of wars : the required modes of ac- 
tivity must remain for innumerable genera- 
tions in some degree displeasurable. Acd in 
the third place, deficiencies of self-control 
such as the improvident show us, as well as 
those many failures of conduct due to inade- 
quate foresight of consequences, though less 
marked than now, could not fail still to pro- 
duce suffering. 

Nor would even complete adaptation, if 
limited to disappearance of the non-adapta- 
tions just indicated, remove all sources of 



554 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



those miseries which, to the extent of their 
manifestation, check the growth of sym- 
pathy. For while the rate of multiplication 
continues so to exceed the rate of mortality as 
to cause pressure on the means of subsistence, 
there must continue to result much happi- 
ness, either from balked affections or from 
overwork and stinted means. Only as fast 
as fertility diminishes, which we have seen it 
must do along with further mental develop- 
ment (" Principles of Biology," §§ 367-377), 
can there go on such diminution of the labors 
required for efficiently supporting self and 
family that they will not constitute a dis- 
pleasurable tax on the energies. 

Gradually then, and only gradually, as 
these various causes of unhappiness become 
less can sympathy become greater. Life 
would be intolerable if, while the causes of 
misery remained as they now are, all men 
were not only in a high degree sensitive to 
the pains, bodily and mental, felt by those 
around and expressed in the faces of those 
they met, but were unceasingly conscious of 
the miseries everywhere being suffered as con- 
sequences of war, crime, misconduct, mis- 
fortune, improvidence, incapacity. But as 
the moulding and remoulding of man and 
society into mutual fitness progresses, and as 
the pains caused by unfitness decrease, sym- 
pathy can increase in presence of the pleas- 
ures that come from fitness. The two 
changes are indeed so related that each fur- 
thers the other. Such growth of sympathy 
as conditions permit, itself aids in lessening 
pain and augmenting pleasure, and the 
greater surplus of pleasure that results makes 
possible further growth of sympathy. 

§ 94. The extent to which sympathy may 
develop when the hinderances are removed 
will be better conceived after observing the 
agencies through which it is excited, and set- 
ting down the reasons for expecting those 
agencies to become more efficient. Two fac- 
tors have to be considered — the natural lan- 
guage of feeling in the being sympathized with 
and the power of interpreting that language 
in the being who sympathizes. We may an- 
ticipate development of both. 

Movements of the body and facial changes 
are visible effects of feeling which, when the 
feeling is strong, are uncontrollable. When 
the feeliDg is less strong, however, be it sen- 
sational or emotional, they may be wholly or 
partially repressed ; and there is a habit, 
more or less constant, of repressing them, 
this habit being the concomitant of a nature 
such that it is often undesirable that others 
should see what is felt. So necessary with 
our existing characters and conditions are 
concealments thus prompted, that they have 
come to form a part of moral duty ; and 
concealment for its own sake is often insisted 
upon as an element in good manners. All 
this is caused by the prevalence of feel- 
ings at variance with social good — feelings 
which cannot be shown without producing 
discords or estrangements. But in propor- 
tion as the egoistic desires fall more under 
control of the altruistic, and there come 



fewer and slighter impulses of a kind to be 
reprobated, the need for keeping guard over 
facial expression and bodily movement will 
decrease, and these will with increasing clear- 
ness convey to spectators the mental state. 
Nor is this all. Restrained as its use is, tins- 
language of the emotions is at present pre- 
vented from growing. But as fast as thtf 
emotions become such that they may be more- 
candidly displayed, there will go, along wife, 
the habit of display, development of the means 
of display ; so that besides the stronger 
emotions, the more delicate shades and 
smaller degrees of emotion will visibly ex. 
hibit themselves, the emotional language 
will become at once more copious, more 
varied, more definite. And obviously sym- 
pathy will be proportionately facilitated. 

, An equally important, if not a more im- 
portant, advance of kindred nature is to 
be anticipated. The vocal signs of sentient 
states will simultaneously evolve further. 
Loudness of tone, pitch of tone, quality of 
tone, and change of tone are severally marks 
of feeling, and, combined ia different ways 
and proportions, serve to express different 
amounts and kinds of feelings. As else- 
where pointed out, cadences are the com- 
ments of the emotions on the propositions of 
the intellect. Not in excited speech only, 
but in ordinary speech, we show by ascend- 
ing and descending intervals, by degrees of 
deviation from the medium tone, as well as 
_by place and strength of emphasis, the kind 
'of sentiency which accompanies the thought 
expressed. Now the manifestation of feeling 
by cadence, like its manifestation by visible 
changes, is at present under restraint : the 
motives for repression act in the one case as 
they act in the other. A double effect is 
produced. This audible language of feeling 
is not used up to the limit of its existing 
capacity, and it is to a considerable degree 
misused, so as to convey other feelings than 
those which are felt. The result of this dis- 
nse and misuse is to check that evolution 
which normal use would cause. We must 
infer, then, that as moral adaptation pro- 
gresses, and there is decreasing need for con- 
cealment of the feelings, their vocal signs 
will develop much further. Though it is not 
to be supposed that cadences will ever con- 
vey emotions as exactly as words convey 
thoughts, yet it is quite possible that the 
emotional language of the future may rise 
as much above our present emotional lan- 
guage as our intellectual language has already 
risen above the intellectual language of the 
lowest races. 

A simultaneous increase in the power of 
interpreting both visible and audible signs of 
feeling must be taken into account. Among 
those around M r e see differences both of abil- 
ity to perceive such signs and of ability to 
conceive the implied mental states and their 
causes ; here a stolidity unimpressed by a 
slight facial change or altered tone of voice, 
or else unable to imagine what is felt, and 
there a quick observation and a penetrating 
intuition, making instantly comprehensible 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



555 



the state of mind and its origin. If wo sup- 
pose both these faculties exalted — both a 
more delicate perception of the signs and a 
strengthened constructive imagination — we 
shall get some idea of the deeper and wider 
sympathy that will hereafter arise. More 
vivid representations of the feelings of others, 
implying ideal excitements of feelings ap- 
proaching to real excitements, must imply a 
greater likeness between the feelings of the 
sympathizer and those of the sympathized 
with — coming near to identity. _ 

By simultaneous increase of its subjective 
and objective factors, sympathy may thus, as 
the hinderances diminish, rise above that 
now shown by the sympathetic as much as in 
them it has risen above that which the cal- 
lous show. 

§ 95. What must be the accompanying 
evolution of conduct? What must the rela- 
tions between egoism and altruism become as 
this form of nature is neared ? 

A conclusion drawn in the chapter on the 
relativity of pleasures and pains, and there 
emphasized as one to be borne in mind, must 
now be recalled. It was pointed out that, 
iupposing them to be consistent with con- 
tinuance of life, there are no activities which 
may not become sources of pleasure, if sur- 
rounding conditions require persistence in 
them. And here it is to be added, as a cor- 
ollary, that if the conditions require any class 
uf activities to be relatively great, there will 
arise a relatively great pleasure accompanying 
that class of activities. What bearing have 
these general inferences on the special ques- 
tion before us ? 

That alike for public welfare and private 
welfare sympathy is essential, we have seen. 
We have seen that co-operation and the bene- 
fits which it brings to each and all become 
high in proportion as the altrustic, that is the 
sympathetic, interests extend. The actions 
prompted by fellow-feeling are thus to be 
counted among those demanded by social 
conditions. They are actions which mainten- 
ance and further development of social or- 
ganization tend ever to increase, and there- 
fore actions with which there will be joined 
an increasing pleasure. From the laws of 
life it must be concluded that unceasing 
social discipline will so mould human nature 
that eventually sympathetic pleasures will be 
spontaneously pursued to the fullest extent 
advantageous to each and all. The scope 
for altruistic activities will not exceed the 
desire for altruistic satisfactions. 

In natures thus constituted, though the 
altruistic gratifications must remain in a 
transfigured sense egoistic, yet they will not 
be egoistically pursued — will not be pursued 
from egoistic motives. Though pleasure 
will be gained by giving pleasure, yet the 
thought of the sympathetic pleasure to be 
gained will not occupy consciousness, but 
only the thought of the pleasure given. To 
a great extent this is so now. In the truly 
sympathetic, attention is so absorbed with 
the proximate end, others' happiness, that 
there is none given to tho prospective self- 



happinesB which may ultimately result. An 
analogy will make the relation clear. 

A miser accumulates money, not delib- 
erately saying to himself, " I shall by doing 
this set the delight which possession gives." 
He thinks only of the money and the means 
of getting it, and he experiences incident- 
ally the pleasure that comes from possession. 
Owning property is that which he revels in 
imagining, and not the feeling which own- 
ing property will cause. Similarly, one who 
is sympathetic in the highest sense is mental- 
ly engaged solely in representing pleasure as 
experienced by another, and pursues it for 
the benefit of that other, forgetting any par- 
ticipation he will have in it. Subjectively 
considered, then, the conciliation of egoism 
and altruism will eventually become such 
that though the altruistic pleasure, as being 
a part of the consciousness of one who ex- 
periences it, can never be other than egois- 
tic, it will not be consciously egoistic. 

Let us now ask what must happen in a 
society composed of persons constituted in 
this manner. 

§ 96. The opportunities for that postpone- 
ment of self to others which constitutes altru- 
ism as ordinarily conceived must, iu several 
ways, be more and more limited as the high- 
est state is approached. 

Extensive demands on the benevolent pre- 
suppose much unhappiness. Before there 
can be many and large calls on some for 
efforts on behalf of others, there must be 
many others in conditions needing help — in 
conditions of comparative misery. But, as 
we have seen above, the development of fel- 
low-feeling can go on only as fast as misery 
decreases. Sympathy can reach its full 
height only when there have ceased to be 
frequent occasions for anything like serious 
self-sacrifice. 

Change the point of view, and this truth 
presents itself under another aspect. We 
have already seen that with the progress of 
adaptation each becomes so constituted that 
he cannot be helped without in some way 
arresting a pleasurable activity. There can- 
not be a beneficial interference between fac- 
ulty and function when the two are adjust- 
ed. Consequently, iu proportion as man- 
kind approach complete adjustment of their 
natures to social needs, there must be fewer 
and smaller opportunities for giving aid. 

Yet again, as was pointed out in the last 
chapter, the sympathy which prompts 
efforts for others' welfare must be pained by 
self-injury on the part of others, and must, 
therefore, cause aversion to accept benefits 
derived from their self- injuries. What is to 
be inferred? While each when occasion 
offers is ready, anxious even, to surrender 
egoistic satisfactions, others, similarly 
natured, cannot but resist the surrender. If 
any one, proposing to treat himself more 
hardly than a disinterested spectator would 
direct, refrains from appropriating that 
which is due, others, caring for him if he will 
not caie for himself, must necessarily insist 
that he shall appropriate it. General altru- 



556 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



5sm then, in its developed form, must inev- 
itably resist individual excesses of altruism. 
The relation at present familiar to us will be 
inverted, and instead of each maintaining 
his own claims, others will maintain his 
claims for him — not, indeed, by active 
efforts, which will be needless, but by pas- 
sively resisting any undue yielding up of 
them. There is nothing in such behavior 
which is not even now to be traced in our 
daily experiences as beginning. In business 
transactions among honorable men, there is 
usually a desire on either side that the other 
shall treat himself fairly. Not unfrequently 
there is a refusal to take something regarded 
as the other's due. but which the other offers 
to give up. In social intercourse, too, the 
cases are common in which those who would 
surrender their shares of pleasure are not 
permitted by the rest to do so. Further de- 
velopment of sympathy cannot but make this 
mode of behaving increasingly general and 
increasingly genuine. 

Certain complex restraints on excesses of 
altruism exist, which, in another way, force 
back the individual upon a normal egoism. 
Two may here be noted. In the first place, 
self-abnegations often repeated imply on the 
part of the actor a tacit ascription of relative 
selfishness to others who profit by the self- 
abnegations. Even with men as they are 
there occasionally arises a feeling among' 
those for whom sacrifices are frequently 
made that they are being insulted by the 
assumption that they are ready to receive 
them ; and in the mind of the actor also 
there sometimes grows up a recognition of 
this feeling on their part, and a consequent 
check on his too great or too frequent sur- 
renders of pleasure. Obviously in more de- 
veloped natures this kind of check must act 
still more promptly. In the second place, 
when, as the hypothesis implies, altruistic 
pleasures have reached a greater intensity 
than they now possess, each person will be de- 
barred from undue pursuit of them by the 
consciousness that other persons, too, desire 
them, and that scope for others' enjoyment 
of them must be left. Even now may be 
observed among groups of friends, where 
some competition in amiability is going on, 
relinquishments of opportunities for self- 
abnegation that others may have them, 
" Let her give up the gratification, she will 
like to do so;" " Let him undertake the 
trouble, it will please him," are suggestions 
which from time to time illustrate this con- 
sciousness. The most developed sympathy 
will care for the sympathetic satisfactions of 
others as well as for their selfish satisfac- 
tions. What may be called a higher equity 
will refrain from trespassing on the spheres 
of others' altruistic activities, as a lower 
equity refrains from trespassing on the 
spheres of their egoistic activities. And by 
this checking of what may be called an egois- 
tic altruism, undue sacrifices on the part of 
each must be prevented. 

What spheres, then, will eventually remain 
for altruism as it is commonly conceived? 



There are three. One of them must to the 

last continue large in extent, and the others 
must progressively diminish, though they do 
not disappear. The first is that which 
family life affords. Always there must be a 
need for subordination of self-regarding feel- 
ings to other-regarding feelings in the rear- 
ing of children. Though this will diminish 
with diminution in the number to be reared, 
yet it will increase with the greater elabora- 
tion and prolongation of the activities on 
their behalf. But as shown above, there is 
even now partially effected a conciliation 
such that those egoistic satisfactions which 
parenthood yields are achieved through 
altruistic activities — a conciliation tending 
ever toward completeness. An important 
development of family altruism must be. 
added: the reciprocal care of parents by 
children during old age — a care becoming 
lighter and better fulfilled in which a kin- 
dred conciliation may be looked for. Pursuit 
of social welfare at large must afford here- 
after, as it does now, scope for the postpone- 
ment of selfish interests to unselfish interests, 
but a continually lessening scope, because 
as adaptation to the social state progresses 
the needs for those regulative actions by 
which social life is made harmonious become 
less. And here the amount of altruistic ac- 
tion which each undertakes must inevitably 
be kept within moderate bounds by others, 
for if they are similarly altruistic they will 
not allow some to pursue public ends to their 
own considerable detriment that the rest may 
profit. In the private relations of men, op- 
portunities for self-sacrifice prompted by 
sympathy must ever in some degree, though 
eventually in a small degree, be afforded by 
accidents, diseases, and misfortunes in gen- 
eral, since, however near to completeness the 
adaptation of human nature to the conditions 
of existence at large, physical and social, 
may become, it can never reach complete- 
ness. Flood, fire, and wreck must to the 
last yield at intervals opportunities for 
heroic acts ; and in the motives to such acts, 
anxiety for others will be less allowed with 
love of admiration than now. Extreme, 
however, as may be the eagerness for altru- 
istic action on the rare occasions hence aris- 
ing, the amount falling to the share of each 
must, for the reasons given, be narrowly 
limited. But though in the incidents of 
ordinary life, postponements of self to others 
in large ways must become very infrequent, 
daily intercourse will still furnish multitudi- 
nous small occasions for the activity of fellow- 
feeling. Always each may continue to fur- 
ther the welfare of others by warding off 
from them evils they cannot see, and by aid- 
ing their actious in ways unknown to them ; 
or, conversely putting it, each may have, as 
it were, supplementary eyes and ears in other 
persons, which perceive for him things he 
cannot perceive himself — so perfecting his 
life in numerous details by making its adjust- 
ments to environing actions complete. 

§ 97. Must it then follow that eventually, 
with this diminution of the spheres for it, 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



657 



altruism must diminish in total amount ? By first reaching a compromise such that eacl< 
no means. Such a conclusion implies a mis- claims no more than his equitalile share 
conception. afterward rises to a conciliation such thai) 

Naturally, under existing conditions, with each insists on the taking of equitable share* 
suffering widely diffused and so much of by others ; so, at the latest etage, altruistic 
effort demanded from the more fortunate in competition, first reaching a compromise un 
succoring the less fortunate, altruism is un- Jder which each restrains himself from tak- 
derstood to mean only self-sacrifice, or, at J vng an undue share of altruistic satisfactions, 
any rate, a mode of action which, while it ^ eventually rises to a conciliation under 
brings some pleasure, has an accompaniment which each takes cure, that others shall haw 
of 6elf-surrender that is not pleasurable, their opportunities for altruistic satisfac- 
But the sympathy which prompts denial of tions — the highest altruism being that whicL 
self to please others is a sympathy which also ministers not to the egoistic satisfactions of 
receives pleasure from their pleasures when others only, but also to their altruistic satfc- 
they are otherwise originated. The stronger factions. 

the* fellow-feeling which excites efforts to Far off as seems such a state, yet every 
make others happy, the stronger is the fellow- one of the factors counted on to produce it 
feeling with their happiness, however caused, may already be traced in operation among 
In its ultimate foiru, then, altruism will be those of highest natures. What now iu 
the achievement of gratification through them is occasional and feeble, may be expect- 
sympathy with those gratifications of others ed with further evolution to become habitual 
which are mainly produced by their activi- and strong j and what now characterizes the 
ties of all kinds successfully carried on— exceptionally high may be expected event- 
sympathetic gratification which costs the re- ually to characterize all. For that which, 
ceiver nothing, but is a gratis addition to his the best human nature is capable of is with- 
egoistic gratifications. This power of repre- in the reach of human nature at large. 
6enting in idea the mental states of others, § 98. That these conclusions will meet 
which, during the process of adaptation has with any considerable acceptance is improb- 
had the function of mitigating suffering, able. Neither with current ideas nor with 
must, as the sufferiug falls to a minimum, current sentiments are they sufficiently con- 
come to have almost wholly the function of gruous. 

mutually exalting men's enjoyments by giv- Such a view will not be agreeable to those 
ing every one a vivid intuition of his neigh- who h.ment the spreading disbelief in eternal 
bor's enjoyments. While pain prevails damnation ; nor to those who follow the 
widely, it is undesirable that each should apostle of brute force in thinking that be : 
participate much in the consciousness of cause the rule of the strong hand was once 
others ; but with an increasing predominance good it is good for all time; nor to those 
of pleasure, participation in others' conscious- whose reverence for One who told them to put 
ntsses becomes a gain of pleasure to all. up the sword is shown by using the sword 
And so there will disappear that appar- to spread his doctrine among heathens. The 
ently permanent opposition between egoism conception set forth would be received with 
aud altruism, implied by the compromise contempt by that Fifeshire regiment of 
reached iu the last chapter. Subjectively militia, of whom eight hundred, at the time 
looked at, the conciliation will be such that of the Franco-German war, asked to be em- 
the individual will not have to balance be- ployed on foreign service, and left the gov- 
tween self -regarding impulses and other-re- ernment to say on which side they should 
gardiug impulses ; but, instead, those satis- fight. From the ten thousand priests of the 
factions of other-regarding impulses which religion of love, who are silent when the 
involve self-sacrifice, becomiug rare and nation is moved by the religion of hate, will 
much prized, will be so unhesitatingly pre- come no sign of assent, nor from their 
ferred that the competition of self-regarding bishops who, far from urging the extreme 
impulses with them will scarcely be felt, precept of the Master they pretend to follow, 
And the subjective conciliation will also be to turn the other cheek when one is smitten, 
such that though altruistic pleasure will be vote for acting on the principle, strike lest ye 
attained, yet the motive of action will not be struck. Nor will any approval be felt by 
consciously be the attainment of altruistic legislators who, after praying to be forgiven 
pleasure, but the idea present will be the their trespasses as they forgive the trespasses 
securing of others' pleasures. Meanwhile of others, forthwith decide to attack those 
the conciliation objectively considered will be who have not trespassed against them, and 
equally complete. Though each, no longer who, after a queen's speech has invoked " the 
needing to maintain his egoistic claims v.ill blessing of Almighty God " on their councils, 
tend rather when occasion offers to surrender immediately provide means for committing 
them, yet others, similarly natured, will not political burglary. 

permit him in any large measure to dS this ; But though men who profess Christianity 
and that fulfilment of personal desired re- and practise Paganism can feel no sympathy 
quired for completion of his life will thus be with such a view, there are some, classed as 
secured to him : though not now egoistic in antagonists to the current creed, who may 
the ordinary sense, yet the effects of dua not think it absurd to believe that a ration- 
egoism will be achieved. Nor is this all, alized version of its ethical principles will 
£s, at an earlier stage, egoistic competition nventually be acted upon. 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



CHAPTER XV. 

ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE ETHICS. 

§ 99. As applid to Ethics, the word 
"absolute" will by many be supposed to 
imply principles of right conduct that exist 
out of relation to life as conditioned on the 
Earth — out of relation to time and place, 
and independent of the Universe as now 
visible to us — "eternal" principles as they 
are called. Those, however, who recall the 
doctrine set forth in "First Principles," will 
hesitate to put this interpretation on the 
word. Right, as we can think it, necessi- 
tates the thought of not right, or wrong, for 
its correlative; and hence, to ascribe Tight- 
ness to the acts of the Power manifested 
through phenomena, is to assume the possi- 
bility that wrong acts may be committed by 
this Power. But how come there to exist, 
apart from this Power, conditions of such 
kind that subordination of its acts to them 
makes them right and insubordination 
wrong. How can Unconditioned Being be 
subject to conditions beyond itself > 

If, for example, any one should assert that 
the Cause of Things, conceived in respect 
of fundamental moral attributes as like our- 
selves, did right in producing a universe 
which, in the course of immeasurable time, 
has given origin to beings capable of pleas 
ure, and would have done wrong in abstain- 
ing from the production of such a Universe; 
then, the comment to be made is that, im- 
posing the moral ideas generated in his finite 
consciousness, upon the infinite Existence 
which transcends consciousness, he goes 
behind that Infinite Existence and prescribes 
for i: principles of action. 

As implied in the foregoing chapters, 
right and wrong as conceived by us can exist 
only in relation to the actions of creatures 
capable of pleasures and pains; seeing that 
analysis carries us back to pleasures and 
pains as the element out of which the con- 
ceptions are framed. 

But if the word "absolute," as used 
above, does not refer to the Unconditioned 
Being — if the principles of action distin- 
guished as absolute and relative concern the 
conduct of conditioned beings ; in what way 
are the words to be understood ? An expla- 
nation of their meanings will be best con- 
veyed by a criticism on the current concep- 
tions of right and wrong. 

§ 100. Conversations about the affairs of 
life habitually imply the belief that every 
deed named may be placed under the one 
head or the other. In discussing a political 
question, both sides take it for granted that 
some line of action may be chosen which is 
right while all other lines of action are 
wrong. So, too, is it with judgments on 
the doings of individuals ; each of these is 
approved or disapproved on the assumption 
that it is definitely classable as good or bad. 
Even where qualifications are admitted, they 
are admitted with an implied idea that some 
such positive characterization is to be made. 

Nor is it in popular thought and speech 



only that we see this, If not wholly and 

definitely yet partially and by implication, 
the belief is expressed by moralists. In his 
" Methods of Ethics " (1 Ed. p. 6), Mr. Sidg- 
wick says: "That there is in any given cir- 
cumstances some one thing which ought to 
be done, and that this can be known, is a 
fundamental assumption, made, not by phi- 
losophers only, but by all men who perform 
any processes of moral reasoning. " In this 
sentence there is specifically asserted only the 
last of the above propositions — namely, that, 
in every case, what "ought to be done" "can 
be known." But though that "which ought 
to be done" is not distinctly identified with 
"the right," it may be inferred, in the 
absence of any indication to the contrary, 
that Mr. Sidgwick regards the two as iden- 
tical ; and, doubtless, in so conceiving the 
postulates of moral science, he is at one with 
most, if not all, who have made it a subject 
of study. At first sight, indeed, nothing 
seems more obvious than that if actions are 
to be judged at all, these postulates must be 
accepted. Nevertheless,- they may both be 
called in question, and, I think, it may be 
shown that neither of them is tenable. In- 
stead of admitting that there is in every case 
a right and a wrong, it may be contended 
that in multitudinous cases no right, properly 
so-called, can be alleged, but only a least 
wrong ; and further, it may be contended 
that in many of these case when there can 
be alleged only a least wrong, it is not possible 
to ascertain with any precision which is the 
least wrong. 

A great part of the perplexities in ethical 
speculation arise from neglect of this dis- 
tinction between right and least wrong — 
between the absolutely right and the rela- 
tively right. And many further perplexities 
are due to the assumption that it can, in 
some way, be decided in every case which 
of two courses is morally obligatory. 

§ 101. The law of absolute right can take 
no cognizance of pain, save the cognizance 
implied by negation. Pain is the correlative 
of some species of wrong — some kind of 
divergence from that course of action which 
perfectly fulfills all requirements. If, as was 
shown in an early chapter, the conception of 
good conduct always proves, when analyzed, 
to be the conception of a conduct wh'ch pro- 
duces a surplus of pleasure somewhere ; 
while conversely the conduct conceived as 
bad proves always to be that which inflicts 
somewhere a surplus of either positive or 
negative pain; then the absolutely good, the 
absolutely right, in conduct, can be that only 
which produces pure pleasure — pleasure un- 
alloyed with pain anywhere. By implication 
conduct which has any concomitant of pain, 
or any painful consequence, is partially 
wrong; and the highest claim to be made 
for such conduct is, that it is the least wrong 
which, under the conditions, is possible — the 
relatively right. 

The contents of preceding chapters imply 
throughout that, considered from the evolu- 
tion point of view, the acts of men during 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



the transition which has been, is still, and 
long will be in progress, must, in most cases, 
be of the kind here classed as least wrong. 
In proportion to the incongruity between 
the natures men inherit from the pre-social 
state, and the requirements of social life, 
must be the amouut of pain entailed by their 
actions, either on themselves or on others. 
In so far as paiu is suffered, evil is inflicted; 
and conduct which inflicts any evil cannot 
be absolutely good. 

To make clear the distinction here insisted 
upon between that perfect conduct which is 
the subject-matter of absolute ethics, and 
that imperfect conduct which is the subject- 
matter of relative ethics, some illustrations 
must be given. 

§ 102. Among the best examples of abso- 
lutely right actions to be named are those 
arising where the nature and the requirement 
have been moulded to one another before 
social evolution began. Two will here suffice. 

Consider the relation of a healthy mother 
to a healthy infant. Between the two there 
exists a mutual dependence which is a source 
of pleasure to both. In yielding its natural 
food to the child, the mother receives grati- 
fication; and to the child there comes the 
•atisfaction of appetite — a satisfaction which 
accompanies furtherance of life, growth, and 
increasing enjoyment. Let the relation be 
suspended, and on both sides there is suffer- 
ing. The mother experiences both bodiiy 
pain and mental paiu; and the painful sen- 
sation borne by the child brings as its results 
physical mischief and some damage to the 
emotional nature. Thus the act is one that 
is to both exclusively pleasurable, while ab- 
stention entails pain on both; and it is con- 
sequently of the kind we here call absolutely 
right. In the parental relations of the father 
we are furnished with a kindred example. 
If he is well constituted in body and mind, 
his boy, eager for play, finds in him a sym- 
pathetic response; and their frolics, giving 
mutual pleasure, not only further the child's 
physical welfare but strengthen that bond of 
good feeling between the two which makes 
subsequent guidance easier. And then if, 
repudiating the stupidities of early educa- 
tion as at present conceived and unhappily 
State-enacted, he has rational ideas of mental 
development, and sees that the second-hand 
knowledge gained through books should be- 
gin to supplement the first-hand knowledge 
gained by direct observation, only when a 
good stock of this has been acquired, he will, 
with active sympathy, aid in that explora- 
tion of the surrounding world which his boy 
pursues with delight; giving and receiving 
gratification from moment to moment while 
furthering ultimate welfare. Here, again, 
are actions of a kind purely pleasurable alike 
ill their immediate and remote effects — ac- 
tions absolutely right. 

The intercourse of adults yields, for the 
reason assigned, relatively few cases that 
fall completely within the same category. 
In their transactions from hour to hour, more 
or less of deduction from pure gratification 



is caused on one or other side by imperfect 
fitness to the requirements. The pleasures 
men gain by laboring in their vocations and 
receiving in one form or other returns for 
their services, usually have the drawback 
that the labors are in a considerable degree 
displeasurable. Cases, however, do occur 
where the energies are so abundant that in- 
action is irksome; and where the daily work, 
not too great in duration, is of a kind ap- 
propriate to the nature; and where, as a 
consequence, pleasure rather than pain is a 
concomitant. When services yielded by 
such a one are paid for by another similarly 
adapted to his occupation, the entire transac- 
tion is of the kind we are here considering: 
exchange under agreement between two so 
constituted, become a means of pleasure to 
both, with no set-off of pain. Bearing in 
mind the form of nature which social disci- 
pline is producing, as shown in the contrast 
between savage and civilized, the implica- 
tion is that ultimately men's activities at 
large will assume this character. Remem- 
bering that in the course of organic evolu- 
tion, the means to enjoyment themselves 
eventual!}' become sources of enjoyment; 
and that there is no form of action which 
may not through the development of appro- 
priate structures become pleasurable; the 
inference must be that industrial activities 
carried on through voluntary co-operation, 
will in time acquire the character of ab- 
solute rightness as here conceived. Al- 
ready, indeed, something like such a state 
has been reached among certain of those 
who minister to our aesthetic gratifications. 
The artist of genius — poet, painter, or musi- 
cian — is one who obtains the means of living 
by acts that are directly pleasurable to him, 
while they yield, immediately or remotely, 
pleasures to others. Once more, among ab- 
solutely right acts may be named certain of 
those which we class as benevolent. I say 
certain of them, because such benevolent 
acts as entail submission to pain, positive or 
negative, that others may receive pleasure, 
are, by the definition, excluded. But there 
are benevolent acts of a kind yielding pleas- 
ure solely. Some one who has slipped is 
saved from falling by a bystander: a hurt is 
prevented and satisfaction is felt by both. A 
pedestrian is choosing a dangerous route, or 
a fellow-passenger is about to alight at the 
wrong station, and warned against doing so, 
is saved from evil: each being, as a con* 
sequence, gratified. There is a misunder- 
standing between friends, and one who sees 
how it has arisen, explains: the result being 
agreeable to all. Services to those around 
in the small affairs of life, may be, and oft< n 
are. of a kind which there is equal pleasure 
in giving and receiving. Indeed, as was 
urged in the last chapter, the actions of de- 
veloped altruism must habitually have this 
character. And so, in countless ways sug- 
gested by these few, men may add to one 
another's happiness without anywhere pro- 
ducing unhappiness — ways which are there- 
fore absolutely right. 



560 ' THE DATA OP ETHICS. 



In contrast with these consider the many 
actions which from hour to hour are goue 
through, now with an accompaniment of 
some pain to the actor and now bringing re - 
sults that are partially painful to others, hut 
which nevertheless are imperative. As im- 
plied by antithesis with cases above referred 
to, the wearisomeness of productive labor as 
ordinarily pursued renders it in so far wrong; 
but then far greater suffering would result, 
both to the laborer and his family, and there- 
fore far greater wrong would be done, were 
this wearisomeness not borne. Though the 
pains which the care of many childreu en- 
tail on a mother form a considerable set off 
from the pleasures secured by them to her 
children and herself, yet the miseries, im- 
mediate and remote, which neglect would 
entail so far exceed them, that submission to 
such pains up to the limit of physical ability 
to bear them, becomes morally imperative as 
being the least wrong. A servant who fails 
to fulfil an agreement in respect of work, or 
who is perpetually breaking crockery, or 
who pilfers, may have to suffer pain from 
being discharged; but since the evils to be 
borne by all concerned if incapacity or mis- 
conduct is tolerated, not in one case only, 
but habitually, must be much greater, such 
infliction of pain is warranted as a means to 
preventing greater pain. "Withdrawal of 
custom from a tradesman whose charges are 
too high, or whose commodities are interior, 
or who gives short measure, or who is un- 
punctusJ, decreases his welfare and perhaps 
injures his belongings; but as saving him 
from these evils would imply bearing the 
evils his conduct causes, and as such regard 
for his well-being would imply disregard of 
the well-being of some more worthy or more 
efficient tradesman to whom the custom 
would else go, and as, chiefly, general adop- 
tion of the implied course, having the effect 
that the inferior would not suffer from their 
inferiority nor the superior gain of their 
superiority, would produce universal misery, 
withdrawal is justified — the act is relatively 
right. 

§ 103. I pass now to the second of the two 
propositions above enuueiated. After recog- 
nizing the truth that a large part of hu- 
man conduct is not absolutely right, but 
only relatively right, we have to recognize 
the further truth that in many cases where 
there is no absolutely right course, but only 
courses that are more or less wrong, it is not 
possible to say which is the least wrong. 
Recurrence to the instances just given will 
show this. 

There is a point up to which it is relatively 
right for a parent to carry self-sacrifice for 
the benefit of offspring; and there is a point 
beyond which self-sacrifice cannot be pushed 
without bringing, not only on himself or 
herself, but also on the family, evils greater 
than those to be prevented by the self-sacri- 
fice. Who shall say where this point is? 
Depending on the constitutions and needs of 
those concerned, it is in no two cases the 
eame, and cannot be by any one more than 



guessed. The transgressions or shortcomings 
of a servant vary from the trivial to the 
grave, and the evils which discharge may 
bring range through countless degrees from 
slight to serious. The penalty may be in- 
flicted for a very small offence, and then 
there is wrong done ; or after numerous grave 
offences it may not be inflicted, and agaiu 
there is wrong done. How shall be deter- 
mined the degree of transgression beyond 
which to discharge is less wrong than not to 
discharge? In like manner with the shop- 
keeper's misdemeanors. No one can sum 
up either the amount of positive and nega- 
tive pain which tolerating them involves, 
nor the amount of positive and negative 
pain involved by not tolerating them; and 
in medium cases no one can say where the 
one exceeds the other. 

Jn men's wider relations frequently occur 
circumstances under which a decision one 
or other way is imperative, and yet under 
which not even the most sensitive conscience, 
helped by the clearest judgment, can decide 
which of the alternatives is relatively right. 
Two examples will suffice. Here is a mer- 
chant who loses by the failure of a man in- 
debted to him. Unless he gets help, he 
himself will fail; and if he fails he will bring 
disaster not only on his family but on all 
who have given him credit. Even if by 
borrowing he is enabled to meet immediate 
engagements, he is not safe; for the time is 
one of panic, and others of his debtors by 
going to the wall may put him in further 
difficulties. Shall lie ask a friend for aloan? 
On the one hand, is it not wrong forthwith 
to bring on himself, his family, and those 
who have business relations with him, the 
evils of his failure? On the other hand, is 
it not wrong to hypothecate the property 
of his friend, and lead him too, with his 
belongings and dependants, into similar 
risks? The loan would probably tide him 
over his difficulty; in which case, would it 
not be unjust to his creditors did he refrain 
from asking it? Contrariwise, the loau 
would very possibly fail to stave off his 
bankruptcy: in which case is not his action 
in trying to obtain it practically fraudulent? 
Though in extreme cases it. may be easy to 
say which course is the least wrong, how ia 
it possible in all those medium cases, where 
even by the keenest man of business the 
contingencies cannot be calculated? Take, 
again, the difficulties that not ^infrequently 
arise from antagonism between family duties 
and social duties. Here is a tenant farmer 
whose political principles prompt him to 
vote in opposition to his landlord. If, being 
a Liberal, he votes for a Conservative, not 
only does he by his act say that lie thinks 
what he does not think, but he may perhaps 
assist what he regards as bad legislation ; his 
vote may by chance turn the election, and 
on a Parliamentary division a single mem- 
ber may decide the fate of a measure. Even 
neglecting, as too improbable, such serious 
consequences, there is the manifest truth 
that if all who hold like views with himself 



TUE DATA OF ETIIlOfl. 



CGI 



are similarly deteiTcd from electoral ex- 
pression of them, there must result a different 
balance of power and a different national 

Eolicy: making it clear that only by ad- 
erence of all to their political principles 
can the policy be thinks right be maintained. 
But now, on the other hand, how can he 
absolve himself from responsibility for the 
evils winch those depending on him may 
suffer if he fulfils what appears to be a 

Eeremptory public duty? Is not his duty to 
is children even more peremptory? Does 
not the family precede tbe Stale; and does 
not the welfare of the State depend on the 
■welfare of the family? May he, then, take 
a course which, if the threats uttered are 
carried out, will eject him from his farm; 
and so cause inability, perhaps temporary, 
perhaps prolonged, to feed bis children. 
The contingent evils are infinitely varied in 
their ratios." In one case the imperativeness 
of the public duty is great and the evil that 
may come on dependants small ; in another 
case the political issue is of trivial moment 
aud tbe possible injury which tbe family 
may suffer is great; and between these ex- 
tremes there are all gradations. Further, 
the degrees of probability of each result, 
public aud private, range from the nearly 
certain to the almost impossible. Admit- 
ting, then, that it is wrong to act in a way 
likely to injure the state, and admitting that 
it is wrong to act in a way likely to injure 
the family, we have to recognize the fact 
that in countless cases no one can decide by 
which of the alternative courses the least 
wrong is likely to be done. 

These instances will sufficiently show that 
in conduct at large, including men's dealings 
with themselves, with their families, with 
their friends, with their debtors and credi- 
tors, and with the public, it usually happens 
that whatever course is taken entails some 
pain somewhere; forming a deduction from 
the pleasure achieved, and making tbe course 
in so far not absolutely right. Further, 
they will show that throughout a consider- 
able part of conduct, no guiding principle, 
no method of estimation, enables us to say 
whether a proposed course is even relaiively 
right, as causing, proximately and remotely, 
specially and generally, the greatest surplus 
>f good over evil. 

§ 104. And now we are prepared for deal- 
ing in a systematic way with tbe distinction 
between absolute ethics and relative ethics. 
Scientific trulhs, of whatever order, are 
reached by eliminating perturbing or con- 
flicting factors, and recognizing otdy funda- 
mental factors. When, by dealing with 
fundamental factors in the abstract, not as 
presented in actual phenomena, but as pre- 
sented in ideal separation, general laws have 
been ascertained, it becomes possible to draw 
inferences in concrete cases by taking into 
account incidental factors. But it is only 
by first ignoring these and recognizing the 
essential elements alone, that we can dis- 
cover the essential truths sought. Take, in 



illustration, the progress of mechanics frcm 
its empirical form to its rational form. 

All have occasional experience of the fac t 
that a person pushed on one side beyond a 
certain degree loses his balance and i alls. It 
is observed that a stone flung or an arrow 
shot does not proceed in a straight line, but 
comes to the earth after pursuing a course 
which deviates more aDd more from its origi- 
nal course. When trying to break a stick 
across the knee, it is found that success is 
easier if the stick is seized at considerable 
distances from the knee on each side than if 
seized close to tbe knee. Daily use of a spear 
draws attention to the truth that by thrust- 
ing its point under, a stone and depressing; 
the shaft, tbe stone may be raised the more 
readily the further away the hand is toward, 
the end. Here, then, are sundry experiences, 
eventually grouped into empirical general i- 
zations, which serve to guide conduct in 
certain simple cases. How does mechanical' 
science evolve from these experiences? To- 
reach a formula expressing the powers of the- 
lever, it supposes a lever which does not,, 
like the stick, admit jf being beet, but is- 
absolutely rigid; and it supposes a fulcrum 
not having a broad surface, like that of one- 
ordinarily used, but a fulcrum without- 
breadth; and it supposes that the weight to- 
be raised bears on a definite point, instead of 
bearing over a considerable portion of the- 
lever. Similarly with the leaning body,, 
which, passing a certain inclination, over- 
balances. Before the truth respecting tbe re- 
lations of centre of gravity and base cau be- 
formulated, it must be assumed that the sur- 
face on which the body stands is unyielding,, 
that the edge of the body itself is unyielding,, 
and that its mass, while made to lean more and 
more, does not change its form — conditions, 
not fulfilled in the cases commonly observed. 
And so, too, is it with the projectile: deter- 
mination of its course by deduction from 
mechanical laws primarily ignores all devia- 
tions caused by its shape and by the resist- 
ance of tbe air. The science of rational mo- 
chanics is a science which consists of such' 
ideal truths, and can come into existence- 
only by thus dealing with ideal cases. It re- 
mains impossible so long as attention is re- 
stricted to concrete cases presenting all the 
complications of friction, plasticity, and so> 
forth. But now, after disentangling certain 
fundamental mechanical truths, it becomea 
possible by their help to guide actions better; 
and it becomes possible to guide them still 
better when, as presently happens, the com- 
plicating elements from which they have- 
been disentangled are themselves taken into 
account. At an advanced stage, the modify- 
ing effects of friction are allowed for, audi 
the inferences are qualified to the requisite- 
extent. Tbe theory of the pulley is corrected 
in its application to actual cases by recogniz- 
ing the rigidity of cordage; the effects of 
which are formulated. The stabilities of 
masses, determinable in the abstract by 
reference to the centres of gravity of the 



562 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



masses in relation to the bases, come to be 
determined in the concrete by including also 
their characters in respect of cohesion. The 
courses of projectiles having been theoreti- 
cally settled as though they moved through 
a vacuum, are afterward settled in more 
exact correspondence with fact by taking 
into account atmospheric resistance. And 
thus we see illustrated the relation between 
certain absolute truths of mechanical science, 
and certain relative truths which involve 
them. We are shown that no scientific es- 
tablishment of relative truths is possible, 
until the absolute truths have been formu- 
lated independently. We see that mechani- 
cal science fitted for dealing with the real, 
•cau arise only after ideal mechanical science 
lias arisen. 

All this holds of moral science. As by 
•early and rude experiences there were indue- 
lively reached, vague but partially true no- 
tions respecting the overbalancing of bodies, 
tthe motions of missiles, the actions of levers; 
#o by early and rude experiences there were 
inductively reached, vague but partially true 
.notions respecting the effects of men's be- 
havior on themselves, on one another, and 
•on society: to a certain extent serving in the 
Inst ease, as in the first, for the guidance of 
conduct. Moreover, as this rudimentary 
rnechauical knowledge, though still remain- 
ing empirical, becomes during early stages 
•of civilization at once more definite and 
more extensive; so during early stages of 
•civilization these ethical ideas, still retaining 
their empirical character, increase in pre- 
cision and multiplicity. But just as we 
have seen that mechanical knowledge of the 
•empirical sort can evolve into mechanical 
science, only by first omitting all qualifying 
circumstances, and generalizing in absolute 
ways the fundamental laws of forces; so here 
we have to see that empirical ethics can 

■ evolve into rational ethics only by first 
neglecting all complicating incidents, and 
formulating the laws of right action apart 
from the obscuring effects of special condi- 
tions. And the final implication is that just 
as the system of mechanical truths, conceived 
in ideal separation as absolute, becomes ap- 
plicable to real mechanical problems in such 
way that making allowance for all inciden- 
tal circumstances there can be reached con- 

■ elusions far nearer to the truth than could 
'Otherwise be reached; so, a system of ideal 
ethical truths, expressing the absolutely 
right, will be applicable to the questions of 
our transitional state in such ways that, al- 
lowing for the friction of an incomplete life 
.and the imperfection of existing natures, we 
may ascertain with approximate correctness 
what is the relatively right. 

§105. In a chapter entitled "Definition 
•of Morality" in " Social Statics" I contended 
that the moral law, properly so called, is 
iiic law of the perfect man — is the formula 
of ideal conduct — is the statement in all 
fuses of that which should be, and cannot 
ncognize in its propositions any elements 
i.nplying existence of that which should not 



be. Instancing questions concerning th* 
right course to be taken in cases wher« 
wrong has already been done, I alleged itiiA. 
the answers to such questions cannot lie 
given "on purely ethical principles." I ar- 
gued that — 

"No conclusions can lay claim to absolute 
truth, but such as depend upon truths that 
are themselves absolute. Before there can 
be exactness in an inference, there must be 
exactness in the antecedent propositions. A 
geometrician requires that the straight lines 
with which he deals shall be veritably 
straight; and that his circles, and ellipses, 
and parabolas, shall agree with precise defi- 
nitions — shall perfectly and invariably an- 
swer to specified equations. If you put to 
him a question in which these conditions 
are not complied with, he tells you that it 
cannot be answered. So likewise is it with 
the philosophical moralist. He treats solely 
of the straight man. He determines the 
properties of the straight man; describes 
how the straight man comports himse'f; 
shows in what relationship he stands to other 
straight men; shows how a community of 
straight men is constituted. Any deviation 
from strict rectitude he is obliged wholly to 
ignore. It cannot be admitted into his prem- 
ises without vitiating all his conclusion-'. 
A problem in which a crooked man forms 
one of the elements is insoluble by him." 

Referring to this view, specifically in the 
first edition of the "Methods of Ethics," 
but more generally in the second edition, Mr. 
Sidgwick says: 

" Those who take this view adduce the 
analogy of geometry to show that ethics 
ought to deal with ideally perfect human 
relations, just as geometry treats of ideally 
perfect lines and circles. But the most 
irregular line has definite spatial relatious 
with which geometry does not refuse to deal . 
though of course they are more complex than 
those of a straight line. So in astronomy, 
it would be more convenient for purposes of 
study if the stars moved in circles, as was 
once believed; but the fact that they move 
not in circles but in ellipses, and even in 
imperfect and perturbed ellipses, does not 
take them out of the sphere of scientific in- 
vestigation: by patience and industry we 
have learned how to reduce to principles 
and calculate even these more complicated 
motions. It is, no doubt, a convenient arti- 
fice for purposes of instruction to assume 
that the planets move in perfect ellipses (or 
even — at an earlier stage of study — in cir- 
cles); we thus allow the individual's know- 
ledge to pass through the same gradations 
in accuracy as that of the race has done. 
But what we want, as astronomers, to know 
is the actual motion of the stars and it* 
causes; and similarly as moralists we natu- 
rally inquire what ought to be done in the 
actual world in which we live." P. 19. Sett 
Ed. 

Beginning with the first of these two state- 
ments, which concerns geometry, I muni 
confess myself surprised to find my propohl- 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



363 



♦ions called in question, and after full con- 
sideration I remain at a loss to understand 
Mr. Sidgwick's mode of viewing the matter. 
When, in a sentence preceding those quoted 
above, I remarked on the impossibility of 
solving "mathematically a series of prob- 
lems respecting crooked lines and broken- 
backed curves," it never occurred to me that 
I should be met by the direct assertion that 
"geometry does not refuse to deal" with 
"the most irregular line." Mr. Sidgwick 
states that an irregular line, say such as a 
child makes in scribbling, has "definite spa- 
tial relations." What meaning docs he here 
give to the word "definite." If he means 
that its relations to space at large are defi- 
nite in the sense that by an infinite intelli- 
gence they would be definable, the reply is 
that to an infinite intelligence all spatial re- 
lations would be definable: there could be 
no indefinite spatial relations — the word 
"definite" thus ceasing to mark any distinc- 
tion. If, on the other hand, when saying 
that an irregular line has "definite spatial 
relations," he means relations knowable 
definitely by human intelligence, there still 
comes the question, How is the word "defi- 
nite" to be understood? Surely anything 
distinguished as definite admits of being 
defined; but how can we define an irregular 
line? And if we cannot define the irregular 
line itself, how can we know its "spatial 
relations" definitely? And how, in the ab- 
sence of definition, can geometry deal with 
it? If Mr. Sidgwick means that it can be 
dealt with by the "method of limits," then 
the reply is that in such case, not the line 
itself is dealt with geometrically, but certain 
definite lines artificially put in quasi-definite 
relations to it; the indefinite becomes cog- 
nizable only through ?he medium of the 
bypotheticaily-definite. 
> Turning to the second illustration, the re- 
joinder to be made is that in so far as it 
concerns the relations between the ideal and 
the real, the analogy drawn does not shake 
but strengthens my argument. For whether 
considered under its geometrical or under 
its dynamical aspect, and whether considered 
in the necessary order of its development or 
in the order historically displayed, astronomy 
shows us throughout that truths respecting 
simple, theoretically-exact relations, must be 
ascertained before truths respecting the 
complex and practically-inexact relations 
that actually exist, can be ascertained. As 
applied to the interpretation of planetary 
movements, we see that the theory of cycles 
and epicycles was based on pre-existing 
knowledge of the circle: the properties of an 
ideal curve having been learned, a power 
was acquired of giving some expression to 
the celestial motions. We see that the 
Copcrnican interpretation expressed the facts 
ju terms of circular movements otherwise 
distributed and combined. AVe see that 
Kepler's advance from the conception of 
circular movements to the conception of 
elliptic movements, was made possible by 
Comparing the facts as they are with the 



facts as they would be were the movements 
circular. We see that the subsequently- 
learned deviations from elliptic movement* 
were learned only through the pre-supposi- 
tion that the movements are elliptical. Ain't 
we see, lastly, that even now predictions 
concerning the exact positions of planets, 
after taking account of perturbations, imply 
constant references to ellipses that are re- 
garded as their normal or average orbits for 
the time being. Thus, ascertainment of the 
actual truths has been made possible only 
by prc-ascertainment of certain ideal trutlm. 
To be convinced that by no other course 
conld the actual truths have been ascertained, 
it needs only to suppose any one saying that 
it did not concern him, as an astronomer, 
to know anything about the properties of 
circles and ellipses, but that he had to had 
with the solar sj'stem as its exists, to which 
end it was his business to observe and tabu- 
late positions and directions and to be guided 
by the facts as he found them. So, too, in 
it if we look at the development of dyna- 
mical astronomy. The first proposition in 
Newton's " Principia" deals with the move- 
ment of a single body round a single centre 
of force: and the phenomena of central mo- 
tion arc first formulated in a case which is 
not simply ideal, but in which there is no 
specification of the force concerned; detach- 
ment from the real is the greatest possible. 
Again, postulating a principle of action 
conforming to an ideal law, the theory of 
gravitation deals with the several problems 
of the solar system in fictitious detachment 
from the rest; and it makes certain fictitious 
assumptions, such as that the mass of each 
body concerned is concentrated in its centre 
of gravity. Only later, after establishing 
the leading truths by this artifice of disen- 
tangling the major factors from the minor 
factors, is the theory applied to the actual 
problems in their ascending degrees of com- 
plexity: taking in more and more of the 
minor factors. And if we ask whether the 
dynamics of the solar system could have 
been established in any other way, we see 
that here, too, simple truths holding under 
ideal conditions, have to be ascertained be- 
fore real truths existing under complex con- 
dition* can-he ascertained. 

The alleged necessary precedence of abso- 
lute ethicsoverrelative ethics is thus, Ithink, 
further elucidated. One who has followed 
the general argument thus far, will not deny 
that an ideal social being may be conceived 
as so constituted that his spontaneous ac- 
tivities are congruous with the condition* 
imposed by the social environment formed 
by other such beings. In many places, and 
in various ways, I have argued that con- 
formably with." the laws of evolution in gen- 
eral, and conformably with the laws of 
organization in particular, there has been, 
and is. in progress, nn adaptation of hu- 
manity to the social state, changing it in the 
direction of such an ideal congruity. And 
the corollary before drawn and here repeal- 
ed, is that 'tire ultimate man is one in whom 



664 



THE DATA OF ETIIICS. 



this process has gone so far as to produce a 
correspondence between all the promptings 
of his nature and all the requirements of his 
life as carried on in society. If so, it is a 
necessary implication that there exists an 
ideal code of conduct formulating the be- 
havior of the completely adapted man in 
the completely evolved society. Such a 
code is that here called absolute ethics as 
distinguished from relative ethics — a code 
the injunctions of which are alone to be 
considered as absolutely right in contrast 
with those that are relatively right or least 
wrong; and which, as a system of ideal con- 
duct, is to serve as a standard for our guid- 
ance in solving, as well as we can, the 
problems of real conduct. 

§ 105. A clear conception of this matter is 
so important that I must be excused for bring- 
ing in aid of it a further illustration, more 
obviously appropriate as being furnished by 
organic science instead of by inorganic sci- 
ence. The relation between morality proper 
and morality as commonly conceived, is an- 
alogous to the relation between physiology 
and pathology ; and the course usually pur- 
sued by moralists is much like the course of 
one who studies pathology without previous 
6tudy of physiology. 

Physiology describes the various functions 
which, as combined, constitute and maintain 
life; and in treating of them it assumes that 
they are severally performed in right ways, 
in due amounts, and in proper order; it rec- 
ognizes only healthy functions. If it ex- 
plains digestion, it supposes that the heart 
is supplying blood and that the visceral ner- 
vous system is stimulating the organs imme- 
diately concerned. If it gives a theory of the 
circulation, it assumes that blood has been 
produced by the combined actions of the 
structures devoted to its production, and that 
it is properly aerated. If the relations be- 
tween respiration and the vital processes at 
large are interpreted, it is on the presupposi- 
tion that the heart goes on sending blood, 
not only to the lungs and to certain nervous 
centres, but to the diaphragm and intercostal 
muscles. Physiology ignores failures in the 
actions of these several organs. It takes no 
account of imperfections, it neglects derange- 
ments, it does not recognize pain, it knows 
nothing of vital wrong. It simply formu- 
lates that which goes on as a result of com- 
plete adaptation of all parts to all needs. 
That is to say, in relation to the inner actions 
constituting bodily life, physiological theory 
has a position like that which ethical theory, 
under its absolute form as above conceived, 
has to the outer actions constituting conduct. 
The moment cognizance is taken of excess 
of function, or arrest of function, or defect 
of function, with the resulting evil, physi- 
ology passes into patholog}'. We begin now 
to take account of wrong actions in the inner 
life analogous to the wrong actions in the 
outer life taken account of by ordinary 
theories of morals. 

The antithesis thus drawn, however, is but 
preliminary. After observing the fact that 



there is a science of vital actions normally 
carried on, which ignores abnormal actions, 
we have more especially to observe that the 
science of abnormal actions can reach such 
definiteness as is possible to it, only on con- 
dition that the science of normal actions has 
previously become definite; or rather, let us 
say, that pathological science depends for 
its advances on previous advances made by 
physiological science. The very conception 
of disordered action implies a preconception 
of well-ordered action. Before it can be de- 
cided that the heart is beating faster or slower 
than it should, its healthy rate of beating 
must be learned ; before the pulse can he 
recognized as too weak or too strong, its 
proper strength must he known; and so 
throughout. Even the rudest and most em- 
pirical ideas of diseases presuppose ideas of 
the healthy stales from which they are devia- 
tions; and obviously the diagnosis of diseases 
can become scientific only as fast as there 
arises scientific knowledge of organic actions 
that are undiseased. 

Similarly, then, is it with the relation be- 
tween absolute morality, or the Jaw of per- 
fect right in human conduct, and relative 
morality which, recognizing wrong in human 
conduct, has to decide in what way the wrong 
deviates from the right, and how the right is 
to be most nearly approached. When, for- 
mulating normal conduct in an ideal society, 
we have reached a science of absolute ethics, 
we have simultaneously reached a scienco 
which, when used to interpret the phenomena 
of real societies in Iheir transitional states, 
full of the miseries due to non-adaptation 
(which we may call pathological states) en- 
ables us to form approximately true conclu- 
sions respecting the natures of the abnormali- 
ties, and the courses which tend most in the 
direction of the normal. 

§ 106. And now let it be observed that the 
conception of ethics thus set forth, strange 
as many will think it, is one which really 
lies latent in the beliefs of moralists at large. 
Though not definitely acknowledged it is 
vaguely implied in many of their proposi- 
tions. 

From early times downward we find in 
ethical speculations, references to the ideal 
man, his acts, his feelings, his judgments. 
Well-doing is conceived by Socrates as the 
doing of "the best man," who "as a hus- 
bandman, performs well the duties of hus- 
bandry; asasurgeon, the duties of the medi- 
cal art; in political life, his duty toward the 
commonwealth." Plato, in Minos, as a stan- 
dard to which state law should conform, 
"postulates the decision of some ideal wise 
men;" and in Ladies the wise man's knowl- 
edge of good and evil is supposed to furnish 
the standard: disregarding "the maxims of 
the existing society" as unscientific. Plato 
regards as the proper guide, that "Idea of 
the Good which oi\]y a philosopher can as- 
cend to." Aristotle (Eih., Bk. iii. eh. 4), 
making the decisions of the pood man the 
standard, says: "For the good man judges 
everything rightly, and in every case the 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



565 



truth appears so to him. . . . And perhaps, 
the principal difference between the good, 
and the bad man is that the good man seesi 
the truth in every case, since he is, as it were, 
the rule and measure of it." The Stoics, too, 
conceived of " complete rectitude of action" 
as that "which none could achieve except) 
the wise man" — the ideal man. And Epi- 
curus had an ideal standard. He held the' 
Tirtuous state to be " a tranquil, undisturbed,- 
innocuous, non-competitive fruition, which 
upproached most nearly to the perfect hap- 
piness of the gods," who " neither suffered 
vexation in themselves nor caused vexation 
to others." 

If in modern times, influenced by theologi- 
cal dogmas concerning the fall and human 
sinfulness, and by a theory of obligation de- 
rived from the current creed, moralists have 
less frequently referred to an ideal, yet ref- 
erences are traceable. We see one in the 
dictum of Kant, "Act according to that 
maxim only, which you can wish, at the 
same time, to become a universal law." For 
this implies the thought of a societj' in which 
the maxim is acted upon by all, and tiniver- 
sal benefit recognized as the effect: there is 
a conception of ideal conduct under ideal 
conditions. And though Mr. Sidgwick, in 
the quotation above made from him, implies 
that ethics is concerned with man as he is, 
rather than with man as he should be; yet, 
In elsewhere speaking of ethics as dealing 
With conduct as it should be, rather than with 
conduct as it is, he postulates ideal conduct 
and indirectly the ideal man. On his first 
page, speaking of ethics along with jurispru- 
dence and politics, he says that they are dis- 
tinguished " by the characteristic that they 
attempt to determine not the actual but the 
ideal — what ought to exist, not what does 
exist." 

It requires only that these various concep- 
tions of an ideal conduct and of an ideal hu- 
manity should be made consistent and defi- 
nite, to bring them into agreement with the 
conception above set forth. At present such 
conceptions are habitually vague. The ideal 
man having been conceived in terms of the 
current morality, is thereupon erected into a 
moral standard by which the goodness of ac- 
tions may be judged; and the reasoning be- 
comes circular. To make the ideal man 
serve as a standard, he lias to be defined in 
terms of the conditions which his nature ful- 
fils — in terms of those objective requirements 
which must be met before conduct can be 
right; and the common defect of these con- 
ceptions of the ideal man is that they sup- 
pose him out of relation to such conditions. 

All the above references to him, direct or 
indirect, imply that the ideal man is sup- 
posed to live and act under existing social 
conditions. The tacit inquiry is, not what 
his actions would be under circumstances 
altogether changed, but what they would be 
under present circumstances. And this in- 
quiry is futile for two reasons. The co-ex- 
istence of a perfect man and an imperfect 
society is impossible; and could the two co- 



exist, the resulting conduct would not fur- 
nish the ethical standard sought. In the 
first place, given the laws of life as they are, 
and a man of ideal nature cannot be pro- 
duced in a society consisting of men having 
natures remote from the ideal. As well 
might we expect a child of English type to 
be born among negroes, as expect that 
among the organically immoral, one who is 
organically moral will arise. Unless it be 
denied that character results from inherited 
structure, it must be admitted that since, in 
any society, each individual descends from 
a stock which, traced back a few generations, 
ramifies everywhere through the society, 
and participates in its average nature, there 
must, notwithstanding marked individual 
diversities, be preserved such community as 
prevents any one from reaching an ideal 
form while the rest remain far below it. In 
the second place, ideal conduct, such as 
ethical theory is concerned with, is not pos- 
sible for the ideal man in the midst of men 
otherwise constituted. An absolutely just 
or perfectly sympathetic person could not 
live and act according to his nature in a 
tribe of cannibals. Amonjr people who are 
treacherous and utterly without scruple, en- 
tire truthfulness and openness must bring 
ruin. If all around recognize only the law 
of the strongest, one whose nature will not 
allow him to inflict pain on others, must go 
to the wall. There requires a certain con- 
gruity between the conduct of each member 
of a society and others' conduct. A mode of 
action entirely alien to the prevailing modes 
of action cannot be successfully persisted in 
— must eventuate in death of self, or poster- 
ity, or both. 

Hence it is manifest that we must consider 
the ideal man as existing in the ideal social 
state. On the evolution-hypothesis, the two 
presuppose one another; and only when they 
co-exist can there exist that ideal conduct 
which absolute ethics has to formulate, and 
which relative ethics has to take as the stan- 
dard by which to estimate divergences from 
right, or degrees of wrong. 



CHAPTER XVI. 

THE SCOPE OF ETHICS. 

§ 107. At the outset it was shown that as 
the conduct with which ethics deals is a part 
of conduct at large, conduct at large must 
be understood before this part can be under- 
stood. After taking a general view of con- 
duct, not human only but sub-humau, and 
not only as existing but as evolving, we saw 
that ethics has for its subject matter the most 
highly-evolved conduct as displayed by the 
most highly-evolved being, man — is a spe- 
cification of those traits which his conduct 
assumes on reaching its limit of evolution. 
Conceived thus as comprehending the laws 
of right living at large, ethics has a wider 
field than is commonly assigned to it. Be- 
yond the conduct commonly approved or 



ES6 



THE DAT A' OF ETHICS. 



reprobated as right or wrong, it includes all 
conduct which furthers or hinders, in either 
direct or indirect ways, the welfare of self or 
others. 

As foregoing chapters in various places 
imply, the entire field of ethics includes the 
two great divisions, personal and social. 
There is a class of actions directed to per- 
sonal ends, which are to be judged in their 
relations to personal well-being, considered 
apart from the well-being of otliers: 1 hough 
they secondarily affect fellow-men, these 
primarily affect the agent himself, and must 
be classed as intrinsically right or wrong ac- 
cording to their beneficial or detrimental ef- 
fects on him. There are actions of another 
class which affect fellow-men immediately 
and remotely.and which, though their results 
to self are not to be ignored, must be judged 
jus good or bad mainly by their results to 
others. Actions of this last class fall into two 
groups. Those of the one group achieve 
ends in ways that do or do not unduly inter- 
fere with the pursuit of ends by others — ac- 
tions which, because of this difference, we 
call respectively unjust or just. Those form- 
ing the other group are of a kind which 
influence the states of otliers without directly 
interfering with the relations between their 
labors and the results, in one way or the 
other — actions which we speak of as benefi- 
cent or maleficent. And the conduct which 
we regard as beneficent is itself subdivisible 
according as it shows us a self-repression to 
avoid giving pain, or an expenditure of ef- 
fort to give pleasure — negative beneficence 
and positive beneficence. 

Each of these divisions and subdivisions 
has to he considered first as a part of absolute 
ethics and then as a part of relative ethics. 
Having seen what its injunctions must be 
for the ideal man under the implied ideal 
conditions, we shall be prepared to see how 
such injunctions are to be most nearly ful- 
filled by actual men under existing condi- 
tions. 

§ 108. For reasons already pointed out, a 
code of perfect personal conduct can never 
be made definite. Many forms of life, di- 
verging from one another in considerable 
<le<rrees, may be so carried on in society as 
entirely to fulfil the conditions to harmoni- 
ous co-operation. And if various types of 
men adapted to various types of activities 
may thus lead lives that are severally com- 
plete after their kinds, no specific statement 
of the activities universally required for per- 
sonal well-being is possible. 

But though the particular requirements to 
be fulfilled for perfect individual well-being 
must vary along with variations in the ma- 
terial conditions of each society, certain gen- 
eral requirements have to be fulfilled by the 
individuals of all societies An average bal- 
ance between waste and nutrition has uni- 
versally to be preserved. Normal vitality 
implies a relation between activity and rest 
falling within moderate limits of variation. 
Continuance of the society depends on satis- 
faction of those primarily personal needs 



which result in marriage and parenthood. 
Perfection of individual life hence implies 
certain modes of action which are approxN 
raately alike in all cases, and which therefore 
become part of the subject-matter of ethics. 

That it is possible to reduce even this re- 
stricted part to scientific definiteness. can 
scarcely be said. But ethical requirements 
may here be to such extent affiliated upon 
physical necessities as to give them a par- 
tially scientific authority. It is clear that 
between the expenditure of bodily substance . 
in vital activities and the taking in of mate- 
rials from which this substance may be re- 
newed, there is a direct relation. It is clear, 
too, that there is a direct relation between 
the wasting of tissue by effort and the need 
for those cessations of effort during which 
repair may overtake waste. Nor is it less 
clear that between the rate of mortality and 
the rate of multiplication in any society there 
is a relation such that the last must reach a 
certain level before it can balance the first, 
and prevent disappearance of the society. 
And it may be inferred that pursuits of other 
leading ends are, in like manner, determined 
by certain natural necessities, and from these 
derive their ethical sanctions. That it will 
ever he practicable to lay down precise rules 
for private conduct in conformity with such 
requirements may be doubted. But the 
function of absolute ethics in relation to 
private conduct will have been discharged 
when it has produced the warrant for its re- 
quirements as generally expressed, when it 
has shown the imperativeness of obedience 
to them, and when it has thus taught i lie 
need for deliberately considering whether the 
conduct fulfils them as well as may be. 

Under the ethics of personal conduct con- 
sidered in relation to existing conditions, 
have to come all questions concerning the 
degree in which immediate personal welfare 
has to be postponed, either to ultimate per- 
sonal welfare or to the welfare of others. 
As now carried on, life hourly sets the 1 
claims of present self against Ihe claims of 
future self, and hourly brings individual in- 
terests face to face with the interests of other 
individuals, taken singly or as associated. 
In many of such cases the decisions can lie 
nothing more than compromises; aud ethical 
science, here necessarily empirical, can do 
no more than aid in making compromises 
that are the least objectionable. To arrive 
at the best compromise in any case implieji 
correct conceptions of the alternative results 
of this or that course. And, consequently, 
in so far as the absolute ethics of individual 
conduct can be made definite, it must help 
us to decide between conflicting personal re- 
quirements and also between the needs for 
asserting self and the needs for subordinat- 
ing self. 

§ 109. From that division of ethics which 
deals with the right regulation of private 
conduct, considered apart from the - effect 8 
directly produced on others, we'pass now to 
that division of ethics which, considering 
exclusively the effect of conduct en others, 



THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



567 



treats of the right regulation of it -with a 
view to such effects. 

The first set of regulations coming under 
this head are those concerning what we dis- 
tinguish as justice. Individual life is pos- 
sible only on condition that each organ is 
paid for its action by an equivalent of blood, 
while the organism as a whole obtains from 
the environment assimilable matters that 
compensate for its efforts; and the mutual 
dependence of parts in the social organism 
necessitates that, alike for its total life and 
the lives of its units, there similarly shall be 
maintained a due proportion between returns 
and labors: the natural relation between 
work and welfare shall be preserved intact. 
Justice, which formulates the range of con- 
duct and limitations to conduct hence aris- 
ing, is at once the most important division 
of ethics and the division which admits of 
tiie greatest defiuiteness. That principle of 
equivalence which meets us when we seek 
its roots in the laws of individual life in- 
volves the idea of measure; and on passing 
to social life, the same principle introduces 
us to the conception of equity or equalness, 
in the relations of citizens to one another: 
the elements of the questions arising are 
quantitative, and hence the solutions assume 
a more scientific form. Though, having to 
recognize differences among individuals due 
to age, sex, or other cause, we cannot regard 
the members of a society as absolutely equal, 
and therefore cannot deal with problems 
growing out of their relations with that pre- 
cision which absolute equality might make 
possible, yet. considering them as approxi- 
mately equal in virtue of their common 
human nature, and dealing with questions 
of equity on this supposition, we may reach 
conclusions of a sufficiently definite kind. 

This division of ethics, considered under 
its absolute form, has to define the equitable 
relations among perfect individuals who 
limit one another's spheres of action by co- 
existing, and who achieve their ends by co- 
operation. It has to do much more than 
this. Beyond justice between man and man, 
justice between each man and the aggregate 
of men has to be dealt with by it. The re- 
lations between the individual and the state, 
considered as representing all individuals, 
have to be deduced — au important and a 
relatively difficult matter. What is the 
einical warrant for governmental authorit}'? 
To what ends may it be legitimately exer- 
cised? How far may it rightly be carried? 
Up to what point is the citizen bound to 
recognize the collective decisions of other 
citizens, and beyond what point may he 
properly refuse to obey them? 

These relations, private and public, con- 
. sidered as maintained under ideal conditions, 
having been formulated, there come to be 
dealt with the analogous relations under real 
conditions — absolute justice being the stand- 
ard, relative justice has to be determined by 
considering how near an approach may, 
under present circumstances, be made to it. 
As already implied in various places, it is 



impossible during stages of transition which 
necessitate ever-changing compromises to 
fulfil the dictates of absolute equity; and 
nothing beyond empirical judgments can be 
formed of the extent to which they may be, 
at any given time, fulfilled. "While war con- 
tinues and injustice is done between socie- 
ties, there cannot be anything like complete 
justice within each society. Militant organi- 
zation no less than militant action is irrecon- 
cilable witli pure equity; and the inequity 
implied by it inevitably ramifies throughout 
ail social relations. But there is at every 
stage in social evolution a certain range of 
variation within which it is possible to ap- 
proach nearer to or diverge further from the 
requirements of absolute equity. Hence 
these requirements have ever to be kept in 
view, that relative equity may be ascer- 
tained. 

§ 110. Of the two subdivisions into which 
beneficence falls, the negative and the posi- 
tive, neither can be specialized. Under ideal 
conditions the first of them has but a nominal 
existence; and the second of them passes 
largely into a transfigured form admitting 
of but general definition. 

In t he conduct of the ideal among ideal 
men, that self-regulation which has for its 
motive to avoid giving pain practically dis- 
appears. No one having feelings which 
prompt acts that disagreeably affect others, 
there can exist no code of restraints refer- 
ring to this division of conduct. 

But though negative beneficence is only 
a nominal part of absolute ethics, it is an 
actual and considerable part of relative 
ethics. For while men's natures remain im- 
perfectly adapted to social life, there must 
continue in them impulses which, causing 
in some cases the actions we name unjust, 
cause in other cases the actions we name un- 
kind — unkind now in deed and now in word ; 
and in respect of these modes of behavior, 
which, though not aggressive, give pain, 
there arise numerous and complicated prob- 
lems. Pain is sometimes given to others 
simply by maintaining an equitable claim; 
pain is at other times given by refusing a re- 
quest; and again at other times by maintain- 
ing an opinion. In these and numerous 
cases suggested by them there have to be an- 
swered the questions whether, to avoid in- 
flicting pain, personal feelings should be 
sacrificed, and how far sacrificed. Again, 
in cases of another class, pain is given not 
by a passive course, but by an active course. 
How far shall a person who has misbehaved 
be grieved by showing aversion to him? 
Shall one whose action is to be reprobated 
have the reprobation expressed to him or 
shall nothing be said? Is it right to annoy 
by condemning a prejudice which another 
displays? These and kindred queries ba*6 
to be answered after taking into account the 
immediate pain given, the possible benefit 
caused by giving it, and the possible evil 
caused by not giving it. In solving proo- 
lems of this class, the only help absolute 
ethics gives is by enforcing the cousiduia- 



868 THE DATA OF ETHICS. 



tion that inflicting more pain than is neces- 
sitated by proper self-regard, or by desire 
for another's benefit, or by the maintenance 
of a general principle, is unwarranted. 

Of positive beneficence under its absolute 
form nothing more specific can be said than 
that it must become coextensive with what- 
ever sphere remains for it; aiding to com- 
plete the life of each as a recipient of ser- 
vices and to exalt the life of each as a Ten- 
derer of services. As "with a developed 
humanity the desire for it by every one 
■will so increase, and the sphere for exercise 
of it so decrease, as to involve an altruistic 
competition, analogous to the existing ego- 
istic competition, it may be that absolute 
ethics will eventually include what we before 
called a higher equity, prescribing the mu- 
tual limitations of altruistic activities. 

Under its relative form, positive benefi- 
cence presents numerous problems, alike im- 
portant and difficult, admitting only of em- 
pirical solutions. How far is self-sacrifice 
for another's benefit to be carried in each 
case? — A question which must be answered 
differently according to the character of the 
other, the needs of the other, and the vari- 
ous claims of self and belongings which 



have to be met. To what extent under given 
circumstances shall private welfare be sub- 
ordinate to public welfare? — a question to 
be answered after considering the import- 
ance of the end and the seriousness of the 
sacrifice. What benefit and what detriment 
will result from gratuitous aid yielded to 
another? — a question in each case implying 
an estimate of probabilities. Is there any 
unfair treatment of sundry others, involved 
by more than fair treatment of this one 
other? Up to what limit may help be given 
to the existing generation of the inferior, 
without entailing mischief on future genera- 
tions of the superior? Evidently to these 
and many kindred questions included in this 
division of relative ethics, approximately 
true answers only can be given. 

But though here absolute elhics, by the 
standard it supplies, does not greatly aid 
relative ethics, yet, as in other cases, it aids 
somewhat by keeping before consciousness 
an ideal conciliation of the various claims 
involved, and by suggesting the search for 
such compromise among them as shall not 
disregard any, but shall satisfy all to tho 
greatest extent practicable. 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE 



I. — Conduct in General 475 

II. — The Evolution of Conduct 477 

III. — Good and Ba<l Conduct 431 

IV. — Ways of Judging Conduct 489 

V.— The Physical View 405 

VWThe Biological View 499 

YIT.— The Psychotoaieal View £07 

VIH.— The Sociological View. 617 



IX.— Criticisms and Explanations 523 

X.— The Relativity of f'ains and Pleasures . . 681 
XI. — Egoism versus Altruism , . . . 633 

XII. — Altruism versus Egoism t33 

XIII. — Trial and Compromise , . 548 

XIV. -Conciliation 553 

XV.— Absolute Ethics an' 1 Relative Ethics 659 

XVI.— The Scope of Ethics E6J 



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THE EVOLUTIONIST AT LARGE. 

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LANDHOLDING IN ENGLAND. 

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FASHION IN DEFORMITY, as Illus- 
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ORIENTAL RELIGIONS. 

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LECTURES ON EVOLUTION, (illus- 
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By Thomas H. Huxley. 

37. SIX LECTURES ON LIGHT, (illui- 

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38. j GEOLOGICAL SKETCHES. 
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